Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo

A recent article in the California Law Review by Professors Eric Posner and John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, argues that the only effective international tribunals are dependent tribunals, by which the authors mean ad hoc tribunals staffed by judges closely controlled by governments through the power of reappointment or threats of retaliation. Independent tribunals, by contrast, meaning tribunals staffed by judges appointed on similar terms as those in domestic courts, pose a danger to international cooperation. According to Posner and Yoo, independent tribunals are suspect because they are more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives or the interests of other states to influence their judgments. In this response, we identify the many shortcomings in the theory, methodology, and empirics in Judicial Independence in International Tribunals. We do so to challenge the authors\u27 core conjecture: that formally dependent international tribunals are correlated with effective judicial outcomes. We then offer our own counter-theory; a theory of constrained independence in which states establish independent international tribunals to enhance the credibility of their commitments and then use more fine grained structural, political, and discursive mechanisms to limit the potential for judicial excesses

Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo

A recent article in the California Law Review by Professors Eric Posner and John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, argues that the only effective international tribunals are dependent tribunals, by which the authors mean ad hoc tribunals staffed by judges closely controlled by governments through the power of reappointment or threats of retaliation. Independent tribunals, by contrast, meaning tribunals staffed by judges appointed on similar terms as those in domestic courts, pose a danger to international cooperation. According to Posner and Yoo, independent tribunals are suspect because they are more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives or the interests of other states to influence their judgments. In this response, we identify the many shortcomings in the theory, methodology, and empirics in Judicial Independence in International Tribunals. We do so to challenge the authors\u27 core conjecture: that formally dependent international tribunals are correlated with effective judicial outcomes. We then offer our own counter-theory; a theory of constrained independence in which states establish independent international tribunals to enhance the credibility of their commitments and then use more fine grained structural, political, and discursive mechanisms to limit the potential for judicial excesses

AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate : analysis

Discusses the Supreme Court decision in AXA General Insurance Ltd, Petitioners on whether Scottish legislation which reversed a House of Lords ruling concerning the actionability of certain asbestos-related conditions breached insurers' rights

The rise of self-driving cars : is the private international law framework for non-contractual obligations posing a bump in the road?

This article focusses on some implications related to the commercialisation of self-driving or autonomous cars. Such vehicles are no longer a mere futuristic idea. They could soon be available on the market. Society in general and the applicable rules in particular will undergo a transformation following the introduction of autonomous vehicles. Despite the many benefits, self-driving cars also pose several challenges. These do not only relate to technical aspects but also to the influence of the autonomisation of traffic on infrastructure and employment in different sectors. More importantly, several legal challenges will need to be addressed as well before society will be able to fully enjoy the benefits of self-driving cars. The question as to who should be held liable for damage caused by self-driving car has already been addressed in academia. Less attention has been devoted to the relationship between autonomous vehicles and the existing private international law rules in the European Union. Although the application of the current jurisdictional and conflict of laws rules does not present problems, the membership of some EU Member States of the 1971 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention and/or the 1973 Hague Products Liability Convention impedes the harmonisation of conflict of laws rules in non-contractual matters as envisaged by the Rome II Regulation. In cases concerning liability arising from traffic accidents and in product liability cases, different Member States courts sometimes apply a different national law. This reduces foreseeability and legal certainty