The Innovation Winter Is Coming: How the U.S.-China Trade War Endangers the World

Massive amounts of data, increased computing power, and advances in technology have created the recent AI Spring. Some feel the continuation of this period of innovation in artificial intelligence is inevitable, but its future is in jeopardy due to the recent trade war between the United States and China. Although the United States spearheaded the globalization movement after WWII, it has shifted to a policy of protectionism and rejectionism. China, conversely, has begun to fill the gap that the United States has left in its wake with its withdrawal from multilateral trade agreements, rejection of the World Trade Organization, and retreat from free trade principles. The future of AI, especially the Internet of Things (IoT), rests on the availability of a massive communication infrastructure that 5G can provide. Although the United States was the undisputed leader in 4G technology, China is the primary supplier of 5G networking equipment and, through its Belt and Road Initiative, seeks to spread its 5G technology throughout the world. Additionally, China has created a long-term strategic plan for AI providing billions for tech start-ups—locally and abroad—promoting collaboration and research, investing in educational programs, and designing technical standards, as well as supporting the needed 5G infrastructure. Conversely, the U.S. government relies on private industry to move this field forward. The U.S.-instigated trade war with China appears to be an attempt to thwart China’s progress. This trade war not only threatens the global economy and endangers democracy, it will likely cause an Innovation Winter—hindering future developments in AI. There is a very real danger that should the United States and China continue with this decoupling, the result could be a bifurcated internet, the development of technology on two divergent tracks, and a 5G infrastructure with non-interchangeable components requiring the rest of the world to choose a side

The potential use of smart cards in vehicle management with particular reference to the situation in Western Australia

Vehicle management may be considered to consist of traffic management, usage control, maintenance, and security. Various regulatory authorities undertake the first aspect, fleet managers will be concerned with all aspects, and owner-drivers will be interested mainly in maintenance and security. Car theft poses a universal security problem. Personalisation, including navigational assistance, might be achieved as a by-product of an improved management system. Authorities and fleet managers may find smartcards to be key components of an improved system, but owners may feel that the need for improved security does not justify its cost. This thesis seeks to determine whether smartcards may be used to personalise vehicles in order to improve vehicle management within a forseeable time and suggest when it might happen. In the process four broad questions are addressed. • First, what improvements in technology are needed to make any improved scheme using smartcards practicable, and what can be expected in the near future? • Second, what problems and difficulties may impede the development of improved management? • Third, what non-vehicle applications might create an environment in which a viable scheme could emerge? • Finally, is there a perceived need for improved vehicle management? The method involved a literature search, the issue of questionnaires to owner drivers and fleet managers, discussions with fleet managers, the preparation of data-flow and state diagrams, and the construction of a simulation of a possible security approach. The study concludes that although vehicle personalisation is possible- and desirable it is unlikely to occur within the next decade because the environment needed to make it practicable will not emerge until a number of commercial and standardisation problems that obstruct all smartcard applications have been solved

From Confrontation to Coopetition in the Globalized Semiconductor Industry

The silicon chip is not only a symbol of marvellous technologies that are transforming industrial production and leisure time in society, but also of trade and technology conflicts while at the same time offering the potential for cooperation.The purpose of this paper is to show that the semiconductor industry has moved from being highly confrontational to being much more cooperative as is evidenced by the emergence of cross-national strategic alliances between companies, spanning R&D, product development, production and distribution.Over the last 15 years the semiconductor industry has experienced startling reversals of competitive fortune in which the USA dominated in 1970s, then Japan entered in 1980s, and in 1986 surpassed the USA as the largest producer of semiconductors with most US firms abandoning DRAM production due to price competition.This reversal of market position has become known as the X-curve. Since the early 1990s the Americans are on top again but with the Koreans and the Taiwanese coming on fast.With China and perhaps India coming on line in the present decade or so, these reversals in competitiveness will continue to play themselves out in the market.Due to external economies and spillover effects for other industries, this industry is considered to be a strategic sector, not only in the USA, where the industry came into existence, but also in Japan and Europe.Observing the excessive returns earned initially in this industry in the USA, Japanese companies wanted to shift these profits, at least in part, to Japan, for which the Japanese government provided support.The closing of the Japanese market both to imports and foreign direct investment undermined the initial American competitive strength.In order to counteract the loss of competitiveness the US industry reacted, besides by restructuring, by creating, with government funding, the research consortium SEMATECH, while the American government responded by concluding since 1986 bilateral trade agreements with Japan in which Japan initially agreed to "voluntarily" restrict its exports of semiconductors and to "voluntarily" expand the imports of American chips.In the mid-1980s Europe was a marginal player in the global competitive battle and suffered dependence on the USA and Japan.This was a consequence of decisions taken by European firms but part also lies in the fragmentation of the European market and the policy pursued by

Переклад у галузі електроенергетики. Методичні рекомендації до практичних занять з дисципліни для студентів спеціальності 7.030507 «Переклад» напряму підготовки 035 «Філологія»

Методичні матеріали призначено для самостійної роботи студентів спеціальності 7.030507 “Переклад” напряму підготовки 035 «Філологія» для організації практичних занять із дисципліни «Переклад у галузі електроенергетики». Рекомендації орієнтовано на вдосконалення навичок перекладу науково-технічних текстів

Переклад у галузі електроенергетики. Методичні рекомендації до практичних занять з дисципліни для студентів спеціальності 7.030507 «Переклад» напряму підготовки 035 «Філологія»

Методичні матеріали призначено для самостійної роботи студентів спеціальності 7.030507 “Переклад” напряму підготовки 035 «Філологія» для організації практичних занять із дисципліни «Переклад у галузі електроенергетики». Рекомендації орієнтовано на вдосконалення навичок перекладу науково-технічних текстів

On the advancement of science and technology among nations: the importance of government policies upon the development of advanced technology industries in five countries

The aims of this study were to compare the importance of government policies upon the development of advanced technology industries in five countries: France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Japan. Three advanced technology industries were selected: microelectronics, machine tools and advanced materials. Data were collected from governments in the five countries, academia, independent research organizations, trade associations, industry and international organizations. The data were analyzed using statistical procedures and the results were related to classical and the "new" theories of comparative advantage determinants for the five countries. Critical analysis was also undertaken of the theories that postulate the role of government policies for industrial growth in the light of the rapid geographic diffusion of advanced technology sectors across national boundaries. As a result of these analyses the role of government policies upon the development of advanced technology industries was identified in the five countries. Analyses were undertaken to determine government policies that were successful and those that were not and the reasons for the success or failure of these policies in the light of economic, social, political and geographic factors

The “License as Tax” Fallacy

Intellectual property licenses are commonly portrayed as a “tax” that limits access to technology assets, which in turn stunts innovation by intermediate users and inflates prices for end-users. Renewed skepticism toward IP licensing, and associated judicial and regulatory interventions that apply per se-like liability rules under patent and antitrust law to IP licensing, overlook the fact that IP licenses typically play a “positive-sum” enabling function, rather than a “zero-sum” exclusionary function, by mitigating expropriation risks that would otherwise frustrate transactions between the holders of complementary specialized IP and non-IP assets. As illustrated by paradigm examples of licensing and other IP-dependent arrangements in content and technology markets, these transactional structures facilitate value-creating exchanges of knowledge assets, promote the division of labor among innovation and production specialists, and lower entry costs for firms that have strong innovation capacities but weak production and distribution capacities. An analytical framework that overlooks the enabling function of IP licensing is prone to recommend “false positive” policy actions that undermine the formation of markets in IP assets and, more generally, induce organizational distortions and reduce competitive intensity by disadvantaging R&D-specialist entities that rely on licensing-based monetization mechanisms while favoring integrated firms that maintain end-to-end commercialization structures