Explanation and Understanding Revisited

"Explanation and Understanding" (1971) by Georg Henrik von Wright is a modern classic in analytic hermeneutics, and in the philosophy of the social sciences and humanities in general. In this work, von Wright argues against naturalism, or methodological monism, i.e. the idea that both the natural sciences and the social sciences follow broadly the same general scientific approach and aim to achieve causal explanations. Against this view, von Wright contends that the social sciences are qualitatively different from the natural sciences: according to his view, the natural sciences aim at causal explanations, whereas the purpose of the social sciences is to understand their subjects. In support of this conviction, von Wright also puts forward a version of the so-called logical connection argument. Von Wright views scientific explanation along the lines of the traditional covering law model. He suggests that the social sciences, in contrast, utilize what he calls “practical syllogism” in understanding human actions. In addition, von Wright presents in this work an original picture on causation: a version of the manipulability theory of causation. In the four decades following von Wright’s classic work, the overall picture in in the philosophy of science has changed significantly, and much progress has been made in various fronts. The aim of the contribution is to revisit the central ideas of "Explanation and Understanding" and evaluate them from this perspective. The covering law model of explanation and the regularity theory of causation behind it have since then fallen into disfavor, and virtually no one believes that causal explanations even in the natural sciences comply with the covering law model. No wonder then that covering law explanations are not found in the social sciences either. Ironically, the most popular theory of causal explanation in the philosophy of science nowadays is the interventionist theory, which is a descendant of the manipulability theory of von Wright and others. However, this theory can be applied with no special difficulties in both the natural sciences and the social sciences. Von Wright’s logical connection argument and his ideas concerning practical syllogisms are also critically assessed. It is argued that in closer scrutiny, they do not pose serious problems for the view that the social sciences too provide causal explanations. In sum, von Wright’s arguments against naturalism do not appear, in today’s perspective, particularly convincing

The reign of Prince Auto : psychology in an age of science

Copyright SpringerThe principle of autonomy (hereafter Prince Auto) is a doctrine which commits physicalistic philosophers to mechanical explanations of human behaviour. In this paper I argue that physicalism (in all its forms) presents a much too narrow account of scientific explanation. If we are to develop an adequate philosophy of psychology we must first free ourselves from the rule of a metaphysical picture which has dominated philosophy since at least the time of Descartes. We must free ourselves from the reign of Prince Auto.Peer reviewe

Recent developments for naturalizing the mind.

The connection between having a mind and fitting a rational pattern remains an important insight

Theory borrowing in IT-rich contexts : lessons from IS strategy research

While indigenous theorizing in information systems has clear merits, theory borrowing will not, and should not, be eschewed given its appeal and usefulness. In this article, we aim at increasing our understanding of modifying of borrowed theories in IT-rich contexts. We present a framework in which we discuss how two recontextualization approaches of specification and distinction help with increasing the IT-richness of borrowed constructs and relationships. In doing so, we use several illustrative examples from information systems strategy. The framework can be used by researchers as a tool to explore the multitude of ways in which a theory from another discipline can yield the understanding of IT phenomena

Sharedness and privateness in human early social life

This research is concerned with the innate predispositions underlying human intentional communication. Human communication is currently defined as a circular and overt attempt to modify a partner's mental states. This requires each party involved to posse ss the ability to represent and understand the other's mental states, a capability which is commonly referred to as mindreading, or theory of mind (ToM). The relevant experimental literature agrees that no such capability is to be found in the human speci es at least during the first year of life, and possibly later. This paper aims at advancing a solution to this theoretical problem. We propose to consider sharedness as the basis for intentional communication in the infant and to view it as a primitive, i nnate component of her cognitive architecture. Communication can then build upon the mental grounds that the infant takes as shared with her caregivers. We view this capability as a theory of mind in a weak sense.

Rational Reconstruction Reconsidered

Here is a dilemma concerning the history of science. Can the history of scientific thought be reduced to the history of the beliefs, motives and actions of scientists? Or should we think of the history of scientific thought as in some sense independent from the history of scientists? The aim of this paper is to carve out an intermediate position between these two. I will argue that the history of scientific thought supervenes on, but not reducible to, the history of scientists. There is a legitimate level of description for analyzing the history of scientific thought that does not reduce to the individual level of scientists. Yet, every aspect of the history of scientific thought is determined by the actual motives and actions of individual scientists. Maybe surprisingly, I use Imre Lakatos’s controversial concept of the rational reconstruction of the history of science in order to argue for this intermediate position

Revisiting the role of the grounded theory research methodology in the accounting Information systems

The aim of this paper is to explore the role of grounded theory (GT) as a research method in the accounting information systems. The GT research method can able the GT researcher to generate a rigour theory. This research paper seeks to investigate how researchers can use GT in relation to its epistemological perspective, methodological stance and research methods. GT as a research philosophy provides clear understanding of how to generate and develop rigorous theory. GT offers an interpretative perspective based on its epistemological stance. This interpretative perspective can be a foundation for GT researchers in interpretative accounting information systems researches

Politics, Deception, and Being Self-Deceived

A review of Anna Elisabeth Galeotti's "Political Self-Deception

Representing First-Order Causal Theories by Logic Programs

Nonmonotonic causal logic, introduced by Norman McCain and Hudson Turner, became a basis for the semantics of several expressive action languages. McCain's embedding of definite propositional causal theories into logic programming paved the way to the use of answer set solvers for answering queries about actions described in such languages. In this paper we extend this embedding to nondefinite theories and to first-order causal logic.Comment: 29 pages. To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP); Theory and Practice of Logic Programming, May, 201