Chemical communication between synthetic and natural cells: a possible experimental design

The bottom-up construction of synthetic cells is one of the most intriguing and interesting research arenas in synthetic biology. Synthetic cells are built by encapsulating biomolecules inside lipid vesicles (liposomes), allowing the synthesis of one or more functional proteins. Thanks to the in situ synthesized proteins, synthetic cells become able to perform several biomolecular functions, which can be exploited for a large variety of applications. This paves the way to several advanced uses of synthetic cells in basic science and biotechnology, thanks to their versatility, modularity, biocompatibility, and programmability. In the previous WIVACE (2012) we presented the state-of-the-art of semi-synthetic minimal cell (SSMC) technology and introduced, for the first time, the idea of chemical communication between synthetic cells and natural cells. The development of a proper synthetic communication protocol should be seen as a tool for the nascent field of bio/chemical-based Information and Communication Technologies (bio-chem-ICTs) and ultimately aimed at building soft-wet-micro-robots. In this contribution (WIVACE, 2013) we present a blueprint for realizing this project, and show some preliminary experimental results. We firstly discuss how our research goal (based on the natural capabilities of biological systems to manipulate chemical signals) finds a proper place in the current scientific and technological contexts. Then, we shortly comment on the experimental approaches from the viewpoints of (i) synthetic cell construction, and (ii) bioengineering of microorganisms, providing up-to-date results from our laboratory. Finally, we shortly discuss how autopoiesis can be used as a theoretical framework for defining synthetic minimal life, minimal cognition, and as bridge between synthetic biology and artificial intelligence.Comment: In Proceedings Wivace 2013, arXiv:1309.712

Autonomy: a review and a reappraisal

In the field of artificial life there is no agreement on what defines ‘autonomy’. This makes it difficult to measure progress made towards understanding as well as engineering autonomous systems. Here, we review the diversity of approaches and categorize them by introducing a conceptual distinction between behavioral and constitutive autonomy. Differences in the autonomy of artificial and biological agents tend to be marginalized for the former and treated as absolute for the latter. We argue that with this distinction the apparent opposition can be resolved

Smell's puzzling discrepancy: Gifted discrimination, yet pitiful identification

Mind &Language, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 90-114, February 2020

Towards a Model of Life and Cognition

What should be the ontology of the world such that life and cognition are possible? In this essay, I undertake to outline an alternative ontological foundation which makes biological and cognitive phenomena possible. The foundation is built by defining a model, which is presented in the form of a description of a hypothetical but a logically possible world with a defined ontological base. Biology rests today on quite a few not so well connected foundations: molecular biology based on the genetic dogma; evolutionary biology based on neo-Darwinian model; ecology based on systems view; developmental biology by morphogenetic models; connectionist models for neurophysiology and cognitive biology; pervasive teleonomic explanations for the goal-directed behavior across the discipline; etc. Can there be an underlying connecting theme or a model which could make these seemingly disparate domains interconnected? I shall atempt to answer this question. By following the semantic view of scientific theories, I tend to believe that the models employed by the present physical sciences are not rich enough to capture biological (and some of the non-biological) systems. A richer theory that could capture biological reality could also capture physical and chemical phenomena as limiting cases, but not vice versa

Motility at the origin of life: Its characterization and a model

Due to recent advances in synthetic biology and artificial life, the origin of life is currently a hot topic of research. We review the literature and argue that the two traditionally competing "replicator-first" and "metabolism-first" approaches are merging into one integrated theory of individuation and evolution. We contribute to the maturation of this more inclusive approach by highlighting some problematic assumptions that still lead to an impoverished conception of the phenomenon of life. In particular, we argue that the new consensus has so far failed to consider the relevance of intermediate timescales. We propose that an adequate theory of life must account for the fact that all living beings are situated in at least four distinct timescales, which are typically associated with metabolism, motility, development, and evolution. On this view, self-movement, adaptive behavior and morphological changes could have already been present at the origin of life. In order to illustrate this possibility we analyze a minimal model of life-like phenomena, namely of precarious, individuated, dissipative structures that can be found in simple reaction-diffusion systems. Based on our analysis we suggest that processes in intermediate timescales could have already been operative in prebiotic systems. They may have facilitated and constrained changes occurring in the faster- and slower-paced timescales of chemical self-individuation and evolution by natural selection, respectively.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, Artificial Lif

The Evolution of Reaction-diffusion Controllers for Minimally Cognitive Agents

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Is defining life pointless? Operational definitions at the frontiers of Biology

Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research

Quantum effects in linguistic endeavors

Classifying the information content of neural spike trains in a linguistic endeavor, an uncertainty relation emerges between the bit size of a word and its duration. This uncertainty is associated with the task of synchronizing the spike trains of different duration representing different words. The uncertainty involves peculiar quantum features, so that word comparison amounts to measurement-based-quantum computation. Such a quantum behavior explains the onset and decay of the memory window connecting successive pieces of a linguistic text. The behavior here discussed is applicable to other reported evidences of quantum effects in human linguistic processes, so far lacking a plausible framework, since either no efforts to assign an appropriate quantum constant had been associated or speculating on microscopic processes dependent on Planck's constant resulted in unrealistic decoherence times