34,399 research outputs found
Fairness Behind a Veil of Ignorance: A Welfare Analysis for Automated Decision Making
We draw attention to an important, yet largely overlooked aspect of
evaluating fairness for automated decision making systems---namely risk and
welfare considerations. Our proposed family of measures corresponds to the
long-established formulations of cardinal social welfare in economics, and is
justified by the Rawlsian conception of fairness behind a veil of ignorance.
The convex formulation of our welfare-based measures of fairness allows us to
integrate them as a constraint into any convex loss minimization pipeline. Our
empirical analysis reveals interesting trade-offs between our proposal and (a)
prediction accuracy, (b) group discrimination, and (c) Dwork et al.'s notion of
individual fairness. Furthermore and perhaps most importantly, our work
provides both heuristic justification and empirical evidence suggesting that a
lower-bound on our measures often leads to bounded inequality in algorithmic
outcomes; hence presenting the first computationally feasible mechanism for
bounding individual-level inequality.Comment: Conference: Thirty-second Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NIPS 2018
THE WAIT-AND-SEE OPTION IN ASCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible
resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that
each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An
important notion of fairness is envy-freeness: No player wishes to switch the
portion of the cake received with another player's portion. Despite intense
efforts in the past, it is still an open question whether there is a
\emph{finite bounded} envy-free cake-cutting protocol for an arbitrary number
of players, and even for four players. We introduce the notion of degree of
guaranteed envy-freeness (DGEF) as a measure of how good a cake-cutting
protocol can approximate the ideal of envy-freeness while keeping the protocol
finite bounded (trading being disregarded). We propose a new finite bounded
proportional protocol for any number n \geq 3 of players, and show that this
protocol has a DGEF of 1 + \lceil (n^2)/2 \rceil. This is the currently best
DGEF among known finite bounded cake-cutting protocols for an arbitrary number
of players. We will make the case that improving the DGEF even further is a
tough challenge, and determine, for comparison, the DGEF of selected known
finite bounded cake-cutting protocols.Comment: 37 pages, 4 figure
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