Asynchronous Multi-Party Quantum Computation

Multi-party quantum computation (MPQC) allows a set of parties to securely compute a quantum circuit over private quantum data. Current MPQC protocols rely on the fact that the network is synchronous, i.e., messages sent are guaranteed to be delivered within a known fixed delay upper bound, and unfortunately completely break down even when only a single message arrives late. Motivated by real-world networks, the seminal work of Ben-Or, Canetti and Goldreich (STOC\u2793) initiated the study of multi-party computation for classical circuits over asynchronous networks, where the network delay can be arbitrary. In this work, we begin the study of asynchronous multi-party quantum computation (AMPQC) protocols, where the circuit to compute is quantum. Our results completely characterize the optimal achievable corruption threshold: we present an n-party AMPQC protocol secure up to t < n/4 corruptions, and an impossibility result when t ? n/4 parties are corrupted. Remarkably, this characterization differs from the analogous classical setting, where the optimal corruption threshold is t < n/3

Asynchronous Multi-Party Quantum Computation

Multi-party quantum computation (MPQC) allows a set of parties to securely compute a quantum circuit over private quantum data. Current MPQC protocols rely on the fact that the network is synchronous, i.e., messages sent are guaranteed to be delivered within a known fixed delay upper bound, and unfortunately completely break down even when only a single message arrives late. Motivated by real-world networks, the seminal work of Ben-Or, Canetti and Goldreich (STOC\u2793) initiated the study of multi-party computation for classical circuits over asynchronous networks, where the network delay can be arbitrary. In this work, we begin the study of asynchronous multi-party quantum computation (AMPQC) protocols, where the circuit to compute is quantum. Our results completely characterize the optimal achievable corruption threshold: we present an $n$-party AMPQC protocol secure up to $t<n/4$ corruptions, and an impossibility result when $t\geq n/4$ parties are corrupted. Remarkably, this characterization differs from the analogous classical setting, where the optimal corruption threshold is $t<n/3$

Chameleon: A Hybrid Secure Computation Framework for Machine Learning Applications

We present Chameleon, a novel hybrid (mixed-protocol) framework for secure function evaluation (SFE) which enables two parties to jointly compute a function without disclosing their private inputs. Chameleon combines the best aspects of generic SFE protocols with the ones that are based upon additive secret sharing. In particular, the framework performs linear operations in the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2^l}$ using additively secret shared values and nonlinear operations using Yao's Garbled Circuits or the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson protocol. Chameleon departs from the common assumption of additive or linear secret sharing models where three or more parties need to communicate in the online phase: the framework allows two parties with private inputs to communicate in the online phase under the assumption of a third node generating correlated randomness in an offline phase. Almost all of the heavy cryptographic operations are precomputed in an offline phase which substantially reduces the communication overhead. Chameleon is both scalable and significantly more efficient than the ABY framework (NDSS'15) it is based on. Our framework supports signed fixed-point numbers. In particular, Chameleon's vector dot product of signed fixed-point numbers improves the efficiency of mining and classification of encrypted data for algorithms based upon heavy matrix multiplications. Our evaluation of Chameleon on a 5 layer convolutional deep neural network shows 133x and 4.2x faster executions than Microsoft CryptoNets (ICML'16) and MiniONN (CCS'17), respectively

Classical Cryptographic Protocols in a Quantum World

Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical attackers. If we accept that quantum information processing is the most realistic model of physically feasible computation, then we must ask: what classical protocols remain secure against quantum attackers? Our main contribution is showing the existence of classical two-party protocols for the secure evaluation of any polynomial-time function under reasonable computational assumptions (for example, it suffices that the learning with errors problem be hard for quantum polynomial time). Our result shows that the basic two-party feasibility picture from classical cryptography remains unchanged in a quantum world.Comment: Full version of an old paper in Crypto'11. Invited to IJQI. This is authors' copy with different formattin

Algorithms and lower bounds for de Morgan formulas of low-communication leaf gates

The class $FORMULA[s] \circ \mathcal{G}$ consists of Boolean functions computable by size-$s$ de Morgan formulas whose leaves are any Boolean functions from a class $\mathcal{G}$. We give lower bounds and (SAT, Learning, and PRG) algorithms for $FORMULA[n^{1.99}]\circ \mathcal{G}$, for classes $\mathcal{G}$ of functions with low communication complexity. Let $R^{(k)}(\mathcal{G})$ be the maximum $k$-party NOF randomized communication complexity of $\mathcal{G}$. We show: (1) The Generalized Inner Product function $GIP^k_n$ cannot be computed in $FORMULA[s]\circ \mathcal{G}$ on more than $1/2+\varepsilon$ fraction of inputs for $$s = o \! \left ( \frac{n^2}{ \left(k \cdot 4^k \cdot {R}^{(k)}(\mathcal{G}) \cdot \log (n/\varepsilon) \cdot \log(1/\varepsilon) \right)^{2}} \right).$$ As a corollary, we get an average-case lower bound for $GIP^k_n$ against $FORMULA[n^{1.99}]\circ PTF^{k-1}$. (2) There is a PRG of seed length $n/2 + O\left(\sqrt{s} \cdot R^{(2)}(\mathcal{G}) \cdot\log(s/\varepsilon) \cdot \log (1/\varepsilon) \right)$ that $\varepsilon$-fools $FORMULA[s] \circ \mathcal{G}$. For $FORMULA[s] \circ LTF$, we get the better seed length $O\left(n^{1/2}\cdot s^{1/4}\cdot \log(n)\cdot \log(n/\varepsilon)\right)$. This gives the first non-trivial PRG (with seed length $o(n)$) for intersections of $n$ half-spaces in the regime where $\varepsilon \leq 1/n$. (3) There is a randomized $2^{n-t}$-time $\#$SAT algorithm for $FORMULA[s] \circ \mathcal{G}$, where $$t=\Omega\left(\frac{n}{\sqrt{s}\cdot\log^2(s)\cdot R^{(2)}(\mathcal{G})}\right)^{1/2}.$$ In particular, this implies a nontrivial #SAT algorithm for $FORMULA[n^{1.99}]\circ LTF$. (4) The Minimum Circuit Size Problem is not in $FORMULA[n^{1.99}]\circ XOR$. On the algorithmic side, we show that $FORMULA[n^{1.99}] \circ XOR$ can be PAC-learned in time $2^{O(n/\log n)}$