Open-Mindedness, Rational Confidence, and Belief Change

It’s intuitive to think that (a) the more sure you are of something, the harder it’ll be to change your mind about it, and (b) you can’t be open-minded about something if you’re very sure about it. If these thoughts are right, then, with minimal assumptions, it follows that you can’t be in a good position to both escape echo chambers and be rationally resistant to fake news: the former requires open-mindedness, but the latter is inimical to it. I argue that neither thought is true and that believing them will get us all mixed up. I show that you can be open-minded and have confidently held beliefs, and that beliefs in which you are less sure are not, thereby, more fragile. I close with some reflections on the nature of rational belief change and open-mindedness and a brief sketch about what might actually help us in the fight against misinformation and belief polarization …. [please read below the rest of the article]

Gauge Your Gambling: The Acceptability and Feasibility of a Brief Online Motivational Enhancement for Non-Treatment Seeking Problem Gamblers

Those who struggle to control their gambling have been shown to experience a number of adverse consequences. Despite these difficulties, only a small percentage of problematic gamblers ever seek gambling treatment or services. As technology advances there is growing evidence that brief online interventions may be efficacious with this population. The present study tested the feasibility and acceptability of a new brief online intervention for those who struggle with their gambling. The intervention was theoretically based on the Health Belief Model, the Transtheoretical Model, and Motivational Interviewing. Participants completed a series of questionnaires about their gambling behaviours, perceived control over gambling, beliefs about their gambling problems, motivation for change and change efforts, and experienced and expected consequences of continued gambling. They also received personalized and normative comparison feedback. The development and administration of the online intervention was inexpensive relative to in person services but did encountered several technical difficulties. In total, 204 participants provided some data. Of those who accessed the website approximately two-thirds were experiencing one or more symptoms of Gambling Disorder. Participants generally found the website acceptable, however, there was a high within-intervention attrition rate. Most participants were in the contemplation stage of change and had low perceived gambling refusal self-efficacy. Perceived severity and perceived benefits from the Health Belief Model were found to account for 76% of the variance in the intent to seek help. There was a small partial mediation effect for readiness to change on the relationship between perceived severity and the intent to seek help. There was insufficient follow-up data to support statistical analysis of outcome variables. The website attracted the target population for the most part, however, future researchers will want to consider methods of increasing engagement and follow-up in this population such as increased incentives. Participants rated the website positively and case study data at follow-up suggest that further testing of brief online interventions such as Gauge Your Gambling is warranted

Kiss the Soul: Ways to Empower Creative Change Leadership and Intuition in Organizations Starting by Creating a Training Module for a Consultancy

One way to Kiss the Soul to empower Creative Change Leadership and Intuition in organizations is by training. This project is about the development and implementation of a new online training module in March 2021 to a small group of an Amsterdam consultancy. It consisted of four two and a half hour zoom sessions on Thursday evenings. The training is placed in a context of kissing the soul for new unexpected beautiful and meaningful organizational impact. This original concept of Kissing the Soul means: making loving contact with what matters deeply to yourself and sharing this with other people to make beautiful organizational impact together. This is grounded in the belief that if people are guided in their work by their creative mind combined with their heart, body and soul - by their own spirit - and make connections with the spirit of other people they work with or for, working life will be more worthwhile and the world will accordingly become more beautiful and meaningful. The literature review is an exploration on what it might take to make training, to lead for creative change in organizations. What tapping into your intuition or inner wisdom might be about. What it takes to be a successful creative change leader, someone who navigates the upsides and downsides of creativity in organizations for productive change. Why making contact with what really matters in inner work life by the deliberate integration of creativity and intuition is essential for joy, energy and creative breakthroughs

Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief

Recent work in psychology on ‘cultural cognition’ suggests that our cultural background drives our attitudes towards a range of politically contentious issues in science such as global warming. This work is part of a more general attempt to investigate the ways in which our wants, wishes and desires impact on our assessments of information, events and theories. Put crudely, the idea is that we conform our assessments of the evidence for and against scientific theories with clear political relevance to our pre-existing political beliefs and convictions. In this paper I explore the epistemological consequences of cultural cognition. What does it mean for the rationality of our beliefs about issues such as global warming? I argue for an unsettling conclusion. Not only are those on the ‘political right’ who reject the scientific consensus on issues like global warming unjustified in doing so, some of those on the ‘political left’ who accept the consensus are also unjustified in doing so. I finish by addressing the practical implications of my conclusions

Beliefs and actions in the trust game: creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect

In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. Recent experimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by shifting the probabilities of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied by a random process, in a way that informs only the �first player (trustor) about the realized variation. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV estimates indicate a signi�ficant causal effect, comparable to the connection between beliefs and actions that is suggested by OLS analyses

For better or for worse? Investigating the meaning of change

For most, change makes a regular appearance in everyday life and has the capacity to usher in excitement, growth, and chaos. Due to the variable nature of change, people may hold subjective definitions of what “change” typically means. Across four studies, we examine the possibility that there are meaningful individual differences in the dominant subjective definitions people hold about the nature of change. Study 1 and 2 investigated the spontaneous associations participants make when asked to think about change, and found that holding a positive or negative general view about change (as measured by the Nature of Change scale, developed by the researchers) predicts the valence of self-generated associations. Studies 1 and 2 also demonstrate that people with an implicit entity theory of change (believing that people largely cannot change) report more negative and less positive dominant definitions of change than incremental theorists who believe people’s attributes are changeable. Study 3 expands on this finding to demonstrate a link between beliefs about the Nature of Change and beliefs about the role of effort in attributions of success. Participants who believe change is positive, predictable and controllable are more likely to believe that success is a product of effort than participants who believe change is negative, unpredictable and uncontrollable. Definitions of change predict success attributions over and above people’s implicit incremental or entity theories, which have previously been shown to predict attributions. Finally, Study 4 investigates the possibility that more precise definitions of change (as improvement, decline, or random) would alter people’s responses to the implicit theories scale, demonstrating that responses are somewhat contingent on definitions of change Further, change defined as improvement, decline, or random differentially predicted success attributions, which are also again predicted by people’s Nature of Change definitions. Overall, the current set of studies demonstrates that individual differences in people’s reactions to change are important to consider and may be as dynamic and diverse as change itself

The Contributing Role of Prevalent Belief Systems to Intergroup Attitudes and Behaviors

Abundant research shows that prevalent belief systems across cultures contribute to people’s levels of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Such popular belief systems are often communicated by everyday sayings (e.g., the belief that hard work leads to success, as captured by “Madruga y verás, trabaja y tendrás” [Colombia], “Kung may tiyaga, may nilaga” [Philippines], The early bird catches the worm [U.S.A.]). We review the relations between intergroup processes and the following belief systems: entity theory, incremental theory, multiculturalism, colorblindness, polyculturalism, and the Protestant work ethic. We discuss factors that affect the development, maintenance, and potential change in these belief systems, and ways that this knowledge may be used to reduce prejudice are discussed

A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism

Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously

Assertion and Testimony

[The version of this paper published by Oxford online in 2019 was not copy-edited and has some sense-obscuring typos. I have posted a corrected (but not the final published) version on this site. The version published in print in 2020 has these corrections.] Which is more fundamental, assertion or testimony? Should we understand assertion as basic, treating testimony as what you get when you add an interpersonal addressee? Or should we understand testimony as basic, treating mere assertion -- assertion without testimony -- as what you get when you subtract that interpersonal relation? In this chapter, I’ll argue for the subtractive approach and for the more general thesis that its treatment of the interpersonal element in assertion makes understanding that interpersonal element the key to understanding how assertion expresses belief. My theory of belief-expression in assertion treats it as internalizing the transmission of belief in testimony. How we understand that internalizing move depends on how we conceptualize the interpersonal element in testimony. Since what I’ll call the Command Model does not give us the conceptual resources to make this move, we should adopt an alternative that I’ll call the Custodial Model, on which a testifier aims not to convince her addressee but to reason with him – to give him reasons to believe what she tells him grounded in her trustworthiness in thus attempting to influence him. The subtractive approach to assertion thus rests on a key distinction between the aims of reasoning and persuasion