Can Influenza Epidemics Be Prevented by Voluntary Vaccination?

Previous modeling studies have identified the vaccination coverage level necessary for preventing influenza epidemics, but have not shown whether this critical coverage can be reached. Here we use computational modeling to determine, for the first time, whether the critical coverage for influenza can be achieved by voluntary vaccination. We construct a novel individual-level model of human cognition and behavior; individuals are characterized by two biological attributes (memory and adaptability) that they use when making vaccination decisions. We couple this model with a population-level model of influenza that includes vaccination dynamics. The coupled models allow individual-level decisions to influence influenza epidemiology and, conversely, influenza epidemiology to influence individual-level decisions. By including the effects of adaptive decision-making within an epidemic model, we can reproduce two essential characteristics of influenza epidemiology: annual variation in epidemic severity and sporadic occurrence of severe epidemics. We suggest that individual-level adaptive decision-making may be an important (previously overlooked) causal factor in driving influenza epidemiology. We find that severe epidemics cannot be prevented unless vaccination programs offer incentives. Frequency of severe epidemics could be reduced if programs provide, as an incentive to be vaccinated, several years of free vaccines to individuals who pay for one year of vaccination. Magnitude of epidemic amelioration will be determined by the number of years of free vaccination, an individuals' adaptability in decision-making, and their memory. This type of incentive program could control epidemics if individuals are very adaptable and have long-term memories. However, incentive-based programs that provide free vaccination for families could increase the frequency of severe epidemics. We conclude that incentive-based vaccination programs are necessary to control influenza, but some may be detrimental. Surprisingly, we find that individuals' memories and flexibility in adaptive decision-making can be extremely important factors in determining the success of influenza vaccination programs. Finally, we discuss the implication of our results for controlling pandemics

Inductive Reasoning Games as Influenza Vaccination Models: Mean Field Analysis

We define and analyze an inductive reasoning game of voluntary yearly vaccination in order to establish whether or not a population of individuals acting in their own self-interest would be able to prevent influenza epidemics. We find that epidemics are rarely prevented. We also find that severe epidemics may occur without the introduction of pandemic strains. We further address the situation where market incentives are introduced to help ameliorating epidemics. Surprisingly, we find that vaccinating families exacerbates epidemics. However, a public health program requesting prepayment of vaccinations may significantly ameliorate influenza epidemics.Comment: 20 pages, 7 figure

Health Newscasts for Increasing Influenza Vaccination Coverage: An Inductive Reasoning Game Approach

Both pandemic and seasonal influenza are receiving more attention from mass media than ever before. Topics such as epidemic severity and vaccination are changing the way in which we perceive the utility of disease prevention. Voluntary influenza vaccination has been recently modeled using inductive reasoning games. It has thus been found that severe epidemics may occur because individuals do not vaccinate and, instead, attempt to benefit from the immunity of their peers. Such epidemics could be prevented by voluntary vaccination if incentives were offered. However, a key assumption has been that individuals make vaccination decisions based on whether there was an epidemic each influenza season; no other epidemiological information is available to them. In this work, we relax this assumption and investigate the consequences of making more informed vaccination decisions while no incentives are offered. We obtain three major results. First, individuals will not cooperate enough to constantly prevent influenza epidemics through voluntary vaccination no matter how much they learned about influenza epidemiology. Second, broadcasting epidemiological information richer than whether an epidemic occurred may stabilize the vaccination coverage and suppress severe influenza epidemics. Third, the stable vaccination coverage follows the trend of the perceived benefit of vaccination. However, increasing the amount of epidemiological information released to the public may either increase or decrease the perceived benefit of vaccination. We discuss three scenarios where individuals know, in addition to whether there was an epidemic, (i) the incidence, (ii) the vaccination coverage and (iii) both the incidence and the vaccination coverage, every influenza season. We show that broadcasting both the incidence and the vaccination coverage could yield either better or worse vaccination coverage than broadcasting each piece of information on its own

The Impacts Of Simultaneous Disease Intervention Decisions On Epidemic Outcomes

The final publication is available at Elsevier via http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.027 © 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Mathematical models of the interplay between disease dynamics and human behavioural dynamics can improve our understanding of how diseases spread when individuals adapt their behaviour in response to an epidemic. Accounting for behavioural mechanisms that determine uptake of infectious disease interventions such as vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) can significantly alter predicted health outcomes in a population. However, most previous approaches that model interactions between human behaviour and disease dynamics have modelled behaviour of these two interventions separately. Here, we develop and analyze an agent based network model to gain insights into how behaviour toward both interventions interact adaptively with disease dynamics (and therefore, indirectly, with one another) during the course of a single epidemic where an SIRV infection spreads through a contact network. In the model, individuals decide to become vaccinated and/or practice NPIs based on perceived infection prevalence (locally or globally) and on what other individuals in the network are doing. We find that introducing adaptive NPI behaviour lowers vaccine uptake on account of behavioural feedbacks, and also decreases epidemic final size. When transmission rates are low, NPIs alone are as effective in reducing epidemic final size as NPIs and vaccination combined. Also, NPIs can compensate for delays in vaccine availability by hindering early disease spread, decreasing epidemic size significantly compared to the case where NPI behaviour does not adapt to mitigate early surges in infection prevalence. We also find that including adaptive NPI behaviour strongly mitigates the vaccine behavioural feedbacks that would otherwise result in higher vaccine uptake at lower vaccine efficacy as predicted by most previous models, and the same feedbacks cause epidemic final size to remain approximately constant across a broad range of values for vaccine efficacy. Finally, when individuals use local information about others' behaviour and infection prevalence, instead of population-level information, infection is controlled more efficiently through ring vaccination, and this is reflected in the time evolution of pair correlations on the network. This model shows that accounting for both adaptive NPI behaviour and adaptive vaccinating behaviour regarding social effects and infection prevalence can result in qualitatively different predictions than if only one type of adaptive behaviour is modelled.Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) Individual Discovery Gran

Pandemic Influenza: Warning, Children At-Risk

Identifies gaps in U.S. preparedness for treating and caring for children during a potential pandemic flu outbreak. Makes recommendations for appropriate doses of vaccine and medications and the management and treatment of children who become ill

Vaccinations against infuenza of healthcare workers

Flu is a contagious disease that poses a problem recurring in each influenza season with varying intensity. At the end of the XX and early XXI century new subtypes appeared , which indicates the high variability of the pathogen from the moment of its isolation to the present day. Many people do not realize, how big a threat is flu, its consequences have a significant rebound in both the health and economic sphere. On the issue of influenza, the best prevention measure is prophylaxis. Hygiene behaviour meet with approval and the problem of incorporating these behaviours into life, while the most effective way of preventing influenza in the form of vaccination, for unknown reasons, does not enjoy excessive recognition and good reputation among the population. Medical personnel through frequent and close contact with patients are exposed to various pathogens that cause disease. The increase in influenza flu among medical personnel facilitates the transmission of a disease that is spreading among patients and other employees. This creates a significant coordination problem, associated with the need to deal with staff shortages among employees, mainly during the epidemic seasons typical of influenza. The results of serological tests show that seasonal exposure to influenza virus is about 25% of medical workers [1]

Imperfect Vaccine Aggravates the Long-Standing Dilemma of Voluntary Vaccination

Achieving widespread population immunity by voluntary vaccination poses a major challenge for public health administration and practice. The situation is complicated even more by imperfect vaccines. How the vaccine efficacy affects individuals' vaccination behavior has yet to be fully answered. To address this issue, we combine a simple yet effective game theoretic model of vaccination behavior with an epidemiological process. Our analysis shows that, in a population of self-interested individuals, there exists an overshooting of vaccine uptake levels as the effectiveness of vaccination increases. Moreover, when the basic reproductive number, , exceeds a certain threshold, all individuals opt for vaccination for an intermediate region of vaccine efficacy. We further show that increasing effectiveness of vaccination always increases the number of effectively vaccinated individuals and therefore attenuates the epidemic strain. The results suggest that ‘number is traded for efficiency’: although increases in vaccination effectiveness lead to uptake drops due to free-riding effects, the impact of the epidemic can be better mitigated

A simulation analysis to characterize the dynamics of vaccinating behaviour on contact networks

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Human behavior influences infectious disease transmission, and numerous "prevalence-behavior" models have analyzed this interplay. These previous analyses assumed homogeneously mixing populations without spatial or social structure. However, spatial and social heterogeneity are known to significantly impact transmission dynamics and are particularly relevant for certain diseases. Previous work has demonstrated that social contact structure can change the individual incentive to vaccinate, thus enabling eradication of a disease under a voluntary vaccination policy when the corresponding homogeneous mixing model predicts that eradication is impossible due to free rider effects. Here, we extend this work and characterize the range of possible behavior-prevalence dynamics on a network.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We simulate transmission of a vaccine-prevetable infection through a random, static contact network. Individuals choose whether or not to vaccinate on any given day according to perceived risks of vaccination and infection.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>We find three possible outcomes for behavior-prevalence dynamics on this type of network: small final number vaccinated and final epidemic size (due to rapid control through voluntary ring vaccination); large final number vaccinated and significant final epidemic size (due to imperfect voluntary ring vaccination), and little or no vaccination and large final epidemic size (corresponding to little or no voluntary ring vaccination). We also show that the social contact structure enables eradication under a broad range of assumptions, except when vaccine risk is sufficiently high, the disease risk is sufficiently low, or individuals vaccinate too late for the vaccine to be effective.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>For populations where infection can spread only through social contact network, relatively small differences in parameter values relating to perceived risk or vaccination behavior at the individual level can translate into large differences in population-level outcomes such as final size and final number vaccinated. The qualitative outcome of rational, self interested behaviour under a voluntary vaccination policy can vary substantially depending on interactions between social contact structure, perceived vaccine and disease risks, and the way that individual vaccination decision-making is modelled.</p