1,320,239 research outputs found

    U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework; A Guide to Self-Certification

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    [Excerpt] In this guide, we have provided an outline of the most critical pieces of the Safe Harbor Framework. The application is made available, along with a Helpful Hints Guide that explains how to fill it out. The Safe Harbor Principles and FAQs are also provided for easy reference. There is also an explanation and listing of third party dispute resolution providers (or Independent Resource Mechanisms) with descriptions of the services provided by three dispute resolution providers that work with Safe Harbor. Finally, we’ve also included several sample company privacy policies for reference, and a glossary that explains key terms. We’ve broken this Guide into nine major sections, each to address different questions you might have. What follows is a brief description of each section: Overview: The overview gives some background on the Safe Harbor Framework, how it came about, and explains many of the certification requirements. The overview also lists the principles of the Safe Harbor program. Application: The Application is provided for easy reference. Applicants should apply online at http://export.gov /safeharbor (click on “Certification Form” in the right sidebar). Certification Mark: The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration has recently developed a certification mark for the Safe Harbor Framework. The mark may be used by companies on their websites to signify that they have self-certified compliance with the provisions of the Safe Harbor Framework. Instructions for use of the certification mark are provided. Helpful Hints Guide (to Certification): The Helpful Hints Guide is meant to give quick answers to any questions a U.S. company might have about the certification process. It should be used in conjunction with the rest of the Guide, however it answers many of the most common questions about the certification process. Safe Harbor Principles: We have provided the full text of the official declaration of the Safe Harbor Principles as announced on July 21, 2000. This text is helpful for understanding the foundation of the Safe Harbor Principles and the Framework. Frequently Asked Questions: We have provided the Frequently Asked Questions in full text because they answer many of the most commonly asked questions about the Safe Harbor Framework. Dispute Resolution Providers: Here we have provided a short description of the role of dispute resolution providers (also referred to as Independent Recourse Mechanisms) and descriptions of the services they offer. Sample Privacy Policies: Here we have provided three sample privacy policies for reference, which may serve as guidance when creating a new Privacy Policy or updating an existing Privacy Policy to align it with the Safe Harbor Framework. The Safe Harbor Framework requires an affirmative commitment in the Privacy Policy to the principles of the Safe Harbor Framework. Glossary: A short glossary is also provided for many of the technical terms frequently used in the Guide

    A language for information commerce processes

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    Automatizing information commerce requires languages to represent the typical information commerce processes. Existing languages and standards cover either only very specific types of business models or are too general to capture in a concise way the specific properties of information commerce processes. We introduce a language that is specifically designed for information commerce. It can be directly used for the implementation of the processes and communication required in information commerce. It allows to cover existing business models that are known either from standard proposals or existing information commerce applications on the Internet. The language has a concise logical semantics. In this paper we present the language concepts and an implementation architecture

    Using webcrawling of publicly available websites to assess E-commerce relationships

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    We investigate e-commerce success factors concerning their impact on the success of commerce transactions between businesses companies. In scientific literature, many e-commerce success factors are introduced. Most of them are focused on companies' website quality. They are evaluated concerning companies' success in the business-to- consumer (B2C) environment where consumers choose their preferred e-commerce websites based on these success factors e.g. website content quality, website interaction, and website customization. In contrast to previous work, this research focuses on the usage of existing e-commerce success factors for predicting successfulness of business-to-business (B2B) ecommerce. The introduced methodology is based on the identification of semantic textual patterns representing success factors from the websites of B2B companies. The successfulness of the identified success factors in B2B ecommerce is evaluated by regression modeling. As a result, it is shown that some B2C e-commerce success factors also enable the predicting of B2B e-commerce success while others do not. This contributes to the existing literature concerning ecommerce success factors. Further, these findings are valuable for B2B e-commerce websites creation

    New technologies for e-commerce

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    Today electronic commerce (e-commerce) has changed the way of doing business, and contributes significantly to economic activity. In any case, e-commerce is not a static field but it is always evolving in order to support new and more complex real world processes. The agriculture sector is expected to undergo significant transformation as a result of new business models being adopted through ecommerce. Examples of the adoption of new technologies in agriculture are provided with a view to demonstrating the benefits that can be achieved. The first part I expound the basics of e-commerce and e-markets. After I describe potential benefits to agriculture from adoption of e-commerce. The last part I describe the ecommerce 2.0, what is a prospect evolution of e-commerce

    An Architecture for Information Commerce Systems

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    The increasing use of the Internet in business and commerce has created a number of new business opportunities and the need for supporting models and platforms. One of these opportunities is information commerce (i-commerce), a special case of ecommerce focused on the purchase and sale of information as a commodity. In this paper we present an architecture for i-commerce systems using OPELIX (Open Personalized Electronic Information Commerce System) [11] as an example. OPELIX provides an open information commerce platform that enables enterprises to produce, sell, deliver, and manage information products and related services over the Internet. We focus on the notion of information marketplace, a virtual location that enables i-commerce, describe the business and domain model for an information marketplace, and discuss the role of intermediaries in this environment. The domain model is used as the basis for the software architecture of the OPELIX system. We discuss the characteristics of the OPELIX architecture and compare our approach to related work in the field

    Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents

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    An increasing number of scholars argue that the Commerce Clause is best read in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the Articles of Confederation. The work of these “collective action theorists” is reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Writing for four Justices, she stressed the “collective-action impasse” at the state level to which the Affordable Care Act responds. In its purest form, a collective action approach maintains that the existence of a significant problem of collective action facing two or more states is both necessary and sufficient for Congress to address the problem by relying on the Commerce Clause. Unlike nationalist defenders of unlimited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. Unlike federalist defenders of limited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not focus on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct, or between regulating and requiring commerce. Accordingly, nationalists may agree that a collective action problem is sufficient for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is necessary. By contrast, federalists may agree that a collective action problem is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is sufficient. This Essay anticipates such criticism. Regarding the nationalist critique of a collective action approach, I argue that the nationalist “substantial effects” test imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause. I also argue that nationalists may define multistate collective action problems too narrowly. In addition to races to the bottom, collective action problems include interstate externalities that do not cause races to the bottom. Broadening the definition of multistate collective action problems to include interstate externalities gives rise to the federalist objection that every subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as a collective action problem. Federalists may further object that the Commerce Clause is limited to “Commerce.” In response, I argue that “Commerce” is best understood broadly to encompass many social interactions outside markets, as Professors Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar have urged. I also argue that a collective action approach need not validate unlimited federal commerce power. Specifically, I identify three ways of limiting the kinds of interstate externalities that justify use of the Commerce Clause

    Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents

    Get PDF
    An increasing number of scholars argue that the Commerce Clause is best read in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the Articles of Confederation. The work of these “collective action theorists” is reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Writing for four Justices, she stressed the “collective-action impasse” at the state level to which the Affordable Care Act responds. In its purest form, a collective action approach maintains that the existence of a significant problem of collective action facing two or more states is both necessary and sufficient for Congress to address the problem by relying on the Commerce Clause. Unlike nationalist defenders of unlimited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. Unlike federalist defenders of limited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not focus on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct, or between regulating and requiring commerce. Accordingly, nationalists may agree that a collective action problem is sufficient for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is necessary. By contrast, federalists may agree that a collective action problem is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is sufficient. This Essay anticipates such criticism. Regarding the nationalist critique of a collective action approach, I argue that the nationalist “substantial effects” test imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause. I also argue that nationalists may define multistate collective action problems too narrowly. In addition to races to the bottom, collective action problems include interstate externalities that do not cause races to the bottom. Broadening the definition of multistate collective action problems to include interstate externalities gives rise to the federalist objection that every subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as a collective action problem. Federalists may further object that the Commerce Clause is limited to “Commerce.” In response, I argue that “Commerce” is best understood broadly to encompass many social interactions outside markets, as Professors Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar have urged. I also argue that a collective action approach need not validate unlimited federal commerce power. Specifically, I identify three ways of limiting the kinds of interstate externalities that justify use of the Commerce Clause
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