Hierarchies of hyper-AFLs

For a full semi-AFL K, B(K) is defined as the family of languages generated by all K-extended basic macro grammars, while H(K) B(K) is the smallest full hyper-AFL containing K; a full basic-AFL is a full AFL K such that B(K) = K (hence every full basic-AFL is a full hyper-AFL). For any full semi-AFL K, K is a full basic-AFL if and only if B(K) is substitution closed if and only if H(K) is a full basic-AFL. If K is not a full basic-AFL, then the smallest full basic-AFL containing K is the union of an infinite hierarchy of full hyper-AFLs. If K is a full principal basic-AFL (such as INDEX, the family of indexed languages), then the largest full AFL properly contained in K is a full basic-AFL. There is a full basic-AFL lying properly in between the smallest full basic-AFL and the largest full basic-AFL in INDEX

Interaction Grammars

Interaction Grammar (IG) is a grammatical formalism based on the notion of polarity. Polarities express the resource sensitivity of natural languages by modelling the distinction between saturated and unsaturated syntactic structures. Syntactic composition is represented as a chemical reaction guided by the saturation of polarities. It is expressed in a model-theoretic framework where grammars are constraint systems using the notion of tree description and parsing appears as a process of building tree description models satisfying criteria of saturation and minimality

CEEME: compensating events based execution monitoring enforcement for Cyber-Physical Systems

Fundamentally, inherently observable events in Cyber-Physical Systems with tight coupling between cyber and physical components can result in a confidentiality violation. By observing how the physical elements react to cyber commands, adversaries can identify critical links in the system and force the cyber control algorithm to make erroneous decisions. Thus, there is a propensity for a breach in confidentiality leading to further attacks on availability or integrity. Due to the highly integrated nature of Cyber-Physical Systems, it is also extremely difficult to map the system semantics into a security framework under existing security models. The far-reaching objective of this research is to develop a science of selfobfuscating systems based on the composition of simple building blocks. A model of Nondeducibility composes the building blocks under Information Flow Security Properties. To this end, this work presents fundamental theories on external observability for basic regular networks and the novel concept of event compensation that can enforce Information Flow Security Properties at runtime --Abstract, page iii

From AADL Model to LNT Specification

The verification of distributed real-time systems designed by architectural languages such as AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design Language) is a research challenge. These systems are often used in safety- critical domains where one mistake can result in physical damages and even life loss. In such domains, formal methods are a suitable solution for rigorous analysis. This paper studies the formal verification of distributed real-time systems modelled with AADL. We transform AADL model to another specification formalism enabling the verification. We choose LNT language which is an input to CADP toolbox for formal analysis. Then, we illustrate our approach with the ”Flight Control System” case study