233 research outputs found
On the Inefficiency of the Uniform Price Auction
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard
sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of
a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and
economically efficient multi-unit Vickrey auction, the Uniform Price Auction
encourages strategic bidding and is socially inefficient in general. The
uniform pricing rule is, however, widely popular by its appeal to the natural
anticipation, that identical items should be identically priced. In this work
we study equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction for bidders with (symmetric)
submodular valuation functions, over the number of units that they win. We
investigate pure Nash equilibria of the auction in undominated strategies; we
produce a characterization of these equilibria that allows us to prove that a
fraction 1-1/e of the optimum social welfare is always recovered in undominated
pure Nash equilibrium -- and this bound is essentially tight. Subsequently, we
study the auction under the incomplete information setting and prove a bound of
4-2/k on the economic inefficiency of (mixed) Bayes Nash equilibria that are
supported by undominated strategies.Comment: Additions and Improvements upon SAGT 2012 results (and minor
corrections on the previous version
Draft Auctions
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at
each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show
that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at
equilibrium over sequential item auctions where predetermined items are
auctioned at each time step. Specifically, we show that for any subadditive
valuation the social welfare at equilibrium is an -approximation
to the optimal social welfare, where is the number of items. We also
provide tighter approximation results for several subclasses. Our welfare
guarantees hold for Bayes-Nash equilibria and for no-regret learning outcomes,
via the smooth-mechanism framework. Of independent interest, our techniques
show that in a combinatorial auction setting, efficiency guarantees of a
mechanism via smoothness for a very restricted class of cardinality valuations,
extend with a small degradation, to subadditive valuations, the largest
complement-free class of valuations. Variants of draft auctions have been used
in practice and have been experimentally shown to outperform other auctions.
Our results provide a theoretical justification
On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria
for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that
agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in
response to prices. A line of research in economics, initiated by Hurwicz
(1972), is devoted to understanding how such markets perform when agents are
strategic about their demands. This is captured by the \emph{Walrasian
Mechanism} that proceeds by collecting reported demands, finding clearing
prices in the \emph{reported} market via an ascending price t\^{a}tonnement
procedure, and returns the resulting allocation. Similar mechanisms are used,
for example, in the daily opening of the New York Stock Exchange and the call
market for copper and gold in London.
In practice, it is commonly observed that agents in such markets reduce their
demand leading to behaviors resembling bargaining and to inefficient outcomes.
We ask how inefficient the equilibria can be. Our main result is that the
welfare of every pure Nash equilibrium of the Walrasian mechanism is at least
one quarter of the optimal welfare, when players have gross substitute
valuations and do not overbid. Previous analysis of the Walrasian mechanism
have resorted to large market assumptions to show convergence to efficiency in
the limit. Our result shows that approximate efficiency is guaranteed
regardless of the size of the market
Price of Competition and Dueling Games
We study competition in a general framework introduced by Immorlica et al.
and answer their main open question. Immorlica et al. considered classic
optimization problems in terms of competition and introduced a general class of
games called dueling games. They model this competition as a zero-sum game,
where two players are competing for a user's satisfaction. In their main and
most natural game, the ranking duel, a user requests a webpage by submitting a
query and players output an ordering over all possible webpages based on the
submitted query. The user tends to choose the ordering which displays her
requested webpage in a higher rank. The goal of both players is to maximize the
probability that her ordering beats that of her opponent and gets the user's
attention. Immorlica et al. show this game directs both players to provide
suboptimal search results. However, they leave the following as their main open
question: "does competition between algorithms improve or degrade expected
performance?" In this paper, we resolve this question for the ranking duel and
a more general class of dueling games.
More precisely, we study the quality of orderings in a competition between
two players. This game is a zero-sum game, and thus any Nash equilibrium of the
game can be described by minimax strategies. Let the value of the user for an
ordering be a function of the position of her requested item in the
corresponding ordering, and the social welfare for an ordering be the expected
value of the corresponding ordering for the user. We propose the price of
competition which is the ratio of the social welfare for the worst minimax
strategy to the social welfare obtained by a social planner. We use this
criterion for analyzing the quality of orderings in the ranking duel. We prove
the quality of minimax results is surprisingly close to that of the optimum
solution
Game Efficiency Through Linear Programming Duality
The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the worst ratio of the value of an equilibrium - solution of the game - and that of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous impact of tools from mathematical programming in the design of algorithms and the similarity of the price of anarchy and different measures such as the approximation and competitive ratios, it is intriguing to develop a duality-based method to characterize the efficiency of games.
In the paper, we present an approach based on linear programming duality to study the efficiency of games. We show that the approach provides a general recipe to analyze the efficiency of games and also to derive concepts leading to improvements. The approach is particularly appropriate to bound the PoA. Specifically, in our approach the dual programs naturally lead to competitive PoA bounds that are (almost) optimal for several classes of games. The approach indeed captures the smoothness framework and also some current non-smooth techniques/concepts. We show the applicability to the wide variety of games and environments, from congestion games to Bayesian welfare, from full-information settings to incomplete-information ones
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