RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT IN RESOLVING INTERNET INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES

This Article will examine the terms and conditions under which Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) switch and route traffic for each of several links between a source of content and consumers. The Article concludes that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) may lack direct statutory authority even to resolve disputes based on its determination that Internet access constitutes an unregulated information service. Additionally the FCC may appropriately forebear from regulating, because sufficient competition favors industry self-regulation. Despite substantial reasons not to intervene, the FCC nevertheless might have to clarify its understanding of what subscribers of retail ISP services can expect to receive. Under truth in billing and other consumer safeguards the Commission might require ISPs to explain what an Internet subscription guarantees not only in terms of transmission speed and downloading capacity, but also what subscribers can expect their ISPs to do when receiving content requiring downstream termination. The Article concludes that both customers of content services, such as Netflix, and retail ISP subscribers expect their service providers to guarantee delivery of movies and all sorts of Internet traffic respectively. For physical delivery of DVDs Netflix must pay the U.S. Postal Service and for delivery of streaming bits Netflix must pay one or more ISPs. But for Internet traffic involving two or more ISPs, the Article examines whether other retail ISPs providing last mile delivery of content violate their service commitments to subscribers by demanding additional payment from upstream carriers

Schizophrenia Among Carriers: How Common and Private Carriers Trade Places

This article will examine court cases and actions by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that distort the traditional concepts of common and private carriage by establishing new rights and responsibilities previously applicable to the other category of carrier. This article will also consider the feasibility of (a) maintaining the traditional common carrier regulatory model and (b) continuing the application of that model to basic services provided by local exchange carriers (LECs). This is especially important as LECs qualify to become private carriers tapping new market opportunities, even within the same geographical region where they provide basic services. Finally, this article examines the circumstances that continue to require application of the pure common carrier model (e.g., the FCC currently regulates the telecommunication transport operations of Comsat Corporation, but does not regulate its non-carrier ventures)

Technological Determinism and Its Discontents

This book review takes a critical review of the claim advanced by Susan Crawford in Captive Audience that the merger between Comcast and NBC Universal would harm consumers and that policymakers should instead promote common carriage regulation and subsidize municipal symmetrical gigabit fiber-to-the-home (FTTH). First it evaluates the extent to which next-generation digital subscriber lines (DSL) and wireless broadband technologies can serve as effective substitutes for cable modem service, identifying FCC data showing that the market has become increasingly competitive and likely to continue to do so. Furthermore, the market is not structured in a way that would permit the combination between content and conduit to harm competition. Furthermore, past attempts to recalibrate the balance between content producers and distribution channels have had the unintended consequence of reducing incentives to invest in network infrastructure. It can also deter technical leadership and innovation within the communications platform itself