Difference within Theology of Nature: The Strategies of Intelligibility and Credibility

This author examines and augments a particular aspect of Ian Barbour's well-known fourfold typology for relating religion and science (conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration) in order to clarify two options available for theology as it develops a robust view of creation in conversation with modern science. Within integration, Barbour identifies several subtypes, including "theology of nature." The Gifford Lectures of Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne provide important examples of theology of nature, yet differences between their approaches remain unexplained within Barbour's typology. An explanation is offered here, showing that Peacocke and Polkinghorne employ two distinct strategies to construct a theology of nature: the strategy of intelligibility and the strategy of credibility. After characterizing these strategies, the author suggests that at present the relationship between them takes the form of a dilemma

Bounded Rationality and Heuristics in Humans and in Artificial Cognitive Systems

In this paper I will present an analysis of the impact that the notion of “bounded rationality”, introduced by Herbert Simon in his book “Administrative Behavior”, produced in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In particular, by focusing on the field of Automated Decision Making (ADM), I will show how the introduction of the cognitive dimension into the study of choice of a rational (natural) agent, indirectly determined - in the AI field - the development of a line of research aiming at the realisation of artificial systems whose decisions are based on the adoption of powerful shortcut strategies (known as heuristics) based on “satisficing” - i.e. non optimal - solutions to problem solving. I will show how the “heuristic approach” to problem solving allowed, in AI, to face problems of combinatorial complexity in real-life situations and still represents an important strategy for the design and implementation of intelligent systems

Business Ontology for Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper presents a software solution that is developed to automatically classify companies by taking into account their level of social responsibility. The application is based on ontologies and on intelligent agents. In order to obtain the data needed to evaluate companies, we developed a web crawling module that analyzes the company’s website and the documents that are available online such as social responsibility report, mission statement, employment structure, etc. Based on a predefined CSR ontology, the web crawling module extracts the terms that are linked to corporate social responsibility. By taking into account the extracted qualitative data, an intelligent agent, previously trained on a set of companies, computes the qualitative values, which are then included in the classification model based on neural networks. The proposed ontology takes into consideration the guidelines proposed by the “ISO 26000 Standard for Social Responsibility”. Having this model, and being aware of the positive relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and financial performance, an overall perspective on each company’s activity can be configured, this being useful not only to the company’s creditors, auditors, stockholders, but also to its consumers.corporate social responsibility, ISO 26000 Standard for Social Responsibility, ontology, web crawling, intelligent agent, corporate performance, POS tagging, opinion mining, sentiment analysis

Common reason to believe and framing effect in the team reasoning theory: an experimental approach

The present paper is aimed at empirically verifying the role of the “common reason to believe” (Sugden 2003) and of framing (Bacharach 1999 and 2006) within the theory of team reasoning. The analysis draws on data collected trough a Traveler’s Dilemma experiment. To study the role of the common reason to believe, players’ belief in their counterpart’s choice are elicited and the correlation between the endorsement of team reasoning and beliefs is considered. With respect to the idea of frame proposed by Bacharach, we study the effect of the reduction of social distance on the probability that the “we-frame” comes to players’ mind. Social distance is decreased by introducing a meeting between the two players after the game. It is shown that the common reason to believe appropriately explains the internal logic of team reasoning and that the reduction of social distance makes the “we-frame” more likely.Team Reasoning, Common Reason to Believe, Framing, Traveler’s Dilemma; Social Distance

Perfect Prediction in Minkowski Spacetime: Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing this approach have been defined on both dynamic games with perfect information and no ties, the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium, and strategic games with no ties, the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. In this paper, we generalize the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium to games in extensive form with imperfect information and no ties. Both the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium and the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for strategic games become special cases of this generalized equilibrium concept. The generalized equilibrium, if there are no ties in the payoffs, is at most unique, and is Pareto-optimal. We also contribute a special-relativistic interpretation of a subclass of the games in extensive form with imperfect information as a directed acyclic graph of decisions made by any number of agents, each decision being located at a specific position in Minkowski spacetime, and the information sets and game structure being derived from the causal structure. Strategic games correspond to a setup with only spacelike-separated decisions, and dynamic games to one with only timelike-separated decisions. The generalized Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium thus characterizes the outcome and payoffs reached in a general setup where decisions can be located in any generic positions in Minkowski spacetime, under necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies. We also argue that this provides a directly usable mathematical framework for the design of extension theories of quantum physics with a weakened free choice assumption.Comment: 25 pages, updated technical repor

How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such “explanatory concepts” of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions – Kuhn's, Thagard's, Chen's and Barker's, and Laudan's – and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept

Evolutionary games on graphs

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure