72 research outputs found
Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity
This dissertation explores the way in which normative facts create a problem for naturalist approaches to philosophy. How can lumpy scientific matter give rise to technicolour normativity? How can normative facts show up in the world described from a scientific perspective? In this context, I start by analysing Humeâs discussion of âisâ and âoughtâ, Mooreâs open question argument, and Kripkeâs interpretation of Wittgensteinâs rule-following considerations. I then look at the nature of philosophical naturalism in detail, arguing that is fundamentally an epistemological commitment to the norms governing scientific publications. I consider the particular examples of Penelope Maddyâs approach to naturalising logic and the instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity favoured by advocates of naturalised epistemology. I argue, however, that these approaches to naturalising normativity are unsuccessful. In the second half of the dissertation, I develop a novel account of the nature of normative facts and explain how this relates to and resolves some of the difficulties raised in the first half. The account I defend has Kantian foundations and an Aristotelian superstructure. I associate the right with the necessary preconditions for engaging in valuable activity and the good with the satisfaction of the constitutive ends of activities and practices. I explain how my theory can account for epistemic normativity and defend a virtue-based theory of epistemic evaluation. Finally, I argue against desire-based accounts of reasons and in favour of a role for the emotions in normative cognition. The view I defend is intended to be compatible with our best scientific theories. However, it is not naturalistic insofar as it is justified by distinctively philosophical methods and relies on extra-scientific considerations
Wittgensteinian epistemology and Cartesian skepticism
This work starts from three complementary and interdependent questions:
1) How should we interpret Wittgensteinâs anti-skeptical strategy as presented in On
Certainty, and especially the elusive and yet central concept of âhingesâ?
2) Can Wittgensteinâs strategy, when properly understood and developed, provide a
satisfactory response to Cartesian skepticism?
3) Does a Wittgensteinian epistemology license epistemic relativism, and if so to what
extent?
In Chapter 1, I present Cartesian-style skepticism and its epistemological implications
along with the Dretske-Nozickâs ârelevant alternativesâ theory, based on the rejection
of the Closure principle for Knowledge which underlies the skeptical challenge. After
a brief discussion of the main concerns raised against this proposal, I argue that this
line is untenable and that a successful anti-skeptical proposal has to retain Closure.
Having shown the shortcomings of the Dretske-Nozick proposal, I then focus
my attention on G. E. Mooreâs famous anti-skeptical works, namely âA Defence of
Common Senseâ (1925, henceforth DCS) and âProof of an External Worldâ, (1939,
henceforth PEW). In these seminal papers, Moore famously argued that it is possible
to know several âobvious truisms of commonsenseâ such as âThere are external
objectsâ, I have a bodyâ and so on and that this knowledge can offer a direct response
to skeptical worries; the aim of this strategy is then to retain both Closure and our
confidence in our everyday knowledge claims.
After a detailed presentation of DCS and PEW I will discuss the problems of
Mooreâs direct response against the skeptic, drawing on the works of distinguished
commentators such as Malcolm, Clarke, Stroud and Wright. Roughly, I argue that
Mooreâs strategy is both unnecessary and unconvincing: unconvincing because
Mooreâs knowledge-claims cannot refute Cartesian skeptical arguments; unnecessary
for they can âworkâ only within our everyday ânon-philosophicalâ context, thus when
no skeptical hypothesis can be sensibly raised.
Even if Mooreâs anti-skeptical attempts have unanimously been considered
unsatisfying, for several reasons his works have nonetheless been extremely
influential, to the extent that quite a few contemporary anti-skeptical proposals can be
fairly described as âMooreanâ. In Chapter 2, I present and discuss the dominant
âMoore-Inspiredâ positions, namely Pryorâs Dogmatist Reading of PEW, Netaâs
interpretation of the Proof, Grecoâs reliabilist account, Faraâs âSecond Proofâ,
DeRoseâs âMoorean contextualismâ and Sosa âNeo-Mooreanismâ. I criticise these
accounts in turn, in order to show that all these strategies inherit the main problems of
Mooreâs treatment of skepticism and also have unpalatable consequences with regard
to the so-called âvalue problem for knowledgeâ.
After having extensively criticised both Mooreâs and âNeo-Mooreanâ
epistemologies, in Chapter 3 I focus my attention on Wittgensteinâs On Certainty;
given the obscurity and ambiguity of this work, in this chapter I present some of the
less contentious aspects of Wittgensteinâs treatment of skepticism and I emphasise the
role played by âhinges â in his anti-skeptical strategy.
This will give me the background to assess the different âWittgensteininspiredâ
anti-skeptical strategies I consider in Chapter 4, namely Conantâs
âtherapeuticâ reading, Wrightâs ârational entitlementâ account, Williamsâ
âWittgensteinian contextualismâ, McGinnâs âframeworkâ reading and Pritchardâs
âhinge commitmentâ strategy. I argue that these proposals are wanting, both as
plausible interpretations of Wittgensteinâs thought and more importantly as viable
anti-skeptical strategies. Moreover, I show that McGinn and Williamsâ proposals can
lead to a form of epistemic relativism, according to which our epistemic practices are
the result of pre-rational, social commitments not subject to rational evaluation of any
sort; a conclusion which is not more palatable than skepticism itself.
Chapter 5 is devoted to presenting Moyal-Sharrockâs ânon-epistemicâ reading
of OC, for which âhingesâ such as âThere are external objectsâ or âI have a bodyâ are
the expression of a pre-theoretical, animal certainty which she sees as constitutively
different from knowledge. While I defend Moyal-Sharrockâs exegesis and her analogy
between âhingesâ and 'rules of grammarâ as the most plausible interpretation of
Wittgensteinâs thought, in this chapter I also criticise her ânon-epistemicâ account;
roughly, I argue that following this strategy we will be forced either to reject the
Closure principle, thus inheriting the problems of the Dretske-Nozickâs line, or else to
endorse skepticism. Moreover, I also consider some of the relativistic implications of
Moyal-Sharrockâs account, which make her proposal vulnerable to the same
objections I have raised against McGinnâs framework reading and Williamsâ
Wittgensteinian contextualism.
In Chapter 6, I develop my own anti-skeptical proposal, which is informed by
the analogy between âhingesâ and ârules of grammarâ and their peculiar status.
Drawing on Wittgensteinâs reflections on grammatical rules, developed in the socalled
second phase of his thought, and especially in his Philosophical Investigations,
I argue that âhingesâ cannot be object of knowledge but are subject to an altogether
different epistemic standing, namely understanding or âmastery of techniquesâ. A
promising anti-skeptical implication of this account is that it will help us to dismiss
Cartesian-style skepticism as the result of a logical error, based on a misleading way
of representing the structure of our epistemic practices, which are not based on
propositional beliefs but rather on non-propositional, normative rules.
In the rest of Chapter 6, I consider a final problem that a Wittgensteinian
epistemology so construed has to face in order to be considered a fully viable antiskeptical
position; that is, whether Wittgensteinâs account of âhingesâ would lead to
epistemic relativism of a kind that is generated by the proposals put forward by
Williams, McGinn and Moyal-Sharrock.
Chapter 7 is devoted to addressing this question in detail. Drawing on
Wittgensteinâs views on mathematics, metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show
that his remarks on âhingesâ will help us to dissolve epistemic relativism rather than
licensing it. This is so because following Wittgensteinâs remarks on the structure of
reason the disagreement between epistemic communities committed to different
âhingesâ (for instance a community which believes in oracles rather than in science) is
either solvable, as different epistemic practices can be compared and assessed if they
have similar aims, or is a pseudo-disagreement which stems from a misguided
comparison between different practices
Causation and Laws of Nature
This is the first Eng translation of Causalite´ et Lois de La Nature, and is an important contribution to the theory of causation. Max Kistler reconstructs a unified concept of causation that is general enough to adequately deal with both elementary physical processes, and the macroscopic level of phenomena we encounter in everyday life. This book will be of great interest to philosophers of science and metaphysics, and also to students and scholars of philosophy of mind where concepts of causation and law play a prominent role
Informal Logic: A 'Canadian' Approach to Argument
The informal logic movement began as an attempt to develop â and teach â an alternative logic which can account for the real life arguing that surrounds us in our daily lives â in newspapers and the popular media, political and social commentary, advertising, and interpersonal exchange. The movement was rooted in research and discussion in Canada and especially at the University of Windsor, and has become a branch of argumentation theory which intersects with related traditions and approaches (notably formal logic, rhetoric and dialectics in the form of pragma-dialectics). In this volume, some of the best known contributors to the movement discuss their views and the reasoning and argument which is informal logicâs subject matter. Many themes and issues are explored in a way that will fuel the continued evolution of the field. Federico Puppo adds an insightful essay which considers the origins and development of informal logic and whether informal logicians are properly described as a âschoolâ of thought. In considering that proposition, Puppo introduces readers to a diverse range of essays, some of them previously published, others written specifically for this volume
An Observation about Truth
Tarski's analysis of the concept of truth gives rise to a hierarchy of languages. Does this fragment the concept all the way to philosophical unacceptability? I argue it doesn't, drawing on a modification of Kaplan's theory of indexicals
Representations of Mind
After defending the view that we can read off the metaphysics of the things we talk about from the form and interpretation of the language we use to talk about things, I develop and defend an account of the form and interpretation of propositional attitude reports (and some closely related constructions) and then read off the metaphysics of propositional attitudes. Views on the metaphysics of speech acts, propositions, and propositionally articulated thoughts also fall out of the account. The result is a tightly knit sets of views which I think together solve a number of outstanding philosophical problems. Given the centrality and importance of the attitudes and reports thereof to our making sense of ourselves and others as minded beings, not to mention their centrality to many domains of philosophy, the hope is that this makes a contribution to our self-understanding. It should also be a contribution to cognitive science
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