Communication and Voting With Double-Sided Information

We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players’ preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players’ preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other. We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communica- tion is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player’s preferences and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication are independent of the identity of the sender

Information Bottleneck

The celebrated information bottleneck (IB) principle of Tishby et al. has recently enjoyed renewed attention due to its application in the area of deep learning. This collection investigates the IB principle in this new context. The individual chapters in this collection: • provide novel insights into the functional properties of the IB; • discuss the IB principle (and its derivates) as an objective for training multi-layer machine learning structures such as neural networks and decision trees; and • offer a new perspective on neural network learning via the lens of the IB framework. Our collection thus contributes to a better understanding of the IB principle specifically for deep learning and, more generally, of information–theoretic cost functions in machine learning. This paves the way toward explainable artificial intelligence

Risk-sharing with a central authority: Free-riding, lack of commitment, and bail-outs

Agents with independent risks (regions) often create unions and delegate redistributive power to a central institution (center) that provides risk-sharing through costly transfers. However, there is the risk that regions free-ride on each other; this risk may be exacerbated when the center cannot commit to future policies. We study a differential game of two regions that make savings decisions and a benevolent center that sets transfers but lacks commitment. One region always ends up bankrupt and the center provides a bailout: as the poor regions enters bankruptcy, there is an upward jump in transfers to the poor region that coincides with a downward jump in the poor region's consumption. Delegation to a center is Pareto-improving provided that the center's welfare weights reflect initial wealth differences between regions. However, once asymmetries in regions' wealth and the center's welfare weights become large, dynamics become unstable, thus hastening impoverishment and bail-outs

人・ユーザー中心の移動サービスと群集マネジメントのためのモデリング，シミュレーションと最適化

Tohoku University博士（情報科学）thesi

Social Welfare

"Social Welfare" offers, for the first time, a wide-ranging, internationally-focused selection of cutting-edge work from leading academics. Its interdisciplinary approach and comparative perspective promote examination of the most pressing social welfare issues of the day. The book aims to clarify some of the ambiguity around the term, discuss the pros and cons of privatization, present a range of social welfare paradoxes and innovations, and establish a clear set of economic frameworks with which to understand the conditions under which the change in social welfare can be obtained

Biofuels Production and Processing Technology

The negative impacts of global warming and global environmental pollution due to fossil fuels mean that the main challenge of modern society is finding alternatives to conventional fuels. In this scenario, biofuels derived from renewable biomass represent the most promising renewable energy sources. Depending on the biomass used by the fermentation technologies, it is possible to obtain first-generation biofuels produced from food crops, second-generation biofuels produced from non-food feedstock, mainly starting from renewable lignocellulosic biomasses, and third-generation biofuels, represented by algae or food waste biomass.Although biofuels appear to be the closest alternative to fossil fuels, it is necessary for them to be produced in competitive quantities and costs, requiring both improvements to production technologies and the diversification of feedstock. This Special Issue is focused on technological innovations, including the utilization of different feedstocks, with a particular focus on biethanol production from food waste; different biomass pretreatments; fermentation strategies, such as simultaneous saccharification and fermentation (SSF) or separate hydrolysis and fermentation (SHF); different applied microorganisms used as a monoculture or co-culture; and different setups for biofuel fermentation processes.The manuscripts collected represent a great opportunity for adding new knowledge to the scientific community as well as industry

Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?

Working paper GATE 2011-28We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both flow pro...ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric ...rms, either preemption or attrition occur depending on the size of the investment externality. Coordination is less likely with more discounting, as in a repeated game, and more likely with higher growth and volatility. Optimal cooperation involves either monopoly or duopoly investment, the latter being either symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, these characterizations are validated by applications to standard speci...cations of capacity accumulation and of R&D investment. In the former setup, coordination is likelier if installed capacities and lumpy investments are both large. With R&D input choices, if investment synergies are large, coordination and cooperation result in the same outcomes

The private sector and the marginalized poor : An assessment of the potential role of business in reducing poverty and marginality in rural Ethiopia

The present research analyzes the role that the private sector can play in reducing poverty and marginality in Ethiopia by providing improved agricultural inputs to marginalized poor farmers. Two important insights motivate the present research: one is the rise of various innovative business approaches in the last years that aim at reducing poverty or contributing to the solution to other societal problems. The other insight motivating this research is that the very poorest have long not benefitted from poverty reduction efforts. In that context, marginality has been identified as a root cause of poverty and its persistence. Against this background, the concept of marginality is presented and applied to the context of Ethiopia. Using Geographic Information System (GIS) software, a marginality map of Ethiopia is created by overlaying seven indicators capturing different aspects of marginality. Results show that marginality is a severe and widespread problem in Ethiopia with more than 40 million people being severely marginalized. Marginality hotspots are found in Amhara and SNNP. Interestingly, marginality hotspots are not correlated with agro-ecological zones and are ethnically more homogeneous than non-hotspot areas. Furthermore, areas posing specific business opportunities and challenges are identified based on information on population density, quality of road and mobile phone connection and farming systems. This area classification reveals that companies catering to the marginalized poor need to go the ‘last mile’ within areas exhibiting special business challenges and opportunities rather than investing in separated areas. After having identified and located the marginalized poor in Ethiopia, survey data that is representative for the most marginalized in the country is analyzed concerning purchasing behavior and needs expressed by the marginalized poor. Using descriptive statistics it can be shown that the amount of cash the marginalized poor have at hand varies considerably across regions but not very much within regions. The marginalized poor have in common that they spend a high percentage of their expenditures on food (around 70%), followed by commodities such as kerosene and clothes. The three most bought products are salt, kerosene and soap. This translates into considerable market sizes of these products. That people mention agricultural inputs as one of their most urgent unsatisfied needs can be explained by the fact that productivity of smallholder farmers is very low in Ethiopia and improved agricultural inputs are in short supply. Thus, an institutional analysis of the seed, fertilizer and agro-chemical markets is carried out to understand the frictions on these markets and to assess possibilities for the private sector to contribute to the reduction of poverty and marginality through adequate investments. Analyzing more than 60 expert interviews carried out in Ethiopia, it turns out that the market for seeds of major crops is highly regulated by the government, with institutions favoring public companies. One implication of this system is that all seed is distributed via one channel, which leads to a lack of traceability of the seed and, thus, lacking accountability for seed producers. Moreover, it causes a lack of agro-dealers as seed distribution is exclusively carried out by cooperatives and cooperative unions on behalf of the government. The only exceptions from the strict government control are international seed companies that produce their own varieties. Fertilizer importation and distribution is completely under government control, with no private companies being active on this market. The markets for fruit and vegetable seeds and agro-chemicals, however, are less regulated. A multitude of small private firms engages in import and distribution. Nevertheless, there is a shortage also for these products that is mainly caused by a lack of access to finance. Due to the absence of an agro-dealer network in the country, the availability of fruit and vegetable seeds and agro-chemicals is very limited outside urban centers as small traders do not have the capacity to invest in marketing infrastructure. To motivate private companies to invest in agricultural markets and to cater to the marginalized poor, several institutional changes are necessary. For seed companies, access to breeder seed, the assignment of more land and the availability of plant breeders are crucial elements. For fertilizer companies, a fair tendering process and the abolishment of import quantity prescriptions are of major importance. Such well-designed market liberalization efforts are likely to result in the creation of an agro-dealer network as a positive externality that would also benefit traders of fruit and vegetable seeds and agro-chemicals. For all companies, access to finance at reasonable cost, especially with lower collateral requirements, is essential to expand operations. While companies can be expected to push for changes, the current system and the self-conception of the Ethiopian government require the government to be in the lead in the efforts for changes. Successful role models, support by other stakeholders and successes with investment incentive schemes in other sectors in Ethiopia could encourage the government to gradually liberalize the market. If institutional changes are enacted to partly liberalize the market, it needs to be ensured that the marginalized poor, who currently benefit from the government’s equity approach, are included in the value chains even if companies do not operate with innovative business approaches. However, as the poor constitute a very large share of the market, Ethiopia may even be a leading example for companies in how to apply business models catering to the poor as companies are forced to adjust to this target group if they want to develop the largest part of the market