Going higher in the First-order Quantifier Alternation Hierarchy on Words

We investigate the quantifier alternation hierarchy in first-order logic on finite words. Levels in this hierarchy are defined by counting the number of quantifier alternations in formulas. We prove that one can decide membership of a regular language to the levels $\mathcal{B}\Sigma_2$ (boolean combination of formulas having only 1 alternation) and $\Sigma_3$ (formulas having only 2 alternations beginning with an existential block). Our proof works by considering a deeper problem, called separation, which, once solved for lower levels, allows us to solve membership for higher levels

Characterizations and algorithms for generalized Cops and Robbers games

We propose a definition of generalized Cops and Robbers games where there are two players, the Pursuer and the Evader, who each move via prescribed rules. If the Pursuer can ensure that the game enters into a fixed set of final positions, then the Pursuer wins; otherwise, the Evader wins. A relational characterization of the games where the Pursuer wins is provided. A precise formula is given for the length of the game, along with an algorithm for computing if the Pursuer has a winning strategy whose complexity is a function of the parameters of the game. For games where the position of one player does not affect the available moves of he other, a vertex elimination ordering characterization, analogous to a cop-win ordering, is given for when the Pursuer has a winning strategy

Compromise values in cooperative game theory

Bargaining;game theory

A note on the characterization of the compromise value

Bargaining;game theory

The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network

Convex Multi-Choice Cooperative Games and their Monotonic Allocation Schemes

This paper focuses on new characterizations of convex multi-choice games using the notions of exactness and superadditivity. Further- more, (level-increase) monotonic allocation schemes (limas) on the class of convex multi-choice games are introduced and studied. It turns out that each element of the Weber set of such a game is ex- tendable to a limas, and the (total) Shapley value for multi-choice games generates a limas for each convex multi-choice game.Multi-choice games;Convex games;Marginal games;Weber set;Monotonic allocation schemes.