110,244 research outputs found
Does anonymity matter in electronic limit order markets ?
We analyze the effect of concealing limit order tradersâ identities on market liquidity. We develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric information on the cost of limit order trading (which is determined by the exposure to informed trading). A thin limit order book signals to uninformed bidders that the profitability of limit orders is small. This deters uninformed bidders from improving upon the posted quotes. Informed bidders exploit this effect by bidding as if the cost of liquidity provision were large when indeed it is small. This bluffing strategy is less effective when traders cannot distinguish between informative and uninformative limit orders. Hence informed bidders act more competitively in the anonymous market. For this reason, concealing limit order tradersâ IDS affects market liquidity in our model. We test this prediction using a natural experiment. On April 23, 2001, the limit order book for stocks listed on Euronext Paris became anonymous. We find that following this change, the average quoted spreads declined significantly whereas the quoted depth decreased.Market Microstructure; Limit Order Trading; Anonymity; Transparency; Liquidity
Making Code Voting Secure against Insider Threats using Unconditionally Secure MIX Schemes and Human PSMT Protocols
Code voting was introduced by Chaum as a solution for using a possibly
infected-by-malware device to cast a vote in an electronic voting application.
Chaum's work on code voting assumed voting codes are physically delivered to
voters using the mail system, implicitly requiring to trust the mail system.
This is not necessarily a valid assumption to make - especially if the mail
system cannot be trusted. When conspiring with the recipient of the cast
ballots, privacy is broken.
It is clear to the public that when it comes to privacy, computers and
"secure" communication over the Internet cannot fully be trusted. This
emphasizes the importance of using: (1) Unconditional security for secure
network communication. (2) Reduce reliance on untrusted computers.
In this paper we explore how to remove the mail system trust assumption in
code voting. We use PSMT protocols (SCN 2012) where with the help of visual
aids, humans can carry out addition correctly with a 99\% degree of
accuracy. We introduce an unconditionally secure MIX based on the combinatorics
of set systems.
Given that end users of our proposed voting scheme construction are humans we
\emph{cannot use} classical Secure Multi Party Computation protocols.
Our solutions are for both single and multi-seat elections achieving:
\begin{enumerate}[i)]
\item An anonymous and perfectly secure communication network secure against
a -bounded passive adversary used to deliver voting,
\item The end step of the protocol can be handled by a human to evade the
threat of malware. \end{enumerate} We do not focus on active adversaries
Innovations in energy and climate policy: lessons from Vermont
We ask in this article: how can planners and policymakers replicate Vermontâs energy and climate policies? We begin by explaining the research methods utilized for this articleâmainly research interviews with a pool of experts, coupled with a targeted literature review. We then analyze the success of Vermont energy policy across four areas: energy efficiency, renewable energy, the smart grid, and energy governance. The following sections first explain how Vermont accomplished these successes, next identify a number of remaining barriers and elements of Vermontâs approach that may not be replicable, and finally present the articleâs conclusions
Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We develop a model of limit order trading in which some traders have better information on future price volatility. As limit orders have option-like features, this information is valuable for limit order traders. We solve for informed and uninformed limit order tradersâ bidding strategies in equilibrium when limit order tradersâ IDs are concealed and when they are visible. In either design, a large (resp. small) spread signals that informed limit order traders expect volatility to be high (resp. low). However the quality of this signal and market liquidity are different in each market design. We test these predictions using a natural experiment. As of April 23, 2001, the limit order book for stocks listed on Euronext Paris became anonymous. For our sample stocks, we find that following this change, the average quoted and effective spreads declined significantly. Consistent with our model, we also find that the size of the spread is a predictor of future price volatility and that the strength of the association between the spread and volatility is weaker after the switch to anonymity.Market Microstructure; Limit Order Trading; Anonymity; Transparency; Liquidity; Volatility Forecasts
Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating ?
How does leadership work in teams? In this paper, leadership is grounded on both the possession of a private information by the leader and by her ability to communicate credibly with followers in order to induce them to expand high efforts. This paper reports an experiment testing the efficiency of two costly communication devices introduced by Hermalin (1998): leading-by-example and leading-by-sacrifice. In leading-by-example, the leader's effort is observable by the follower. Experimental evidence shows that leadership works more through reciprocity than through signaling. In leading-by-sacrifice, the leader can give up a part of her payoff. Experimental evidence indicates that this sacrifice works as a truthful signaling device when it is lost for the follower but not when it is transferred to him.experimental economics; leadership; reciprocity; signaling; work teams
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