A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R&D

If an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emissions are too high, strategic investments in research and development (R&D) of green technology, for example sustainable drive-trains, can pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full participation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent sustainable policies. --emissions,discount factor,commitment,endogenous technical change,repeated prisoner's dilemma

Spartan Daily, November 16, 1934

Volume 23, Issue 40https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/2219/thumbnail.jp

Game Changer: Investing in Digital Play to Advance Children's Learning and Health

Based on a literature review and interviews with digital learning experts, explores how digital games can foster skills and knowledge for better academic performance and health. Makes recommendations for government research, partnerships, and media

First mover advantage in a dynamic duopoly with spillover

We present a dynamic duopoly model of technical innovation where R&D costs decrease exogenously with time, and inter-firm knowledge spillover lowers the second comer's R&D cost. The spillover effect only becomes available after a disclosure lag. These features allow us to identify a new type of equilibrium: the leader delays investment until the R&D cost is low enough that the follower finds it optimal to invest as soon as he can benefit from the spillover. This equilibrium is subgame perfect over a wide range of parameters, and raises several interesting implications. First, in our new equilibrium the time delay between the two R&D investments is realistically short. Second, while the presence of a spillover favors the second mover, this benefit is not enough to rule out a first mover advantage. Indeed, the first mover advantage survives whenever technical progress is sufficiently fast and the disclosure lag is relatively long. Third, in case of a major innovation our equilibrium implies under--investment, which requires a substantial public intervention in favour of the investment activity.R&D, knowledge spillover, dynamic oligopoly

Knight News Challenge: Casting the Net Wide for Innovation

Reviews the evolution of the Knight News Challenge contest for experimental projects in digital delivery of news and information to local communities, profiles winning projects and explores the grants' impact, and considers issues of sustainability

Spartan Daily, June 11, 1946

Volume 34, Issue 152https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/3781/thumbnail.jp

Spartan Daily, June 11, 1946

Volume 34, Issue 152https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/3781/thumbnail.jp

Fundraising: Keys to the Cashbox

This special fundraising report for performing arts organizations discusses a variety of nonprofit trends. Articles cover the use of social media, competitive fundraising using games, data usage, kickstarter, legal issues in fundraising, and individual giving