A Conditional Intent to Perform

The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor’s conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor’s intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform. Building on Michael Bratman’s planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions on a promisor’s intent to perform are likely to result in material promissory misrepresentation, while background conditions are not. The difference between foreground and background conditions lies in whether the agent accepts the satisfaction of the condition for the purposes of her practical reasoning. A promisor’s nonacceptance of a condition on her intent to perform is material because it is likely to affect her preperformance deliberations and investment in the transaction, as well as her willingness to seek agreement with the promisee on how to fill contractual gaps

Defeaters and Disqualifiers

Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual feature, disqualification, which doesn't involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier otiose, as direct testimony sometimes does to distal testimony, and as manifestly decisive evidence might do to gratuitous evidence on the same team. Basing a belief on disqualified evidence, moreover, is distinctively irrational. One is not necessarily irresponsible. Instead one is turning down a free upgrade to a sleeker, stabler basis for one's beliefs. Such an upgrade would prevent wastes of epistemic effort, since someone who bases her belief on a disqualified proposition E will need to remember E and rethink her belief should E ever be defeated. The upgrade might also reduce reliance on unwieldy evidence, if E is relevant only thanks to some labyrinthine argument; and if even ideal agents should doubt their ability to follow such arguments, even they should care about disqualifiers

An Ordinal View of Independence with Application to Plausible Reasoning

An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of blocking of property inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic reasoning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994

Nietzsche's Critique of Truth

Nietzsche has made many paradoxical remarks about truth, including the claim that truth does not exist. Philosophers have attempted to tease out various theories of truth from his scattered remarks. This piece argues that Nietzsche had no interest in a theory of truth, rather he is interested in the rhetoric of truth; how claims of truth are used to coerce agreement and conformity, to hide expressions of subjective wills behind alleged objective facts. This kind of analysis is predicated on understanding Nietzsche’s various prima facie conflicting pronouncements by finding their intended audience. Nietzsche is not interested in finding eternal truths, rather his pragmatic concern is to move various audiences from their complacent beliefs. What is needed to move one target audience might be the opposite of what is needed at another time to move another targeted audience. Nietzsche is aiming at local interventions rather than global philosophical truths. This suggests a general model for Nietzsche interpretation: To understand a given Nietzsche text, first try to find who his intended audience/ audiences is/are and from what beliefs is he trying to pry them, and in what direction he seeks to move them. The general thought behind this piece is that Nietzsche should be regarded more as a psychologist or Kulturkritker than as a philosopher in the modern sense (one who is interested in questions of ultimate ontology, epistemology, etc.). I also suggest in this piece that careful attention be paid to Nietzsche language, in particular his use of the metaphoric of degeneration. To this end I analyze his use of martial and forensic metaphors. Footnote 14 touches on the highly important and vexing question of his responsibility for his subsequent use arguing that Nietzsche's culpability lays not so much in his particular claims but in his very language.Article (Reprinted in "Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Nietzsche", edited by B. Leiter and J. Richardson, Oxford University Press, 200

Updating preferences with multiple priors

We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity. These rules apply to the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg’s paradox) with dynamic consistency for all non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes’ rule to subsets of the set of priors, where the specific subset depends on the preferences, the conditioning event, and the choice problem (i.e., a feasible set of acts together with an act chosen from that set).Updating, dynamic consistency, ambiguity, Ellsberg, Bayesian, consequentialism

Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker

We study the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with market scoring rule (MSR) market makers. One attractive feature of MSR is that it is myopically incentive compatible: it is optimal for traders to report their true beliefs about the likelihood of an event outcome provided that they ignore the impact of their reports on the profit they might garner from future trades. In this paper, we analyze non-myopic strategies and examine what information structures lead to truthful betting by traders. Specifically, we analyze the behavior of risk-neutral traders with incomplete information playing in a dynamic game. We consider finite-stage and infinite-stage game models. For each model, we study the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) with two different information structures: conditionally independent signals and (unconditionally) independent signals. In the finite-stage model, when signals of traders are independent conditional on the state of the world, truthful betting is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Moreover, it is the unique Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE) of the game. In contrast, when signals of traders are unconditionally independent, truthful betting is not a WPBE. In the infinite-stage model with unconditionally independent signals, there does not exist an equilibrium in which all information is revealed in a finite amount of time. We propose a simple discounted market scoring rule that reduces the opportunity for bluffing strategies. We show that in any WPBE for the infinite-stage market with discounting, the market price converges to the fully-revealing price, and the rate of convergence can be bounded in terms of the discounting parameter. When signals are conditionally independent, truthful betting is the unique WPBE for the infinite-stage market with and without discounting.Engineering and Applied Science

Delegation versus authority

The paper studies the role of delegation and authority within a principal-agent relation in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. Consequently, an information revelation problem arises. We contribute to the literature by assuming transferable utility and contractibility of messages and decision rights. While delegation leads to loss of control, it facilitates the agent’s participation and leads to an informed decision. Moreover, message-contingent delegation creates incentives for information revelation. We derive the optimal contract for the principal and investigate when delegation outperforms authority. -- Das Papier untersucht die Bestimmungsgründe für die Delegation von Entscheidungen in Organisationen. Wir betrachten eine Prinzipal-Agent Beziehung, in der eine Entscheidung getroffen werden muss, die vertraglich nicht festgeschrieben werden kann. Der Agent verfügt über für den Prinzipal relevante private Information, hat aber andere Entscheidungspräferenzen als der Prinzipal. Im Unterschied zur bisherigen Literatur betrachten wir den Fall, dass Nutzen transferierbar ist, und dass der Prinzipal sein Entscheidungsrecht in Abhängigkeit eines Berichtes des Agenten an diesen abtreten kann. Delegation führt einerseits zu einem Kontrollverlust für den Prinzipal. Andererseits erleichtert sie die Partizipation des Agenten und führt zu einer informierten Entscheidung. Darüber hinaus schafft Delegation Anreize zur Informationsoffenlegung, wenn dem Agenten das Entscheidungsrecht in Abhängigkeit seines Berichtes übertragen wird. Wir untersuchen, wann es für den Prinzipal optimal ist, die Entscheidung zu delegieren.Delegation,Partial Contracting,Mechanism Design,Imperfect Commitment,Transferable Utility

Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems

A careful analysis of conditioning in the Sleeping Beauty problem is done, using the formal model for reasoning about knowledge and probability developed by Halpern and Tuttle. While the Sleeping Beauty problem has been viewed as revealing problems with conditioning in the presence of imperfect recall, the analysis done here reveals that the problems are not so much due to imperfect recall as to asynchrony. The implications of this analysis for van Fraassen's Reflection Principle and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are considered.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference (KR 2004). This version will appear in Oxford Studies in Epistemolog