Challenges To Increase Government e-Services Take-Up In Lebanon

Governments around the world are introducing the virtual channel of public service delivery system (UNDESA 2008). This channel allows for integrated public e-services that are available 24/7. However, citizens who do not have access to ICTs, who do not have the ability to use ICTs, and/or who do not accept to use government e-services cannot benefit from these advantages. Therefore, introducing e-services will create three types of divide: access, e-skills, and acceptance divides. This e-service divide will lead to an inferior quality public service translated in a low e-services’ Take-Up. In Lebanon for example, the government is heavily investing in public online services. However, only 26.28 per cent of the Lebanese population has Internet access, 11.45 per cent have PC at home, and only 30.53 per cent have a mobile telephone (OMSAR 2008). It means that e-government will lead to a system where only privileged segments of the population may have access to the government e-services. Therefore the e-government implementation will create a public online service divide constituted of three types of inequalities: (1) inequality in the access to e-services between citizens, (2) inequality in the ability to use e-services among those who have access, and (3) inequality in e-services acceptance among those who have the access and the ability to use ICTs and e-services. Reducing this e-services divide can enhance the value of services to the citizens and that can dramatically increase e-services Take-Up

European Neighbourhood Policy in the Mashreq Countries: Enhancing Prospects for Reform. CEPS Working Documents No. 229, 1 September 2005

This report assesses ways in which the Action Plan process that has been launched under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could become a more effective driver of political and economic change in the Mashreq region (covering Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories), compared with the modest results from the Barcelona process to date. The development of the ENP has already provided a valuable systemic/institutional advance in Euro-Med relations and has been an important confidence-building measure in an increasingly uncertain political environment. But it has yet to provide momentum for economic, political and social advance in the partner states. Key elements in making the Action Plan process more effective would be the following: · The Commission needs to deepen the policy content of the ENP with sketches of different degrees of desirable EU acquis compliance as a function of different economic structures and capabilities of the partner states. · The task of policy-shaping in different sectors of the Action Plans with the partner states needs to be shared by the Commission with other international organisations, most importantly the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). · The policy-shaping recommendations in support of the economic parts of the Action Plans should be explicitly linked to financial or market-access incentives (or both) on offer from the EU and international financial institutions. The promotion of political reform in the partner states is a more delicate affair. Yet there is still some room for ‘positive conditionality’ if the Commission were to define more substantively the package of incentives that are offered to partner states

Population scenarios and policy implications for South Mediterranean countries, 2010-2050

Four population scenarios were derived describing changes in indicators of demographic behaviour should people come to live in different future political-economic contexts. Focus of this policy brief is on expected trends in (1) population growth at regional and national levels, (2) working age populations in view of demographic dividend potential for the economy, and (3) population of elderly persons in view of the future financial burden this group might impose on societies. Results show that different economic-political development scenarios do have large effects on population growth, at least up to 2030). This is due to the socalled population momentum effect in the relatively young age-structures of most SMCs. In the short term, up to 2030, and depending on which economic-political unfolds, SMCs expected to grow from 280 million people to a figure between 362 and 349 million people. Thus, in a period of about 20 years SMC populations are expected to grow with a figure between 69 and 83 million. In that same period, EU27 populations will grow with 21 million only from about 500 to 521 million people. Between 2030 and 2050, additional population growth is foreseen in SMCs, between 48 and 62 million people, while EU27 populations are expected to grow with only 4 million during that period. SMCs appear to vary widely regarding demographic transition profiles so that demographic dividend potentials also vary. For instance, Egypt has considerably demographic dividend potential ahead in the coming decades as working age population shares will rise from 63% (2010) to a peak level of about 68% by 2045. In Turkey though, the working age population share is already high (68%) and near the expected peak level of 69% (by 2025) after which a decline sets in. The window of opportunity -the period when working age population shares rise to peak levels and remain at a high level- is starting to close for Lebanon and Tunisia though levels will remain high up to 2035 after which a decline sets in due to ageing of these populations. Ageing implies an increase of the economic burden to economies as elderly generally do not contribute any longer to economies as they did during their working age years. Old-age dependency ratios, the share of elderly in relation to the working age population, are still low compared to EU27 ratios but will increase after 2035. Should SMCs remain politically, economically and environmentally fragile in the coming decades, these lower dependency ratios will impose a relatively higher social and financial burden to societies than the high dependency ratios in EU countries