Inter-firm trade finance in times of crisis

The paper discusses the main features that distinguish inter-firm international trade finance from alternative sources of financing. On the one hand, inter-firm trade finance could help overcome informational problems associated with other lending relationships; on the other, it may contribute to propagate shocks due to the interconnection among firms along credit chains. The paper evaluates the potential effects of a financial crisis on the use of trade credit for firms operating in developing countries. It argues that while the advantages of trade credit might remain largely unexploited due to poor legal institutions, the disadvantages might be exacerbated because of these firms’ greater exposure to a default chain. Based on these arguments, a menu of choices is identified for what policymakers can do to boost firms’ access to inter-firm trade finance in times of crisis.Debt Markets,Access to Finance,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Economic Theory&Research,Emerging Markets

Large-scale structure of a nation-wide production network

Production in an economy is a set of firms' activities as suppliers and customers; a firm buys goods from other firms, puts value added and sells products to others in a giant network of production. Empirical study is lacking despite the fact that the structure of the production network is important to understand and make models for many aspects of dynamics in economy. We study a nation-wide production network comprising a million firms and millions of supplier-customer links by using recent statistical methods developed in physics. We show in the empirical analysis scale-free degree distribution, disassortativity, correlation of degree to firm-size, and community structure having sectoral and regional modules. Since suppliers usually provide credit to their customers, who supply it to theirs in turn, each link is actually a creditor-debtor relationship. We also study chains of failures or bankruptcies that take place along those links in the network, and corresponding avalanche-size distribution.Comment: 17 pages with 8 figures; revised section VI and references adde

Transient fluctuation of the prosperity of firms in a network economy

The transient fluctuation of the prosperity of firms in a network economy is investigated with an abstract stochastic model. The model describes the profit which firms make when they sell materials to a firm which produces a product and the fixed cost expense to the firms to produce those materials and product. The formulae for this model are parallel to those for population dynamics. The swinging changes in the fluctuation in the transient state from the initial growth to the final steady state are the consequence of a topology-dependent time trial competition between the profitable interactions and expense. The firm in a sparse random network economy is more likely to go bankrupt than expected from the value of the limit of the fluctuation in the steady state, and there is a risk of failing to reach by far the less fluctuating steady state

Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukrainian Data

In this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms to be exploited by their input suppliers when suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia

Power Law in Firms Bankruptcy

We consider the scaling behaviors for fluctuations of the number of Korean firms bankrupted in the period from August 1 2002 to October 28 2003. We observe a power law for the distribution of the number of the bankrupted firms. The Pareto exponent is close to unity. We also consider the daily increments of the number of firms bankrupted. The probability distribution of the daily increments for the firms bankrupted follows the Gaussian distribution in central part and has a fat tail. The tail parts of the probability distribution of the daily increments for the firms bankrupted follow a power law.Comment: 3 pages, 4figure

Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukranian Data

In this paper we survey the common explanations of barter in transition economies and expose them to detailed survey data on 165 barter deals in Ukraine in 1997. The evidence does not support the notion that soft budget constraints, lack of restructuring, or that the virtual economy are the driving forces behind barter. Further, tax avoidance is only weakly associated with the incidence of barter in Ukraine. We then explore an alternative explanation of barter as a mechanism to address transitional challenges where capital markets and economic institutions are poorly developed. First, barter helps to maintain production by creating a deal-specific collateral which softens the liquidity squeeze in the economy when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. Second, barter helps to maintain production by preventing firms to be exploited by their input suppliers when suppliers' bargaining position is very strong due to high costs of switching suppliers. Thus, in the absence of trust and functioning capital markets barter is a self-enforcing response to imperfect input and financial markets in the former Soviet Union. The paper concludes by discussing potential long-term costs of barter arrangements, and by suggesting particular pitfalls of expansionary monetary policy in barter economies such as Ukraine and Russia.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39671/3/wp287.pd

A Primer on Private Equity at Work: Management, Employment, and Sustainability

Private equity, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds and other private pools of capital form part of the growing shadow banking system in the United States; these new financial intermediaries provide an alternative investment mechanism to the traditional banking system.2 Private equity and hedge funds have their origins in the U.S., while the first sovereign wealth fund was created by the Kuwaiti Government in 1953. While they have separate roots and distinct business models, these alternative investment vehicles increasingly have been merged into overarching asset management funds that encompass all three alternative investments. These funds have wielded increasing power in financial and non-financial sectors -- not only via direct investments but also indirectly, as their strategies -- such as high use of debt to fund investments -- have been adopted by investment arms of banks and by publicly-traded corporations

A Primer on Private Equity at Work: Management, Employment, and Sustainability

[Excerpt] Private equity, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds and other private pools of capital form part of the growing shadow banking system in the United States; these new financial intermediaries provide an alternative investment mechanism to the traditional banking system. Private equity and hedge funds have their origins in the U.S., while the first sovereign wealth fund was created by the Kuwaiti Government in 1953. While they have separate roots and distinct business models, these alternative investment vehicles increasingly have been merged into overarching asset management funds that encompass all three alternative investments. These funds have wielded increasing power in financial and non-financial sectors – not only via direct investments but also indirectly, as their strategies – such as high use of debt to fund investments – have been adopted by investment arms of banks and by publicly-traded corporations. This primer focuses on private equity (PE) because this is the new financial intermediary that most directly affects the management of, and employment relations in, operating companies that employ millions of U.S. workers. However, as the boundaries among alternative investment funds have begun to blur, we will touch on hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds as their activities relate to private equity. To address the question of why these new financial intermediaries have become prominent in the last three decades, we begin by outlining the changes in financial regulation in the U.S. and the characteristics of labor market institutions that have facilitated the emergence and rapid growth of private equity and other alternative investment funds. We outline the changes in size and scope of the private equity industry; describe the generic PE business model, using examples from the retail sector where it has been particularly active; and examine the sources of gains for PE investors. We then review the impact of private equity buyouts on the sustainability of the operating companies and on workers and employment relations in these companies. In the period since the collapse of the housing and real estate markets and the onset of recession and financial crisis, the risk of financial distress and even bankruptcies among the highly leveraged operating companies in PE portfolios has increased. We examine this increased risk to operating companies in this period. In addition, we discuss the experience of private equity firms in the post-crisis period, noting the signs of recovery in the sector as well as the continuing challenges facing private equity investors. We illustrate our points – both positive and negative – with brief case examples to help clarify the issues. We conclude with proposals for regulatory changes that are needed to curb the destructive outcomes associated with some types of private equity activity

Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk

U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights. This Article examines whether exempting those transactions from bankruptcy’s automatic stay, including the stay of foreclosure actions against collateral, is necessary or appropriate in order to minimize systemic risk