Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes

In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, a strategy that the book by and large endorses, and even develops in an original way concerning the Ellsberg paradox. We argue that the BJ theory is too specific to fulfil Bradley’s foundational project and that the redefinition strategy fails in both the Allais and Ellsberg cases. Although we share Bradley’s conclusion that EU theories do not state universal rationality requirements, we reach it not by a comparison with BJ theory, but by a comparison with the non-EU theories that the paradoxes have heuristically suggested

Experience and relations in the metaphysics of A.N. Whitehead and F.H. Bradley

The central purpose of this thesis is to examine the affinities and contrasts in the metaphysical systems of A. N. Whitehead and F. H. Bradley. Not only does this thesis aim to explore thoroughly and show exactly where these two philosophers agree, it also attempts to provide an analysis and evaluation of the arguments where conflict does arise.After a brief introduction which sets out Whitehead's and Bradley's respective positions on philosophic method and approach to metaphysics, Chapter II "Immediate Experience and Feeling ", shows where Whitehead and Bradley unite in their reaction against the ontology of scientific materialism of the 17th century cosmology. At this point various affinities are shown concerning the central role of the doctrine of feeling. But in Chapter III "The Analysis of Experience ", Whitehead's interpretation of feeling in terms of a distinctive pluralistic ontology is seen to conflict with Bradley's doctrine, and thus the stage is set for the central Chapter IV "Relations: Internal and External ". In this chapter Whitehead is confronted with Bradley's very rigorous and exhaustive analysis of the relational form. Despite Bradley's arguments it is here concluded that Whitehead's scheme can be shown to be consistent, given various modifications of the pluralist ontology in terms of the temporal asymmetry of one -way dependence. In Chapter V "Extension and Whole -Part Relations ", an attempt is made to defend the new doctrine of event -pluralism against a recent version of the ontology of material substance; and it is shown how such an ontology of events can account for the physical bodies which make up the system of nature. In the remainder of this chapter and the following Chapter VI "Time ", special problems of space and time are raised in connection with Whitehead's and Bradley's very different conceptions of the extended universe; and various attempts are made to defend Whitehead's view of process against an eternalistic view of the universe largely consistent with the Bradleian Absolute. However in the course of evaluating the arguments, it is discovered that Whitehead's ultimate metaphysical position must make certain concessions to the theory of eternalism; and this gives rise to the final Chapter VII "God and the Absolute ", where it is concluded that Whitehead's God must be seen as an 'Absolute open at one end'. Here Whitehead and Bradley merge on the notion of universal absorption of all finite actualities into one eternal actual entity; though Whitehead's conception, in the end, differs in the sense that God is not the only real entity, but one divine actuality which is in unison of becoming with the whole of creation

Causal attribution and the analysis of literary characters: A. C. Bradley's study of Iago and Othello

A. C. Bradley's approach to character-construal in Shakespearean Tragedy (1904) has often been regarded as a good example of the humanizing approach to literary characters. His lectures on Iago, Othello or Macbeth have been criticized by other scholars for a number of reasons, but particularly for using premises and facts in his argumentation which are not found in the plays. Bradley's task is in many senses an example of person perception, which he performs without alluding to any social psychological theories or methods. In the present article I revise Bradley's reasoning in the light of Kelley 's Covariance Theo1y of Causal Attribution, in an attempt both to re-evaluate Bradley s procedures and, especially, to determine ways in which social psychology might provide literary critics with valuable tools and insights

Generality and singular terms in the proposition: a comparison between Bradley and various modern logicians

It is argued that propositions are general, which is taken to mean that there are no such things as 'singular terms' in the sense that certain parts of sentences are connected in a direct and simple one-to-one way with isolable bits of the world. Rather, it is suggested, the kinds of expressions usually called singular terms can be used to refer to individual things because of their respective meanings. An expression's possessing a meaning is understood univocally for both singular and general terms: it means that the expression implies certain characteristics which anything must have before the expression can properly be applied to it. The claim that the proposition is general is under¬ stood, therefore, as the claim that any part of a proposition which purports to pick out and individuate some item does so through devices common to the rest of the proposition, and thus cannot be thought of as non-general any more than the predicative component can be.Bradley first articulated this view, and that he did is the chief burden of Part I. In Part II this view is supported through an examination of the three kinds of singular terms: proper names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions. In each case it is argued that the expressions involved are general, as a consequence of their possessing moaning