1,672 research outputs found
Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of
smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously
possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the
users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is
paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation.
In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for
participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing
incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently
discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally,
we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in
participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201
Location Privacy in Spatial Crowdsourcing
Spatial crowdsourcing (SC) is a new platform that engages individuals in
collecting and analyzing environmental, social and other spatiotemporal
information. With SC, requesters outsource their spatiotemporal tasks to a set
of workers, who will perform the tasks by physically traveling to the tasks'
locations. This chapter identifies privacy threats toward both workers and
requesters during the two main phases of spatial crowdsourcing, tasking and
reporting. Tasking is the process of identifying which tasks should be assigned
to which workers. This process is handled by a spatial crowdsourcing server
(SC-server). The latter phase is reporting, in which workers travel to the
tasks' locations, complete the tasks and upload their reports to the SC-server.
The challenge is to enable effective and efficient tasking as well as reporting
in SC without disclosing the actual locations of workers (at least until they
agree to perform a task) and the tasks themselves (at least to workers who are
not assigned to those tasks). This chapter aims to provide an overview of the
state-of-the-art in protecting users' location privacy in spatial
crowdsourcing. We provide a comparative study of a diverse set of solutions in
terms of task publishing modes (push vs. pull), problem focuses (tasking and
reporting), threats (server, requester and worker), and underlying technical
approaches (from pseudonymity, cloaking, and perturbation to exchange-based and
encryption-based techniques). The strengths and drawbacks of the techniques are
highlighted, leading to a discussion of open problems and future work
A Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing Service Market
Mobile Crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale
problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive Mobile Users (MUs). The MUs
will participate in a Crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory
reward. In this paper, in order to effectively and efficiently recruit
sufficient MUs, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal reward mechanism
of the monopoly Crowdsensing Service Provider (CSP). We model the rewarding and
participating as a two-stage game, and analyze the MUs' participation level and
the CSP's optimal reward mechanism using backward induction. At the same time,
the reward is designed taking the underlying social network effects amid the
mobile social network into account, for motivating the participants. Namely,
one MU will obtain additional benefits from information contributed or shared
by local neighbours in social networks. We derive the analytical expressions
for the discriminatory reward as well as uniform reward with complete
information, and approximations of reward incentive with incomplete
information. Performance evaluation reveals that the network effects
tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of
the CSP. In addition, the discriminatory reward enables the CSP to extract
greater surplus from this Crowdsensing service market.Comment: 7 pages, accepted by IEEE Globecom'1
Quality of Information in Mobile Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges
Smartphones have become the most pervasive devices in people's lives, and are
clearly transforming the way we live and perceive technology. Today's
smartphones benefit from almost ubiquitous Internet connectivity and come
equipped with a plethora of inexpensive yet powerful embedded sensors, such as
accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, and camera. This unique combination has
enabled revolutionary applications based on the mobile crowdsensing paradigm,
such as real-time road traffic monitoring, air and noise pollution, crime
control, and wildlife monitoring, just to name a few. Differently from prior
sensing paradigms, humans are now the primary actors of the sensing process,
since they become fundamental in retrieving reliable and up-to-date information
about the event being monitored. As humans may behave unreliably or
maliciously, assessing and guaranteeing Quality of Information (QoI) becomes
more important than ever. In this paper, we provide a new framework for
defining and enforcing the QoI in mobile crowdsensing, and analyze in depth the
current state-of-the-art on the topic. We also outline novel research
challenges, along with possible directions of future work.Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN
What’s in it for me? Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources
With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresence-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1/2-approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798
Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources
Technical ReportWith the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in
which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a
mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1-approximation algorithm to solve the 2 problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments
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