Learning from the Past: Trends in Executive Compensation over the Twentieth Century

In recent years, a large academic debate has tried to explain the rapid rise in CEO pay experienced over the past three decades. In this article, I review the main proposed theories, which span views of compensation as the result of a competitive labor market for executivesto theories based on excess of managerial power. Some of these hypotheses have foundsupport in cross-sectional evidence, but it has proven more difficult to determine which factors have caused the observed changes in pay over time. An alternative strategy is to evaluate the fit of plausible explanations out of sample by contrasting them with the evolution in executive pay and the market for managers during earlier time periods. A case study of General Electric suggests that evidence for earlier decades can speak to the recent trends and reveals the limitations of current explanations to address the long-run data.executive compensation, managerial incentives, corporate governance, market for managers

The Other Pathway To The Boardroom: Interpersonal Influence Behavior As A Substitute For Elite Credentials And Majority Status In Obtaining Board Appointments

Using survey data on interpersonal influence behavior from a large sample of managers and chief executive officers (CEOs) at Forbes 500 companies, we examine how ingratiatory behavior directed at individuals who control access to board positions can provide an alternative pathway to the boardroom for managers who lack the social and educational credentials associated with the power elite. Findings show that top managers who engage in ingratiatory behavior toward their CEO, with ingratiation comprising flattery, opinion conformity, and favor-rendering, will be more likely to receive board appointments at other firms where their CEO serves as director and at boards to which the CEO is indirectly connected in the board interlock network. Further results suggest that interpersonal influence behavior substitutes to some degree for the advantages of an elite background or demographic majority status. Our findings help explain why norms of director deference to CEOs have persisted despite increased diversity in the corporate elite and have implications for research on corporate governance, social networks in the corporate elite, and for the sociological question of whether demographic minorities and individuals who lack privileged backgrounds have equal access to positions of leadership in large U.S. companies. Our study ultimately suggests that such individuals face a rather subtle and perhaps unexpected form of social discrimination, in that they must engage in a higher level of interpersonal influence behavior in order to have the same chance of obtaining a board appointment.Managemen

Renegotiating the Realm of Influence: The Shifting Priorities of President Trump during NAFTA Renegotiations

This article examines the factors that caused that drastic shift in international trade policy. First, it addresses the corporate interests that established significant influence on the White House. Second, it assesses the moderating influence on trade policy that followed from this corporate access. Third, it analyzes the rationale behind the imbedded corporate interests in trade policy and the importance of NAFTA to influential American businesses. A contextual analysis follows concerning the President’s comments about the 2017 Charlottesville, Virginia protests and how they affected corporate influence in the White House. Next, this essay examines the effects of the dissolution of access first granted to corporate interests, followed by an analysis of populist nationalism and its impact on the Administration’s trade negotiations. Finally, the implications of these findings on US foreign policy and international relations is considered

Corporate Engagement with Public Policy: The New Frontier of Ethical Business

The article explains that a normative framework for corporate engagement with public policy is required as part of the evolving corporate responsibility paradigm

Connections and Performance in Bankers' Turnover: Better Wed over the Mixen than over the Moor

In this paper we study top executive turnover in Italian Banks over the period 1993-2001. We relate the probability of survival of top executives (Presidents, CEOs and General Managers) to bank performance and the manager’s local connections, controlling for (observable and unobservable) bank and manager characteristics by exploiting longitudinal information on bank-manager appointments. We measure the extent? of managers’ local connections by the distance between the province of the bank’s headquarters and the manager’s province of birth. We show that top managers tend to be local in the sense that the distribution of this distance is heavily skewed towards zero. On the basis of this evidence, we address two questions. First, we investigate whether connections affect the duration of the appointment at the bank. Second, we ask whether connections entrench managers at the expense of the bank’s performance. We find that connections generally increase the probabilities of managerssurviving at their banks, and that the positive effect of performance on tenure (as amply documented by the executive turnover literature) disappears once connections are taken into account. On the other hand, we provide evidence against the hypothesis that managerial connections contain information valuable for enhancing a bank’s performance. In particular, we find that highly connected boards cause the shorter survival of banks, and that those who benefit from connections are top managers themselves (mostly Presidents and General Managers). This suggests that connections may be collusion devices with which to maintain and share rents.connections, executive turnover, commercial and cooperative banks

The Persistence of the Glass Ceiling

This paper presents a comprehensive review and analysis of the obstacles white women encounter as they climb the corporate ladder to senior executive positions. It explores the phenomenon known as the glass ceiling. Gender issues, societal stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination will be researched to determine the impact to women seeking senior executive positions. For the purpose of this paper, senior executive positions are defined as company presidents and chief executive officers (CEO), as well as positions reporting to them. This paper will define the glass ceiling, review obstacles, determine if the obstacles still exist, and suggest ways to obtain senior executive positions in spite of those obstacles. The paper will illustrate why women are important in senior executive positions and will recommend steps for women who struggle with the glass ceiling as they aspire to senior executive roles

It\u27s A Small World After All... At The Top: The View From Davos

This paper provides an intersectional portrait of the most powerful and influential group in the world: the global power elite, symbolized by the Davos man. An examination of this emerging class and its national and denationalized components includes analyses of the global economic and political system, concepts of the American power elite, hierarchal institutions of power, and the potential for elite gender parity

The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies

In theory, democracy is a bulwark against socially harmful policies. In practice, however, democracies frequently adopt and maintain policies that are damaging. How can this paradox be explained? The influence of special interests and voter ignorance are two leading explanations. I offer an alternative story of how and why democracy fails. The central idea is that voters are worse than ignorant; they are, in a word, irrational -- and they vote accordingly. Despite their lack of knowledge, voters are not humble agnostics; instead, they confidently embrace a long list of misconceptions. Economic policy is the primary activity of the modern state. And if there is one thing that the public deeply misunderstands, it is economics. People do not grasp the "invisible hand" of the market, with its ability to harmonize private greed and the public interest. I call this anti-market bias. They underestimate the benefits of interaction with foreigners. I call this anti-foreign bias. They equate prosperity not with production, but with employment. I call this make-work bias. Finally, they are overly prone to think that economic conditions are bad and getting worse. I call this pessimistic bias. In the minds of many, Winston Churchill's famous aphorism cuts the conversation short: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." But this saying overlooks the fact that governments vary in scope as well as form. In democracies the main alternative to majority rule is not dictatorship, but markets. A better understanding of voter irrationality advises us to rely less on democracy and more on the market