8,945 research outputs found
ID-based Ring Signature and Proxy Ring Signature Schemes from Bilinear Pairings
In 2001, Rivest et al. firstly introduced the concept of ring signatures. A
ring signature is a simplified group signature without any manager. It protects
the anonymity of a signer. The first scheme proposed by Rivest et al. was based
on RSA cryptosystem and certificate based public key setting. The first ring
signature scheme based on DLP was proposed by Abe, Ohkubo, and Suzuki. Their
scheme is also based on the general certificate-based public key setting too.
In 2002, Zhang and Kim proposed a new ID-based ring signature scheme using
pairings. Later Lin and Wu proposed a more efficient ID-based ring signature
scheme. Both these schemes have some inconsistency in computational aspect.
In this paper we propose a new ID-based ring signature scheme and a proxy
ring signature scheme. Both the schemes are more efficient than existing one.
These schemes also take care of the inconsistencies in above two schemes.Comment: Published with ePrint Archiv
Tracking Report 2010 Asics, China 40021512HV
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, Cornell University, pertaining to the effects of globalization on the workplace worldwide. Special emphasis is placed on labor rights, working conditions, labor market changes, and union organizing.FLA_2011_Asics_TR_China_400215124HV.pdf: 7 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020
KeyForge: Mitigating Email Breaches with Forward-Forgeable Signatures
Email breaches are commonplace, and they expose a wealth of personal,
business, and political data that may have devastating consequences. The
current email system allows any attacker who gains access to your email to
prove the authenticity of the stolen messages to third parties -- a property
arising from a necessary anti-spam / anti-spoofing protocol called DKIM. This
exacerbates the problem of email breaches by greatly increasing the potential
for attackers to damage the users' reputation, blackmail them, or sell the
stolen information to third parties.
In this paper, we introduce "non-attributable email", which guarantees that a
wide class of adversaries are unable to convince any third party of the
authenticity of stolen emails. We formally define non-attributability, and
present two practical system proposals -- KeyForge and TimeForge -- that
provably achieve non-attributability while maintaining the important protection
against spam and spoofing that is currently provided by DKIM. Moreover, we
implement KeyForge and demonstrate that that scheme is practical, achieving
competitive verification and signing speed while also requiring 42% less
bandwidth per email than RSA2048
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