10,741 research outputs found
Cryptanalysis of an Encryption Scheme Based on Blind Source Separation
Recently Lin et al. proposed a method of using the underdetermined BSS (blind
source separation) problem to realize image and speech encryption. In this
paper, we give a cryptanalysis of this BSS-based encryption and point out that
it is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext
attack. In addition, there exist some other security defects: low sensitivity
to part of the key and the plaintext, a ciphertext-only differential attack,
divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack on part of the key. We also discuss the role of
BSS in Lin et al.'s efforts towards cryptographically secure ciphers.Comment: 8 pages, 10 figures, IEEE forma
Chosen-Plaintext Cryptanalysis of a Clipped-Neural-Network-Based Chaotic Cipher
In ISNN'04, a novel symmetric cipher was proposed, by combining a chaotic
signal and a clipped neural network (CNN) for encryption. The present paper
analyzes the security of this chaotic cipher against chosen-plaintext attacks,
and points out that this cipher can be broken by a chosen-plaintext attack.
Experimental analyses are given to support the feasibility of the proposed
attack.Comment: LNCS style, 7 pages, 1 figure (6 sub-figures
Cryptanalysis of an MPEG-Video Encryption Scheme Based on Secret Huffman Tables
This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed MPEG-video encryption
scheme based on secret Huffman tables. Our cryptanalysis shows that: 1) the key
space of the encryption scheme is not sufficiently large against
divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack and known-plaintext attack; 2) it is possible
to decrypt a cipher-video with a partially-known key, thus dramatically
reducing the complexity of the DAC brute-force attack in some cases; 3) its
security against the chosen-plaintext attack is very weak. Some experimental
results are included to support the cryptanalytic results with a brief discuss
on how to improve this MPEG-video encryption scheme.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figure
On the Security of the Yi-Tan-Siew Chaos-Based Cipher
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis on the security of the
Yi-Tan-Siew chaotic cipher proposed in [IEEE TCAS-I 49(12):1826-1829 (2002)]. A
differential chosen-plaintext attack and a differential chosen-ciphertext
attack are suggested to break the sub-key K, under the assumption that the time
stamp can be altered by the attacker, which is reasonable in such attacks.
Also, some security Problems about the sub-keys and are
clarified, from both theoretical and experimental points of view. Further
analysis shows that the security of this cipher is independent of the use of
the chaotic tent map, once the sub-key is removed via the proposed
suggested differential chosen-plaintext attack.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures, IEEEtrans.cls v 1.
Breaking a Chaotic Cryptographic Scheme Based on Composition Maps
Recently, a chaotic cryptographic scheme based on composition maps was
proposed. This paper studies the security of the scheme and reports the
following findings: 1) the scheme can be broken by a differential attack with
chosen-plaintext, where is the size of
plaintext and is the number of different elements in plain-text; 2) the
scheme is not sensitive to the changes of plaintext; 3) the two composition
maps do not work well as a secure and efficient random number source.Comment: 9 pages, 7 figure
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