Managing the trade-off implications of global supply

The cost versus response trade-off is a growing logistics issue due to many markets being increasingly characterized by demand uncertainty and shorter product life cycles. This is exacerbated further with supply increasingly moving to low cost global sources. However, the poor response implications of global supply are often not addressed or even acknowledged when undertaking such decisions. Consequently, various practical approaches to minimising, postponing or otherwise managing the impact of the demand uncertainty are often only adopted retrospectively. Even though such generic solutions are documented through case examples we lack effective tools and concepts to support the proactive identification and resolution of such trade-offs. This paper reports on case-based theory building research, involving three cases from the UK and USA used in developing a conceptual model with associated tools, in support of such a process

Structuring postponement strategies in the supply chain by analytical modeling

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The Flexibility and Specialization of Resources - Competitive Strategies of Materials Decoupling Points of a Network Supply Chain of Metallurgic Products

AbstractThe configuration of the supply chain which realizes the postponed production strategy, requires consideration of the issue of formation of network relations in order to increase the supply potential. The increase in the number of network relations shaped by materials decoupling point of the supply chain can be a consequence of an endeavour to reduce the logistic costs, improvement in the level of the customer service or an increase in innovativeness. In the model presented in the article the authors considered the issue of reducing logistic costs with the established high level of the customer service, taking into account the problem of the flexibility of resources

Transmission and interconnection planning in power systems: Contributions to investment under uncertainty and cross-border cost allocation.

<p>Electricity transmission network investments are playing a key role in the integration process of power systems in the European Union. Given the magnitude of investment costs, their irreversibility, and their impact in the overall development of a region, accounting for the role of uncertainties as well as the involvement of multiple parties in the decision process allows for improved and more robust investment decisions. Even though the creation of this internal energy market requires attention to flexibility and strategic decision-making, existing literature and practitioners have not given proper attention to these topics. Using portfolios of real options, we present two stochastic mixed integer linear programming models for transmission network expansion planning. We study the importance of explicitly addressing uncertainties, the option to postpone decisions and other sources of flexibility in the design of transmission networks. In a case study based on the Azores archipelago we show how renewables penetration can increase by introducing contingency planning into the decision process considering generation capacity uncertainty. We also present a two-party Nash-Coase bargaining transmission capacity investment model. We illustrate optimal fair share cost allocation policies with a case study based on the Iberian market. Lastly, we develop a new model that considers both interconnection expansion planning under uncertainty and cross-border cost allocation based on portfolios of real options and Nash-Coase bargaining. The model is illustrated using Iberian transmission and market data.</p

Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty

In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators´ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors? decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.Fil: Rios Festner, Daniel. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; ParaguayFil: Blanco, Gerardo. Universidad Nacional de Asunción; ParaguayFil: Olsina, Fernando Gabriel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Juan. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica. Universidad Nacional de San Juan. Facultad de Ingeniería. Instituto de Energía Eléctrica; Argentin