The Other Side of Limited Liability: Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing

This paper investigates the interplay of investment irreversibility, predatory behavior, and limited liability in a duopoly with aggregate demand uncertainty. We find that limited liability and investment irreversibility is likely to produce predatory behavior in very competitive industries in which prices react strongly to changes in quantity and capacity increases are not too costly. The rationale for this may be summarized as follows: Under limited liability, the owners of a firm have to decide whether they are willing to finance losses from private funds, or whether they rather default on the firms obligations in adverse states. However, market conditions themselves become endogenous in a duopoly since the quantity decisions of all competitors determine the market price. If now investment is irreversible, it is a strong commitment. It hence becomes a device to force others to leave early and allows oneself to commit to leave late. If the ability to promote the exit of a competitor is strong, it may then even result in firms investing only to prey, i.e. firms invest only to consequently monopolize the market. Therefore, the model of this paper explains predatory behavior in a duopoly without invoking reputational, network- or learning-effects. Moreover, this paper's model also does not define predatory behavior as deviations from tacit collusion.Real Options, Duopoly, Predatory Behavior, Timing Game

Incorporating life cycle external cost in optimization of the electricity generation mix

The present work aims to examine the strategic decision of future electricity generation mix considering, together with all other factors, the effect of the external cost associated with the available power generation technology options, not only during their operation but also during their whole life cycle. The analysis has been performed by integrating the Life Cycle Assessment concept into a linear programming model for the yearly decisions on which option should be used to minimize the electricity generation cost. The model has been applied for the case of Greece for the years 2012-2050 and has led to several interesting results. Firstly, most of the new generating capacity should be renewable (mostly biomass and wind), while natural gas is usually the only conventional fuel technology chosen. If externalities are considered, wind energy increases its share and hydro-power replaces significant amounts of biomass-generated energy. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis has been performed. One of the most important findings is that natural gas increases its contribution when externalities are increased. Summing-up, external cost has been found to be a significant percentage of the total electricity generation cost for some energy sources, therefore significantly changing the ranking order of cost-competitiveness for the energy sources examined

Modelling Wind in the Electricity Sector

We represent hourly, regional an wind data and transmission constraints in an investment planning model calibrated to the UK and test sensitivities of least cost expansions to fuel and technology prices. Thus we can calculate the value of transmission expansions to the system. We represent limited public acceptance of wind and regional network constraints by maximum built rates per region and year. Thus we calculate the marginal value of improved planning and grid connection regimes. It is likely that some constraints will remain. Market designs that do not allow for regional differentiation to reflect transmission and planning constraints can increase overall costs to consumers