Certificate size reduction in abstraction-carrying code

Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been proposed as a framework for mobile code safety in which the code supplier provides a program together with an abstraction (or abstract model of the program) whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certificate and its generation is carried out automatically by a fixpoint analyzer. The advantage of providing a (fixpoint) abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked in a single pass (i.e., one iteration) of an abstract interpretation-based checker. A main challenge to make ACC useful in practice is to reduce the size of certificates as much as possible while at the same time not increasing checking time. The intuitive idea is to only include in the certificate information that the checker is unable to reproduce without iterating. We introduce the notion of reduced certificate which characterizes the subset of the abstraction which a checker needs in order to validate (and re-construct) the fall certificate in a single pass. Based on this notion, we instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the necessary extensions in order to identify the information relevant to the checker. Interestingly, the fact that the reduced certificate omits (parts of) the abstraction has implications in the design of the checker. We provide the sufficient conditions which allow us to ensure that 1) if the checker succeeds in validating the certificate, then the certificate is valid for the program (correctness) and 2) the checker will succeed for any reduced certificate which is valid (completeness). Our approach has been implemented and benchmarked within the CiaoPP system. The experimental results show t h a t our proposal is able to greatly reduce the size of certificates in practice. To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP)

On abstraction-carrying code and certificate-size reduction

Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) is a framework for mobile code safety in which the code supplier provides a program together with an abstraction (or abstract model of the program) whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certificate and its generation is carried out automatically by a fixed-point analyzer. The advantage of providing a (fixed-point) abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked in a single pass (i.e., one iteration) of an abstract interpretation-based checker. A main challenge to make ACC useful in practice is to reduce the size of certificates as much as possible, while at the same time not increasing checking time. Intuitively, we only include in the certificate the information which the checker is unable to reproduce without iterating. We introduce the notion of reduced certifícate which characterizes the subset of the abstraction which a checker needs in order to validate (and re-construct) the full certificate in a single pass. Based on this notion, we show how to instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the necessary extensions in order to identify the information relevant to the checker

Abstract Certification of Java Programs in Rewriting Logic

In this thesis we propose an abstraction based certification technique for Java programs which is based on rewriting logic, a very general logical and semantic framework efficiently implemented in the functional programming language Maude. We focus on safety properties, i.e. properties of a system that are defined in terms of certain events not happening, which we characterize as unreachability problems in rewriting logic. The safety policy is expressed in the style of JML, a standard property specification language for Java modules. In order to provide a decision procedure, we enforce finite-state models of programs by using abstract interpretation. Starting from a specification of the Java semantics written in Maude, we develop an abstraction based, finite-state operational semantics also written in Maude which is appropriate for program verification. As a by-product of the verification based on abstraction, a dependable safety certificate is delivered which consists of a set of rewriting proofs that can be easily checked by the code consumer by using a standard rewriting logic engine. The abstraction based proof-carrying code technique, called JavaPCC, has been implemented and successfully tested on several examples, which demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. We analyse local properties of Java methods: i.e. properties of methods regarding their parameters and results. We also study global confidentiality properties of complete Java classes, by initially considering non--interference and, then, erasure with and without non--interference. Non--interference is a semantic program property that assigns confidentiality levels to data objects and prevents illicit information flows from occurring from high to low security levels. In this thesis, we present a novel security model for global non--interference which approximates non--interference as a safety property.Alba Castro, MF. (2011). Abstract Certification of Java Programs in Rewriting Logic [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/13617Palanci

Generation of reduced certificates in abstraction-carrying code

Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been proposed as a framework for mobile code safety in which the code supplier provides a program together with an abstraction whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certifícate and its generation is carried out automatically by a fixed-point analyzer. The advantage of providing a (fixedpoint) abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked in a single pass of an abstract interpretation-based checker. A main challenge is to reduce the size of certificates as much as possible while at the same time not increasing checking time. In this paper, we first introduce the notion of reduced certifícate which characterizes the subset of the abstraction which a checker needs in order to validate (and re-construct) the full certifícate in a single pass. Based on this notion, we then instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the necessary extensions in order to identify the information relevant to the checker

Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Proof-Carrying Code and Software Certification

This NASA conference publication contains the proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Proof-Carrying Code and Software Certification, held as part of LICS in Los Angeles, CA, USA, on August 15, 2009. Software certification demonstrates the reliability, safety, or security of software systems in such a way that it can be checked by an independent authority with minimal trust in the techniques and tools used in the certification process itself. It can build on existing validation and verification (V&V) techniques but introduces the notion of explicit software certificates, Vvilich contain all the information necessary for an independent assessment of the demonstrated properties. One such example is proof-carrying code (PCC) which is an important and distinctive approach to enhancing trust in programs. It provides a practical framework for independent assurance of program behavior; especially where source code is not available, or the code author and user are unknown to each other. The workshop wiII address theoretical foundations of logic-based software certification as well as practical examples and work on alternative application domains. Here "certificate" is construed broadly, to include not just mathematical derivations and proofs but also safety and assurance cases, or any fonnal evidence that supports the semantic analysis of programs: that is, evidence about an intrinsic property of code and its behaviour that can be independently checked by any user, intermediary, or third party. These guarantees mean that software certificates raise trust in the code itself, distinct from and complementary to any existing trust in the creator of the code, the process used to produce it, or its distributor. In addition to the contributed talks, the workshop featured two invited talks, by Kelly Hayhurst and Andrew Appel. The PCC 2009 website can be found at http://ti.arc.nasa.gov /event/pcc 091

Computer-aided verification in mechanism design

In mechanism design, the gold standard solution concepts are dominant strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. These solution concepts relieve the (possibly unsophisticated) bidders from the need to engage in complicated strategizing. While incentive properties are simple to state, their proofs are specific to the mechanism and can be quite complex. This raises two concerns. From a practical perspective, checking a complex proof can be a tedious process, often requiring experts knowledgeable in mechanism design. Furthermore, from a modeling perspective, if unsophisticated agents are unconvinced of incentive properties, they may strategize in unpredictable ways. To address both concerns, we explore techniques from computer-aided verification to construct formal proofs of incentive properties. Because formal proofs can be automatically checked, agents do not need to manually check the properties, or even understand the proof. To demonstrate, we present the verification of a sophisticated mechanism: the generic reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to algorithm design given by Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian. This mechanism presents new challenges for formal verification, including essential use of randomness from both the execution of the mechanism and from the prior type distributions. As an immediate consequence, our work also formalizes Bayesian incentive compatibility for the entire family of mechanisms derived via this reduction. Finally, as an intermediate step in our formalization, we provide the first formal verification of incentive compatibility for the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Foundational certification of data-flow analyses

Data-flow analyses, such as live variables analysis, available expressions analysis etc., are usefully specifiable as type systems. These are sound and, in the case of distributive analysis frameworks, complete wrt. appropriate natural semantics on abstract properties. Applications include certification of analyses and "optimization" of functional correctness proofs alongside programs. On the example of live variables analysis, we show that analysis type systems are applied versions of more foundational Hoare logics describing either the same abstract property semantics as the type system (liveness states) or a more concrete natural semantics on transition traces of a suitable kind (future defs and uses). The rules of the type system are derivable in the Hoare logic for the abstract property semantics and those in turn in the Hoare logic for the transition trace semantics. This reduction of the burden of trusting the certification vehicle can be compared to foundational proof-carrying code, where general-purpose program logics are preferred to special-purpose type systems and universal logic to program logics. We also look at conditional liveness analysis to see that the same foundational development is also possible for conditional data-flow analyses proceeding from type systems for combined “standard state and abstract property” semantics.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT