RTO Governance Structures Can Affect Capacity Market Outcomes

Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), which coordinate delivery for over two-thirds of the electricity consumed in the U.S., are required by the FERC to employ stakeholder-driven mechanisms to establish market and operational rules. These “governance structures” set up a quasi-political process for determining which market rules are adopted and which are not. This study shows how governance systems are not simply administrative constructs but have real impacts – the details of how the market rules are made will ultimately affect market outcomes. Using the capacity market in the PJM Interconnection as a case study, we model the preferences of individual stakeholders over different capacity market designs, under different decision rules for which capacity market design is implemented. We compare capacity market design choices under PJM’s current decision system, which requires a super-majority in a sector-weighted voting context to implement a new market rule, with the decision systems used in the New York ISO and also under systems of preferential voting. This voting model is integrated with a model of capacity market clearing which allows us to demonstrate how different decision systems matter in terms of installed capacity and capacity market outcomes

One Person, One Weighted Vote

This Article argues that weighted voting should be used to comply with the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement while preserving representation for political units on the legislative body. First, this Article demonstrates that weighted voting satisfies the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement by equalizing the mathematic weight of each vote. Second, this Article demonstrates that weighted voting has the potential to remedy several negative consequences of equal- population districts. Specifically, this Article argues that by preserving local political boundaries, weighted voting eliminates the decennial redistricting process that gives rise to claims of partisan gerrymandering, enables local governments to function both as administrative arms of the state and as independent political communities and provides a format for regional governance. Third, this Article recognizes that while weighted- voting equalizes the mathematic weight of each vote, it does not equalize all aspects of legislative representation. In particular, this Article explains that weighted-voting generates inequality in the functional representation each voter receives, inflates the political power and voting power of legislators from more populous districts, and increases the risk of minority vote dilution. Though the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of weighted voting, this Article argues that weighted voting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, this Article maintains that the Equal Protection Clause does not require equal functional representation or legislator power, and that the Supreme Court permits the use of at-large voting systems that have a similar capacity to dilute minority voice. Thus, this Article concludes that while it is important to recognize the tradeoffs inherent in weighted-voting apportionment plans, these tradeoffs do not preclude their use

Workforce participation: developing a theoretical framework for longitudinal research

This paper describes and evaluates an action research project on workforce participation at Viewpoint Research Community Interest Company (CIC). By setting out the research protocols devised by Viewpoint to stimulate and study co-operative management, it is possible to abstract a theoretical framework that emerged from a pilot case study. The paper contributes to theory by highlighting not only the potential of action research to catalyse interest in co operative management but also how to engage theoretically with the paradox of a workforce voting to limit its own participation in ownership, governance and management. In this study, the authors interpreted that participants did not automatically equate participatory management with workplace democracy leading to a theoretical perspective that “democratic management is the propensity and capacity of management systems to respond to members’ desires regarding the scope, depth, level and quality of participation in management”. The paper concludes by evaluating the efficacy of Viewpoint’s action research methodology as a strategy for deepening knowledge on workforce participation in co-operatives and employee-owned businesses

Capacity-testing as a means of increasing political inclusion

Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilized by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity-testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilize capacity-testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity-testing against common objections

Power, Connected Coalitions, and Efficiency: Challenges to the Council of the European Union

This article is concerned with challenges to reforming the voting procedures of the Council of the European Union (EU). The next major waves of EU enlargement will cause the Union to increase to a membership of first twenty-one, and then twenty-six or possibly even more states. How does enlargement affect the Council's inherent "capacity to act" under the currently used qualified majority voting rule? It is demon strated here that the expected increase in EU membership will most likely induce a larger "status quo bias" as compared to the present situation in the Council if the crucial majority decision quota is not lowered. In addition, the article is responding to some criticism that has been applied against assessing the leverage of EU governments in one of the EU's most important institutions: the Council of the EU. By resorting to techniques that capture the influence of a priori coalitions on the one hand and "connected coalitions" among EU governments on the other—applying n- person cooperative game theory—the piece illustrates how the assessment of relative voting leverage in the framework of weighted voting systems may be extended and applied to situations in which the specific distribu tion of members' preferences is known. These calculations are again relevant in the face of the upcoming rounds of EU enlargement and projects for institutional reform.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68064/2/10.1177_019251219902000404.pd

On the Hardness of Bribery Variants in Voting with CP-Nets

We continue previous work by Mattei et al. (Mattei, N., Pini, M., Rossi, F., Venable, K.: Bribery in voting with CP-nets. Ann. of Math. and Artif. Intell. pp. 1--26 (2013)) in which they study the computational complexity of bribery schemes when voters have conditional preferences that are modeled by CP-nets. For most of the cases they considered, they could show that the bribery problem is solvable in polynomial time. Some cases remained open---we solve two of them and extend the previous results to the case that voters are weighted. Moreover, we consider negative (weighted) bribery in CP-nets, when the briber is not allowed to pay voters to vote for his preferred candidate.Comment: improved readability; identified Cheapest Subsets to be the enumeration variant of K.th Largest Subset, so we renamed it to K-Smallest Subsets and point to the literatur; some more typos fixe

Electronic Voting: the Devil is in the Details

Observing electronic voting from an international point of view gives some perspective about its genesis and evolution. An analysis of the voting process through its cultural, ontological, legal and political dimensions explains the difficulty to normalize this process. It appears that international organizations are not capable to properly defend the fundamental rights of the citizens. The approach that was taken when DRE voting computers appeared seems to have reoccured with VVAT voting computers and the european e-poll project.Comment: 9 page

Report on the Evaluation of EVS Usage and Trends at the University of Hertfordshire : February to June 2014

The Electronic Voting Systems (EVS) evaluation project for iTEAM has investigated the current level of engagement in the use of EVS across the institution in 2014. It has built on the work and outputs of the JISC supported Evaluating Electronic Voting Systems (EEVS) project in 2011-12 and the work of the iTEAM project through 2011-2013. It offers an up-to-date examination of the trends in EVS adoption and the breadth and nature of EVS use across the different academic schools. The project adopted a mixed-methods approach to evaluate usage and engagement. The starting point was a desk study to examine the existing data on numbers of EVS handsets purchased by academic schools in 2011, 2012 and 2013 and registered across the University and to explore the details from the School reports previously submitted to iTEAM. Sources of data included Information Hertfordshire and the iTEAM archive. Quantitative surveys were drawn up and information requests for student numbers were made to Senior Administrative Managers (SAM). A series of interviews were held with School-based academics including EVS Champions and Associate Deans for Learning and Teaching. Three purchasing trends for EVS handsets by different Schools were found:- slow decrease in HUM, LAW and PAM, moderate increase in BS, EDU and HSK and rapid increase in CS, ET and LMS. In terms of levels of EVS usage in 2013 -14 four different patterns emerged among the schools. These showed: slow increase (CS, LMS and PAM), slow decrease (BS, ET, EDU and HUM), rapid decrease (LAW) and no change (CA and HSK). The EVS purchasing and usage trends comply with the figures given by Rogers for his technology adoption model. Some schools are characterised by successful ongoing EVS use over several years while other school strategies for EVS, which had showed promise early on, have faltered in their use. There was some evidence that academics in STEMM subjects are more likely to engage willingly with EVS use where larger groups are taught, but this is not yet in evidence across all the STEMM groups at this university. Furthermore good practice exists and flourishes across non-STEMM subjects as well. The strategies for successful School-based EVS embedding and continued use include the following three hallmarks:- •Top-down management support for purchasing of handsets and including training for academics and administrators, and alignment with the School teaching and learning strategy. •The existence of a core of innovators and early adopters of technology including the local EVS champions, who are willing to actively engage with their fellow colleagues in sharing the potential of EVS technology. •An engagement with the pedagogical implications for changing and developing practice that the greater use of formative or summative polling and questioning requires. The immediate future of classroom technologies such as EVS offers two main directions. Firstly, there is the continuation of adopting ‘institutionally provided’ handheld devices. This is a low-cost method that can be used easily and flexibly. The other options for classroom polling rely on sufficient wifi availability in the teaching rooms and/or mobile phone signal strength/network availability and capacity. It is anticipated that the capacity issue will present fewer barriers for adoption in future, and that the future of the classroom response systems is inevitably linked to the widespread use of mobile technologies by students

Towards Optimal Distributed Node Scheduling in a Multihop Wireless Network through Local Voting

In a multihop wireless network, it is crucial but challenging to schedule transmissions in an efficient and fair manner. In this paper, a novel distributed node scheduling algorithm, called Local Voting, is proposed. This algorithm tries to semi-equalize the load (defined as the ratio of the queue length over the number of allocated slots) through slot reallocation based on local information exchange. The algorithm stems from the finding that the shortest delivery time or delay is obtained when the load is semi-equalized throughout the network. In addition, we prove that, with Local Voting, the network system converges asymptotically towards the optimal scheduling. Moreover, through extensive simulations, the performance of Local Voting is further investigated in comparison with several representative scheduling algorithms from the literature. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm achieves better performance than the other distributed algorithms in terms of average delay, maximum delay, and fairness. Despite being distributed, the performance of Local Voting is also found to be very close to a centralized algorithm that is deemed to have the optimal performance