4,128 research outputs found
Dynamic Efficiency, the Riskless Rate, and Debt Ponzi Games under Uncertainty.
In a dynamically efficient economy, can a government roll its debt forever and avoid the need to raise taxes? In a series of examples of economies with zero growth, this paper shows that such Ponzi games may be infeasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is negative, and may be feasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is positive. The paper then reveals the structure which underlies these examples.
Approximate public-signal correlated equilibria for nonzero-sum differential games
We construct an approximate public-signal correlated equilibrium for a
nonzero-sum differential game in the class of stochastic strategies with
memory. The construction is based on a solution of an auxiliary nonzero-sum
continuous-time stochastic game. This class of games includes stochastic
differential games and continuous-time Markov games. Moreover, we study the
limit of approximate equilibrium outcomes in the case when the auxiliary
stochastic games tend to the original deterministic one. We show that it lies
in the convex hull of the set of equilibrium values provided by deterministic
punishment strategies.Comment: 35 page
The Logit-Response Dynamics
We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportunities. Our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games.Learning in games, logit-response dynamics, best-response potential games
Price of Anarchy in Bernoulli Congestion Games with Affine Costs
We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player participates in
the game with an exogenous and known probability , independently
of everybody else, or stays out and incurs no cost. We first prove that the
resulting game is potential. Then, we compute the parameterized price of
anarchy to characterize the impact of demand uncertainty on the efficiency of
selfish behavior. It turns out that the price of anarchy as a function of the
maximum participation probability is a nondecreasing
function. The worst case is attained when players have the same participation
probabilities . For the case of affine costs, we provide an
analytic expression for the parameterized price of anarchy as a function of
. This function is continuous on , is equal to for , and increases towards when . Our work can be interpreted as
providing a continuous transition between the price of anarchy of nonatomic and
atomic games, which are the extremes of the price of anarchy function we
characterize. We show that these bounds are tight and are attained on routing
games -- as opposed to general congestion games -- with purely linear costs
(i.e., with no constant terms).Comment: 29 pages, 6 figure
Correlated Equilibria in Competitive Staff Selection Problem
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to
Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum
stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each
player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution
over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples
of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection
competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian,
republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equilibria selection are
used.Comment: The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical
Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Los(1920 - 1998),
Warsaw, September 200
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