80 research outputs found

    Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks

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    The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things Journa

    The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Internet Economy

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    The next stage of the digital economy will involve trillions of networked devices across every industry and sphere of human activity: The Internet of the World. Early manifestations of this evolution through on-demand services such as Uber and Airbnb raise a host of serious legal questions. The stage seems set for a decisive battle between regulation and innovation. Yet this perception is mistaken. In the end, the emerging businesses will welcome government engagement, and regulatory actors will accept creative solutions to achieve their goals. Why expect such a resolution? Because the same story played out twenty years ago, in the early days of the commercial internet. Contemporary debates recapitulate a familiar error: the artificial division of virtual and real-space activity. Now, as in the past, this “digital dichotomy” feeds both excessive skepticism about legal protections and excessive concern about the threats from technology-based innovations. The history of cyberlaw shows the importance of overcoming such perceptions and recognizing the potential of government as an enabler of innovation

    Pluralizing the Sharing Economy

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    The so-called “sharing” economy presents one of the most important and controversial regulatory dilemmas of our time—yet, surprisingly, it remains undertheorized. This Article supplies needed analysis. Specifically, the Article offers a regulatory model that distinguishes between two separate kinds of transactions: conventional economic transactions and those that rely on temporary access to goods and services that would otherwise go underutilized (what I call “access-to-excess” transactions). The regulatory regime that this Article proposes would distinguish between true access-to-excess transactions and conventional transactions. The model is rooted in a version of pluralist theory that posits that the state is responsible for cultivating a range of social institutions that offer meaningful economic and social alternatives to individuals. Recognizing access-to-excess transactions in a separate legal regime does not mean countenancing all access-to-excess activity in an under-regulated Wild West of markets. Pluralism has something to offer here as well: I argue that, properly understood, pluralistic principles do not endorse free-market and hands-off policies. Rather, they require state intervention to preserve existing choices, embed and balance diverse values (not only autonomy), ensure fair competition, and protect consumers and employees from strategic and opportunistic behaviors. Thus, pluralistic principles offer the normative foundation for inventive regulation—neither conventional nor free market—that can restrain some of the “sharing” economy’s harms without impeding innovation. Finally, the Article reverses the lens: The “sharing” economy serves as a real-life laboratory to reveal the operation of pluralistic theory and, thus, sheds light on the theory’s limitations. In particular, the “sharing” economy shows how the plasticity of pluralistic theory may enable harmful free-market policies to masquerade as “choice.

    Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods

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    Understanding if, and when, copyright should attempt to proscribe private copying deserves far more than the simplistic treatment it has so far received from a handful of courts. This Essay aims to begin that conversation. Part I begins by introducing simple models that compare the market and socially optimal production of continuous and discrete public goods models and discussing their implications for copyright. Part II will then focus on the limits of the market\u27s ability to produce efficiently discrete public goods in the absence of government intervention. Part III will then consider the implications of the discrete public goods model for copyright. Finally, in Part IV, I offer some concluding thoughts

    Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods

    Get PDF
    Understanding if, and when, copyright should attempt to proscribe private copying deserves far more than the simplistic treatment it has so far received from a handful of courts. This Essay aims to begin that conversation. Part I begins by introducing simple models that compare the market and socially optimal production of continuous and discrete public goods models and discussing their implications for copyright. Part II will then focus on the limits of the market\u27s ability to produce efficiently discrete public goods in the absence of government intervention. Part III will then consider the implications of the discrete public goods model for copyright. Finally, in Part IV, I offer some concluding thoughts

    Platform capitalism: the intermediation and capitalization of digital economic circulation

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    A new form of digital economic circulation has emerged, wherein ideas, knowledge, labour and use rights for otherwise idle assets move between geographically distributed but connected and interactive online communities. Such circulation is apparent across a number of digital economic ecologies, including social media, online marketplaces, crowdsourcing, crowdfunding and other manifestations of the so-called ‘sharing economy’. Prevailing accounts deploy concepts such as ‘co-production’, ‘prosumption’ and ‘peer-to-peer’ to explain digital economic circulation as networked exchange relations characterised by their disintermediated, collaborative and democratizing qualities. Building from the neologism of platform capitalism, we place ‘the platform’ – understood as a distinct mode of socio-technical intermediary and business arrangement that is incorporated into wider processes of capitalization – at the centre of the critical analysis of digital economic circulation. To create multi-sided markets and coordinate network effects, platforms enrol users through a participatory economic culture and mobilize code and data analytics to compose immanent infrastructures. Platform intermediation is also nested in the ex-post construction of a replicable business model. Prioritizing rapid up-scaling and extracting revenues from circulations and associated data trails, the model performs the structure of venture capital investment which capitalizes on the potential of platforms to realize monopoly rents

    Contrived Surplus and Negative Externalities in the Sharing Economy

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    The modern-day sharing economy delivers a multitude of benefits to users and providers worldwide. While there is much discussion about its benefits (e.g., convenience, access, and income), due to its largely unregulated/ under-regulated status, the increasing commercialization of the sharing economy spawns negative effects which must be mitigated to foster long-term sustainability. Based on externalities and concerned markets, this conceptual paper examines the implications of contrived surplus for stakeholders in ridesharing, home sharing, and bike sharing and presents managerial implications for developing these sectors in a reasonable and sustainable manner

    Contrived Surplus And Negative Externalities In The Sharing Economy

    Get PDF
    The modern-day sharing economy delivers a multitude of benefits to users and providers worldwide. While there is much discussion about its benefits (e.g., convenience, access, and income), due to its largely unregulated/ underregulated status, the increasing commercialization of the sharing economy spawns negative effects which must be mitigated to foster long-term sustainability. Based on externalities and concerned markets, this conceptual paper examines the implications of contrived surplus for stakeholders in ridesharing, home sharing, and bike sharing and presents managerial implications for developing these sectors in a reasonable and sustainable manner
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