Equality of Voice: Towards Fair Representation in Crowdsourced Top-K Recommendations

To help their users to discover important items at a particular time, major websites like Twitter, Yelp, TripAdvisor or NYTimes provide Top-K recommendations (e.g., 10 Trending Topics, Top 5 Hotels in Paris or 10 Most Viewed News Stories), which rely on crowdsourced popularity signals to select the items. However, different sections of a crowd may have different preferences, and there is a large silent majority who do not explicitly express their opinion. Also, the crowd often consists of actors like bots, spammers, or people running orchestrated campaigns. Recommendation algorithms today largely do not consider such nuances, hence are vulnerable to strategic manipulation by small but hyper-active user groups. To fairly aggregate the preferences of all users while recommending top-K items, we borrow ideas from prior research on social choice theory, and identify a voting mechanism called Single Transferable Vote (STV) as having many of the fairness properties we desire in top-K item (s)elections. We develop an innovative mechanism to attribute preferences of silent majority which also make STV completely operational. We show the generalizability of our approach by implementing it on two different real-world datasets. Through extensive experimentation and comparison with state-of-the-art techniques, we show that our proposed approach provides maximum user satisfaction, and cuts down drastically on items disliked by most but hyper-actively promoted by a few users.Comment: In the proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* '19). Please cite the conference versio

Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee

Dynamic Time-domain Duplexing for Self-backhauled Millimeter Wave Cellular Networks

Millimeter wave (mmW) bands between 30 and 300 GHz have attracted considerable attention for next-generation cellular networks due to vast quantities of available spectrum and the possibility of very high-dimensional antenna ar-rays. However, a key issue in these systems is range: mmW signals are extremely vulnerable to shadowing and poor high-frequency propagation. Multi-hop relaying is therefore a natural technology for such systems to improve cell range and cell edge rates without the addition of wired access points. This paper studies the problem of scheduling for a simple infrastructure cellular relay system where communication between wired base stations and User Equipment follow a hierarchical tree structure through fixed relay nodes. Such a systems builds naturally on existing cellular mmW backhaul by adding mmW in the access links. A key feature of the proposed system is that TDD duplexing selections can be made on a link-by-link basis due to directional isolation from other links. We devise an efficient, greedy algorithm for centralized scheduling that maximizes network utility by jointly optimizing the duplexing schedule and resources allocation for dense, relay-enhanced OFDMA/TDD mmW networks. The proposed algorithm can dynamically adapt to loading, channel conditions and traffic demands. Significant throughput gains and improved resource utilization offered by our algorithm over the static, globally-synchronized TDD patterns are demonstrated through simulations based on empirically-derived channel models at 28 GHz.Comment: IEEE Workshop on Next Generation Backhaul/Fronthaul Networks - BackNets 201

Calibrated Fairness in Bandits

We study fairness within the stochastic, \emph{multi-armed bandit} (MAB) decision making framework. We adapt the fairness framework of "treating similar individuals similarly" to this setting. Here, an `individual' corresponds to an arm and two arms are `similar' if they have a similar quality distribution. First, we adopt a {\em smoothness constraint} that if two arms have a similar quality distribution then the probability of selecting each arm should be similar. In addition, we define the {\em fairness regret}, which corresponds to the degree to which an algorithm is not calibrated, where perfect calibration requires that the probability of selecting an arm is equal to the probability with which the arm has the best quality realization. We show that a variation on Thompson sampling satisfies smooth fairness for total variation distance, and give an $\tilde{O}((kT)^{2/3})$ bound on fairness regret. This complements prior work, which protects an on-average better arm from being less favored. We also explain how to extend our algorithm to the dueling bandit setting.Comment: To be presented at the FAT-ML'17 worksho

Mechanism Design for Team Formation

Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in the related hedonic games has received much attention, but only from the perspective of coalition stability, with little emphasis on the mechanism design objectives of true preference elicitation, social welfare, and equity. We present the first formal mechanism design framework for team formation, building on recent combinatorial matching market design literature. We exhibit four mechanisms for this problem, two novel, two simple extensions of known mechanisms from other domains. Two of these (one new, one known) have desirable theoretical properties. However, we use extensive experiments to show our second novel mechanism, despite having no theoretical guarantees, empirically achieves good incentive compatibility, welfare, and fairness.Comment: 12 page

Online Algorithms for Matchings with Proportional Fairness Constraints and Diversity Constraints

Matching problems with group-fairness constraints and diversity constraints have numerous applications such as in allocation problems, committee selection, school choice, etc. Moreover, online matching problems have lots of applications in ad allocations and other e-commerce problems like product recommendation in digital marketing. We study two problems involving assigning {\em items} to {\em platforms}, where items belong to various {\em groups} depending on their attributes; the set of items are available offline and the platforms arrive online. In the first problem, we study online matchings with {\em proportional fairness constraints}. Here, each platform on arrival should either be assigned a set of items in which the fraction of items from each group is within specified bounds or be assigned no items; the goal is to assign items to platforms in order to maximize the number of items assigned to platforms. In the second problem, we study online matchings with {\em diversity constraints}, i.e. for each platform, absolute lower bounds are specified for each group. Each platform on arrival should either be assigned a set of items that satisfy these bounds or be assigned no items; the goal is to maximize the set of platforms that get matched. We study approximation algorithms and hardness results for these problems. The technical core of our proofs is a new connection between these problems and the problem of matchings in hypergraphs. Our experimental evaluation shows the performance of our algorithms on real-world and synthetic datasets exceeds our theoretical guarantees.Comment: 16 pages, Full version of a paper accepted in ECAI 202