Mass Customization in Wireless Communication Services: Individual Service Bundles and Tariffs

This paper presents results on mass customization of wireless communications services and tariffs. It advocates for a user-centric view of wireless service configuration and pricing as opposed to present-day service catalog options. The focus is on design methodology and tools for such individual services and tariffs, using altogether information compression, negotiation algorithms, and risk portfolio analysis. We first analyze the user and supplier needs and aspirations. We then introduce the systematic design-oriented approach which can be applied. The implications of this approach for users and suppliers are discussed based on an end-user survey and on model-based calculations. It is shown that users can achieve desired service bundle cost reduction, while suppliers can improve significantly their risk-profit equilibrium points, reduce churn and simplify provisioning.negotiation;mass customization;service configuration;mobile communication services;individual tariffs

Broadband Openness Rules Are Fully Justified by Economic Research

This paper responds to arguments made in filings in the FCC’s broadband openness proceeding (GN Dkt. 09-191) and incorporates data made available since my January 14th filing in that proceeding. Newly available data confirm that there is limited competition in the broadband access marketplace. Contrary to some others’ arguments, wireless broadband access services are unlikely to act as effective economic substitutes for wireline broadband access services (whether offered by telephone companies or cable operators) and instead are likely to act as a complement. Nor will competition in the Internet backbone marketplace constrain broadband providers’ behavior in providing “last mile” broadband access services. The last mile, concentrated market structure, combined with high switching costs, provides last mile broadband network providers with the ability to engage in practices that will reduce social welfare in the absence of open broadband rules. Furthermore, the effect of open broadband rules on broadband provider revenues is likely to be small and can be either positive or negative. Unfortunately, various filings have misstated or mischaracterized the results on the economics of two-sided markets. Contrary to what some have argued, allowing broadband providers to charge third party content providers will not necessarily result in lower prices being charged to residential Internet subscribers. This is true under a robust set of assumptions. Despite some parties’ mischaracterization of the economic literature, price discrimination by broadband providers against third party applications and content providers will reduce societal welfare for numerous reasons. This reduction in societal welfare is especially acute when price discrimination is taken to the extreme of exclusive dealing between broadband providers and content providers. Antitrust and consumer protection laws are insufficient to protect societal welfare in the absence of open broadband rules.

An Antitrust Analysis of the Case for Wireless Network Neutrality

The ongoing debate about possible implementation of regulatory rules requiring “network neutrality” for wireless telecommunications services is inherently about whether to impose a prohibition on the ability of network operators to control their vertical relationships. Antitrust analysis is well suited to analyze whether a wireless network neutrality rule is socially beneficial. Implementing network neutrality rules would be akin to using a per se antitrust rule regarding vertical relationships instead of the rule of reason analysis typically applied to vertical relationships in antitrust. Per se rules are used to prevent actions that rarely, if ever, have any pro-competitive benefits, such as price-fixing agreements. Rule of reason analysis is used when there are potential efficiency gains from the actions under investigation. Some vertical practices of the wireless carriers, such as bandwidth restrictions, may appear to be anticompetitive, but may also have plausible efficiency justifications so should be judged under rule of reason analysis. Economic examination of the wireless industry shows significant competition between networks which reduces the concern about vertical relationships, but some areas that should be monitored by antitrust and regulatory authorities. We propose several regulatory changes that would likely increase wireless competition and lessen the perceived need for prophlactic network neutrality rules while at the same time allowing efficiency-enhancing vertical relationships.network neutrality, wireless internet, antitrust,

Evaluating a mobile telecommunications merger in Portugal

This paper evaluates the impact of the proposed Optimus-TMN mobile telecommunications merger in Portugal. The results suggest that, if the merger would have taken place, the average market profit margin would have increased by 11.6 percentage points and the average market price would have increased by 3.8%. As a consequence, the average marginal cost would have decreased by 14.9%, and welfare would have increased by €163.3mn per year, a gain entirely captured by the producers. Moreover, the merger would have resulted in a large transfer of surplus from consumers to producers, to the tune of €99.5mn per year. The conclusion is that, while the merger could have been authorized on efficiency grounds, such authorization should have been accompanied by strict retail price-cap merger remedies.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Broadband Openness Rules Are Fully Justified by Economic Research

This paper responds to arguments made in filings in the FCC’s broadband openness proceeding (GN Dkt. 09-191) and incorporates data made available since my January 14th filing in that proceeding. Newly available data confirm that there is limited competition in the broadband access marketplace. Contrary to some others’ arguments, wireless broadband access services are unlikely to act as effective economic substitutes for wireline broadband access services (whether offered by telephone companies or cable operators) and instead are likely to act as a complement. Nor will competition in the Internet backbone marketplace constrain broadband providers’ behavior in providing “last mile” broadband access services. The last mile, concentrated market structure, combined with high switching costs, provides last mile broadband network providers with the ability to engage in practices that will reduce social welfare in the absence of open broadband rules. Furthermore, the effect of open broadband rules on broadband provider revenues is likely to be small and can be either positive or negative. Unfortunately, various filings have misstated or mischaracterized the results on the economics of two-sided markets. Contrary to what some have argued, allowing broadband providers to charge third party content providers will not necessarily result in lower prices being charged to residential Internet subscribers. This is true under a robust set of assumptions. Despite some parties’ mischaracterization of the economic literature, price discrimination by broadband providers against third party applications and content providers will reduce societal welfare for numerous reasons. This reduction in societal welfare is especially acute when price discrimination is taken to the extreme of exclusive dealing between broadband providers and content providers. Antitrust and consumer protection laws are insufficient to protect societal welfare in the absence of open broadband rules.Network Neutrality, Internet, Discrimination, Prioritization, Two-Sided Market, Market Power, Termination Fee, Broadband

Bagging and boosting classification trees to predict churn.

Bagging; Boosting; Classification; Churn;

Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability

Increasing numbers of countries require mobile telephone networks to offer mobile number portability (MNP). MNP allows customers who wish to switch mobile operator to keep their mobile numbers, avoiding the costs of switching to new numbers. Ex ante assessments suggest that MNP should reduce switching costs and strengthen competition. In this paper, we test MNP’s impact on market outcomes using international time-series cross-section data. We find that MNP significantly increases average mobile telephony retail prices and churn (a proxy for switching).

Asymmetric-valued Spectrum Auction and Competition in Wireless Broadband Services

We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile network operators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Given asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price sealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOs and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game's equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market share between two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that the MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higher price, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further show that the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, it serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs

Mass Customization in Wireless Communication Services: Individual Service Bundles and Tariffs

This paper presents results on mass customization of wireless communications services and tariffs. It advocates for a user-centric view of wireless service configuration and pricing as opposed to present-day service catalog options. The focus is on design methodology and tools for such individual services and tariffs, using altogether information compression, negotiation algorithms, and risk portfolio analysis. We first analyze the user and supplier needs and aspirations. We then introduce the systematic design-oriented approach which can be applied. The implications of this approach for users and suppliers are discussed based on an end-user survey and on model-based calculations. It is shown that users can achieve desired service bundle cost reduction, while suppliers can improve significantly their risk-profit equilibrium points, reduce churn and simplify provisioning