Ozone: Efficient Execution with Zero Timing Leakage for Modern Microarchitectures

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A number of approaches to mitigate timing-based side-channel attacks have been proposed including cache partitioning, control-flow obfuscation and injecting timing noise into the outputs of code. While these techniques make timing-based side-channel attacks more difficult, they do not eliminate the risks. Prior techniques are either too specific or too expensive, and all leave remnants of the original timing side channel for later attackers to attempt to exploit. In this work, we show that the state-of-the-art techniques in timing side-channel protection, which limit timing leakage but do not eliminate it, still have significant vulnerabilities to timing-based side-channel attacks. To provide a means for total protection from timing-based side-channel attacks, we develop Ozone, the first zero timing leakage execution resource for a modern microarchitecture. Code in Ozone execute under a special hardware thread that gains exclusive access to a single core's resources for a fixed (and limited) number of cycles during which it cannot be interrupted. Memory access under Ozone thread execution is limited to a fixed size uncached scratchpad memory, and all Ozone threads begin execution with a known fixed microarchitectural state. We evaluate Ozone using a number of security sensitive kernels that have previously been targets of timing side-channel attacks, and show that Ozone eliminates timing leakage with minimal performance overhead

GCC-Plugin for Automated Accelerator Generation and Integration on Hybrid FPGA-SoCs

In recent years, architectures combining a reconfigurable fabric and a general purpose processor on a single chip became increasingly popular. Such hybrid architectures allow extending embedded software with application specific hardware accelerators to improve performance and/or energy efficiency. Aiding system designers and programmers at handling the complexity of the required process of hardware/software (HW/SW) partitioning is an important issue. Current methods are often restricted, either to bare-metal systems, to subsets of mainstream programming languages, or require special coding guidelines, e.g., via annotations. These restrictions still represent a high entry barrier for the wider community of programmers that new hybrid architectures are intended for. In this paper we revisit HW/SW partitioning and present a seamless programming flow for unrestricted, legacy C code. It consists of a retargetable GCC plugin that automatically identifies code sections for hardware acceleration and generates code accordingly. The proposed workflow was evaluated on the Xilinx Zynq platform using unmodified code from an embedded benchmark suite.Comment: Presented at Second International Workshop on FPGAs for Software Programmers (FSP 2015) (arXiv:1508.06320

CapablePtrs: Securely Compiling Partial Programs using the Pointers-as-Capabilities Principle

Capability machines such as CHERI provide memory capabilities that can be used by compilers to provide security benefits for compiled code (e.g., memory safety). The C to CHERI compiler, for example, achieves memory safety by following a principle called "pointers as capabilities" (PAC). Informally, PAC says that a compiler should represent a source language pointer as a machine code capability. But the security properties of PAC compilers are not yet well understood. We show that memory safety is only one aspect, and that PAC compilers can provide significant additional security guarantees for partial programs: the compiler can provide guarantees for a compilation unit, even if that compilation unit is later linked to attacker-controlled machine code. This paper is the first to study the security of PAC compilers for partial programs formally. We prove for a model of such a compiler that it is fully abstract. The proof uses a novel proof technique (dubbed TrICL, read trickle), which is of broad interest because it reuses and extends the compiler correctness relation in a natural way, as we demonstrate. We implement our compiler on top of the CHERI platform and show that it can compile legacy C code with minimal code changes. We provide performance benchmarks that show how performance overhead is proportional to the number of cross-compilation-unit function calls

PROSET — A Language for Prototyping with Sets

We discuss the prototyping language PROSET(Prototyping with Sets) as a language for experimental and evolutionary prototyping, focusing its attention on algorithm design. Some of PROSET’s features include generative communication, flexible exception handling and the integration of persistence. A discussion of some issues pertaining to the compiler and the programming environment conclude the pape

Automatic Loop Kernel Analysis and Performance Modeling With Kerncraft

Analytic performance models are essential for understanding the performance characteristics of loop kernels, which consume a major part of CPU cycles in computational science. Starting from a validated performance model one can infer the relevant hardware bottlenecks and promising optimization opportunities. Unfortunately, analytic performance modeling is often tedious even for experienced developers since it requires in-depth knowledge about the hardware and how it interacts with the software. We present the "Kerncraft" tool, which eases the construction of analytic performance models for streaming kernels and stencil loop nests. Starting from the loop source code, the problem size, and a description of the underlying hardware, Kerncraft can ideally predict the single-core performance and scaling behavior of loops on multicore processors using the Roofline or the Execution-Cache-Memory (ECM) model. We describe the operating principles of Kerncraft with its capabilities and limitations, and we show how it may be used to quickly gain insights by accelerated analytic modeling.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figures, 8 listing