Architecture-based Qualitative Risk Analysis for Availability of IT Infrastructures

An IT risk assessment must deliver the best possible quality of results in a time-effective way. Organisations are used to customise the general-purpose standard risk assessment methods in a way that can satisfy their requirements. In this paper we present the QualTD Model and method, which is meant to be employed together with standard risk assessment methods for the qualitative assessment of availability risks of IT architectures, or parts of them. The QualTD Model is based on our previous quantitative model, but geared to industrial practice since it does not require quantitative data which is often too costly to acquire. We validate the model and method in a real-world case by performing a risk assessment on the authentication and authorisation system of a large multinational company and by evaluating the results w.r.t. the goals of the stakeholders of the system. We also perform a review of the most popular standard risk assessment methods and an analysis of which one can be actually integrated with our QualTD Model

Vulnerability analysis of satellite-based synchronized smart grids monitoring systems

The large-scale deployment of wide-area monitoring systems could play a strategic role in supporting the evolution of traditional power systems toward smarter and self-healing grids. The correct operation of these synchronized monitoring systems requires a common and accurate timing reference usually provided by a satellite-based global positioning system. Although these satellites signals provide timing accuracy that easily exceeds the needs of the power industry, they are extremely vulnerable to radio frequency interference. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying their potential vulnerabilities is of paramount importance for correct and safe wide-area monitoring system operation. Armed with such a vision, this article presents and discusses the results of an experimental analysis aimed at characterizing the vulnerability of global positioning system based wide-area monitoring systems to external interferences. The article outlines the potential strategies that could be adopted to protect global positioning system receivers from external cyber-attacks and proposes decentralized defense strategies based on self-organizing sensor networks aimed at assuring correct time synchronization in the presence of external attacks

Talos: Neutralizing Vulnerabilities with Security Workarounds for Rapid Response

Considerable delays often exist between the discovery of a vulnerability and the issue of a patch. One way to mitigate this window of vulnerability is to use a configuration workaround, which prevents the vulnerable code from being executed at the cost of some lost functionality -- but only if one is available. Since program configurations are not specifically designed to mitigate software vulnerabilities, we find that they only cover 25.2% of vulnerabilities. To minimize patch delay vulnerabilities and address the limitations of configuration workarounds, we propose Security Workarounds for Rapid Response (SWRRs), which are designed to neutralize security vulnerabilities in a timely, secure, and unobtrusive manner. Similar to configuration workarounds, SWRRs neutralize vulnerabilities by preventing vulnerable code from being executed at the cost of some lost functionality. However, the key difference is that SWRRs use existing error-handling code within programs, which enables them to be mechanically inserted with minimal knowledge of the program and minimal developer effort. This allows SWRRs to achieve high coverage while still being fast and easy to deploy. We have designed and implemented Talos, a system that mechanically instruments SWRRs into a given program, and evaluate it on five popular Linux server programs. We run exploits against 11 real-world software vulnerabilities and show that SWRRs neutralize the vulnerabilities in all cases. Quantitative measurements on 320 SWRRs indicate that SWRRs instrumented by Talos can neutralize 75.1% of all potential vulnerabilities and incur a loss of functionality similar to configuration workarounds in 71.3% of those cases. Our overall conclusion is that automatically generated SWRRs can safely mitigate 2.1x more vulnerabilities, while only incurring a loss of functionality comparable to that of traditional configuration workarounds.Comment: Published in Proceedings of the 37th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland 2016

A Graphical Adversarial Risk Analysis Model for Oil and Gas Drilling Cybersecurity

Oil and gas drilling is based, increasingly, on operational technology, whose cybersecurity is complicated by several challenges. We propose a graphical model for cybersecurity risk assessment based on Adversarial Risk Analysis to face those challenges. We also provide an example of the model in the context of an offshore drilling rig. The proposed model provides a more formal and comprehensive analysis of risks, still using the standard business language based on decisions, risks, and value.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163

Guide to Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Science and Engineering Projects, v1

This document is a product of the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC). CTSC is supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Number OCI-1234408. Any opinions,findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation

Understanding Malicious Attacks Against Infrastructures - Overview on the Assessment and Management of Threats and Attacks to Industrial Control Systems

This report describes approaches to the assessment and management of malicious threats and attacks relating to critical infrastructures in general, and electric power infrastructures in particular. Securing infrastructures implies taking into account both the natural and man-made (intentional) events. While protecting against the natural disruptive events is a feasible (yet not trivial) task, benefiting by well-established practices, dealing with intentional attacks comes up across many difficulties, especially due to the unpredictability of such events. The report outlines the state-of-the-art in dealing with threats and malicious attacks, considering both physical and cyber actions. Several approaches taken at national and international levels towards securing the critical infrastructures are also provided.JRC.G.6-Sensors, radar technologies and cybersecurit