The Contest Between Simplicity and Efficiency in Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement

In the wake of the decisive impossibility result of Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson for deterministic consensus protocols in the aynchronous model with just one failure, Ben-Or and Bracha demonstrated that the problem could be solved with randomness, even for Byzantine failures. Both protocols are natural and intuitive to verify, and Bracha's achieves optimal resilience. However, the expected running time of these protocols is exponential in general. Recently, Kapron, Kempe, King, Saia, and Sanwalani presented the first efficient Byzantine agreement algorithm in the asynchronous, full information model, running in polylogarithmic time. Their algorithm is Monte Carlo and drastically departs from the simple structure of Ben-Or and Bracha's Las Vegas algorithms. In this paper, we begin an investigation of the question: to what extent is this departure necessary? Might there be a much simpler and intuitive Las Vegas protocol that runs in expected polynomial time? We will show that the exponential running time of Ben-Or and Bracha's algorithms is no mere accident of their specific details, but rather an unavoidable consequence of their general symmetry and round structure. We define a natural class of "fully symmetric round protocols" for solving Byzantine agreement in an asynchronous setting and show that any such protocol can be forced to run in expected exponential time by an adversary in the full information model. We assume the adversary controls $t$ Byzantine processors for $t = cn$, where $c$ is an arbitrary positive constant $< 1/3$. We view our result as a step toward identifying the level of complexity required for a polynomial-time algorithm in this setting, and also as a guide in the search for new efficient algorithms.Comment: 21 page

Peer-to-Peer Secure Multi-Party Numerical Computation Facing Malicious Adversaries

We propose an efficient framework for enabling secure multi-party numerical computations in a Peer-to-Peer network. This problem arises in a range of applications such as collaborative filtering, distributed computation of trust and reputation, monitoring and other tasks, where the computing nodes is expected to preserve the privacy of their inputs while performing a joint computation of a certain function. Although there is a rich literature in the field of distributed systems security concerning secure multi-party computation, in practice it is hard to deploy those methods in very large scale Peer-to-Peer networks. In this work, we try to bridge the gap between theoretical algorithms in the security domain, and a practical Peer-to-Peer deployment. We consider two security models. The first is the semi-honest model where peers correctly follow the protocol, but try to reveal private information. We provide three possible schemes for secure multi-party numerical computation for this model and identify a single light-weight scheme which outperforms the others. Using extensive simulation results over real Internet topologies, we demonstrate that our scheme is scalable to very large networks, with up to millions of nodes. The second model we consider is the malicious peers model, where peers can behave arbitrarily, deliberately trying to affect the results of the computation as well as compromising the privacy of other peers. For this model we provide a fourth scheme to defend the execution of the computation against the malicious peers. The proposed scheme has a higher complexity relative to the semi-honest model. Overall, we provide the Peer-to-Peer network designer a set of tools to choose from, based on the desired level of security.Comment: Submitted to Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Journal (PPNA) 200

Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators

We consider games that have (k,t)-robust equilibria when played with a mediator, where an equilibrium is (k,t)-robust if it tolerates deviations by coalitions of size up to k and deviations by up to $t$ players with unknown utilities. We prove lower bounds that match upper bounds on the ability to implement such mediators using cheap talk (that is, just allowing communication among the players). The bounds depend on (a) the relationship between k, t, and n, the total number of players in the system; (b) whether players know the exact utilities of other players; (c) whether there are broadcast channels or just point-to-point channels; (d) whether cryptography is available; and (e) whether the game has a $k+t)-punishment strategy; that is, a strategy that, if used by all but at most$k+t$ players, guarantees that every player gets a worse outcome than they do with the equilibrium strategy

Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey

There has been a remarkable increase in work at the interface of computer science and game theory in the past decade. In this article I survey some of the main themes of work in the area, with a focus on the work in computer science. Given the length constraints, I make no attempt at being comprehensive, especially since other surveys are also available, and a comprehensive survey book will appear shortly.Comment: To appear; Palgrave Dictionary of Economic