10 research outputs found
Bounded Collusion Protocols, Cylinder-Intersection Extractors and Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
In this work we study bounded collusion protocols (BCPs) recently introduced in the context of secret sharing by Kumar, Meka, and Sahai (FOCS 2019). These are multi-party communication protocols on parties where in each round a subset of -parties (the collusion bound) collude together and write a function of their inputs on a public blackboard.
BCPs interpolate elegantly between the well-studied number-in-hand (NIH) model () and the number-on-forehead (NOF) model (). Motivated by questions in communication complexity, secret sharing, and pseudorandomness we investigate BCPs more thoroughly, answering several questions about them.
* We prove a polynomial (in the input-length) lower bound for an explicit function against BCPs where any constant fraction of players can collude. Previously, nontrivial lower bounds were known only when the collusion bound was at most logarithmic in the input-length (owing to bottlenecks in NOF lower bounds).
* For all , we construct efficient -out-of- secret sharing schemes where the secret remains hidden even given the transcript of a BCP with collusion bound . Prior work could only handle collusions of size . Along the way, we construct leakage-resilient schemes against disjoint and adaptive leakage, resolving a question asked by Goyal and Kumar (STOC 2018).
* An explicit -source cylinder intersection extractor whose output is close to uniform even when given the transcript of a BCP with a constant fraction of parties colluding. The min-entropy rate we require is (independent of collusion bound ).
Our results rely on a new class of exponential sums that interpolate between the ones considered in additive combinatorics by Bourgain (Geometric and Functional Analysis 2009) and Petridis and Shparlinski (Journal d\u27Analyse Mathématique 2019)
Leakage-Resilient Extractors and Secret-Sharing against Bounded Collusion Protocols
In a recent work, Kumar, Meka, and Sahai (FOCS 2019) introduced the notion of bounded collusion protocols (BCPs), in which parties wish to compute some joint function using a public blackboard, but such that only parties may collude at a time. This generalizes well studied models in multiparty communication complexity, such as the number-in-hand (NIH) and number-on-forehead (NOF) models, which are just endpoints on this rich spectrum. We construct explicit hard functions against this spectrum, and achieve a tradeoff between collusion and complexity. Using this, we obtain improved leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes against bounded collusion protocols.
Our main tool in obtaining hard functions against BCPs are explicit constructions of leakage resilient extractors against BCPs for a wide range of parameters. Kumar et al. (FOCS 2019) studied such extractors and called them cylinder intersection extractors. In fact, such extractors directly yield correlation bounds against BCPs. We focus on the following setting: the input to the extractor consists of independent sources of length , and the leakage function Leak is a BCP with some collusion bound and leakage (output length) . While our extractor constructions are very general, we highlight some interesting parameter settings:
1. In the case when the input sources are uniform, and parties collude, our extractor can handle bits of leakage, regardless of the dependence between . The best NOF lower bound (i.e., ) on the other hand requires even to handle bit of leakage.
2. Next, we show that for the same setting as above, we can drop the entropy requirement to polylog , while still handling polynomial leakage for . This resolves an open question about cylinder intersection extractors raised by Kumar et al. (FOCS 2019), and we find an application of such low entropy extractors in a new type of secret sharing.
We also provide an explicit compiler that transforms any function with high NOF (distributional) communication complexity into a leakage-resilient extractor that can handle polylogarithmic entropy and substantially more leakage against BCPs. Thus any improvement of NOF lower bounds will immediately yield better leakage-resilient extractors.
Using our extractors against BCPs, we obtain improved -out-of- leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes. The previous best scheme from Kumar et al. (FOCS 2019) required share size to grow exponentially in the collusion bound, and thus cannot efficiently handle . Our schemes have no dependence of this form, and can thus handle collusion size
Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
In this work, we consider the natural goal of designing secret sharing schemes that ensure security against a powerful adaptive adversary who may learn some ``leaked\u27\u27 information about all the shares. We say that a secret sharing scheme is -party leakage-resilient, if the secret remains statistically hidden even after an adversary learns a bounded amount of leakage, where each bit of leakage can depend jointly on the shares of an adaptively chosen subset of parties. A lot of works have focused on designing secret sharing schemes that handle individual and (mostly) non-adaptive leakage for (some) threshold secret sharing schemes [DP07,DDV10,LL12,ADKO15,GK18,BDIR18].
We give an unconditional compiler that transforms any standard secret sharing scheme with arbitrary access structure into a -party leakage-resilient one for logarithmic in the number of parties. This yields the first secret sharing schemes secure against adaptive and joint leakage for more than two parties.
As a natural extension, we initiate the study of leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing} and build such schemes for general access structures. We empower the computationally unbounded adversary to adaptively leak from the shares and then use the leakage to tamper with each of the shares arbitrarily and independently. Leveraging our -party leakage-resilient schemes, we also construct such non-malleable secret sharing schemes: any such tampering either preserves the secret or completely `destroys\u27 it. This improves upon the non-malleable secret sharing scheme of Goyal and Kumar (CRYPTO 2018) where no leakage was permitted. Leakage-resilient non-malleable codes can be seen as 2-out-of-2 schemes satisfying our guarantee and have already found several applications in cryptography [LL12,ADKO15,GKPRS18,GK18,CL18,OPVV18].
Our constructions rely on a clean connection we draw to communication complexity in the well-studied number-on-forehead (NOF) model and rely on functions that have strong communication-complexity lower bounds in the NOF model (in a black-box way). We get efficient -party leakage-resilient schemes for upto as our share sizes have exponential dependence on . We observe that improving this dependence from to will lead to progress on longstanding open problems in complexity theory
Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange and Two-Seed Extractors
Can Alice and Bob agree on a uniformly random secret key without having any truly secret randomness to begin with? Here we consider a setting where Eve can get partial leakage on the internal state of both Alice and Bob individually before the protocol starts. They then run a protocol using their states without any additional randomness and need to agree on a shared key that looks uniform to Eve, even after observing the leakage and the protocol transcript. We focus on non-interactive (one round) key exchange (NIKE), where Alice and Bob send one message each without waiting for one another.
We first consider this problem in the symmetric-key setting, where the states of Alice and Bob include a shared secret as well as individual uniform randomness. However, since Eve gets leakage on these states, Alice and Bob need to perform privacy amplification to derive a fresh secret key from them. Prior solutions require Alice and Bob to sample fresh uniform randomness during the protocol, while in our setting all of their randomness was already part of their individual states a priori and was therefore subject to leakage. We show an information-theoretic solution to this problem using a novel primitive that we call a two-seed extractor, which we in turn construct by drawing a connection to communication-complexity lower-bounds in the number-on-forehead (NOF) model.
We then turn to studying this problem in the public-key setting, where the states of Alice and Bob consist of independent uniform randomness. Unfortunately, we give a black-box separation showing that leakage-resilient NIKE in this setting cannot be proven secure via a black-box reduction under any game-based assumption when the leakage is super-logarithmic. This includes virtually all assumptions used in cryptography, and even very strong assumptions such as indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Nevertheless, we also provide positive results that get around the above separation:
- We show that every key exchange protocol (e.g., Diffie-Hellman) is secure when the leakage amount is logarithmic, or potentially even greater if we assume sub-exponential security without leakage.
- We notice that the black-box separation does not extend to schemes in the common reference string (CRS) model, or to schemes with preprocessing, where Alice and Bob can individually pre-process their random coins to derive their secret state prior to leakage. We give a solution in the CRS model with preprocessing using bilinear maps. We also give solutions in just the CRS model alone (without preprocessing) or just with preprocessing (without a CRS), using iO and lossy functions
Continuously Non-Malleable Secret Sharing: Joint Tampering, Plain Model and Capacity
We study non-malleable secret sharing against joint leakage and joint tampering attacks.
Our main result is the first threshold secret sharing scheme in the plain model achieving resilience to noisy-leakage and continuous tampering. The above holds under (necessary) minimal computational assumptions (i.e., the existence of one-to-one one-way functions), and in a model where the adversary commits to a fixed partition of all the shares into non-overlapping subsets of at most shares (where is the reconstruction threshold), and subsequently jointly leaks from and tampers with the shares within each partition.
We also study the capacity (i.e., the maximum achievable asymptotic information rate) of continuously non-malleable secret sharing against joint continuous tampering attacks. In particular, we prove that whenever the attacker can tamper jointly with shares, the capacity is at most . The rate of our construction matches this upper bound.
An important corollary of our results is the first non-malleable secret sharing scheme against independent tampering attacks breaking the rate-one barrier (under the same computational assumptions as above)
Democracy Enhancing Technologies: Toward deployable and incoercible E2E elections
End-to-end verifiable election systems (E2E systems) provide a provably correct tally while maintaining the secrecy of each voter's ballot, even if the voter is complicit in demonstrating how they voted. Providing voter incoercibility is one of the main challenges of designing E2E systems, particularly in the case of internet voting. A second challenge is building deployable, human-voteable E2E systems that conform to election laws and conventions. This dissertation examines deployability, coercion-resistance, and their intersection in election systems. In the course of this study, we introduce three new election systems, (Scantegrity, Eperio, and Selections), report on two real-world elections using E2E systems (Punchscan and Scantegrity), and study incoercibility issues in one deployed system (Punchscan). In addition, we propose and study new practical primitives for random beacons, secret printing, and panic passwords. These are tools that can be used in an election to, respectively, generate publicly verifiable random numbers, distribute the printing of secrets between non-colluding printers, and to covertly signal duress during authentication. While developed to solve specific problems in deployable and incoercible E2E systems, these techniques may be of independent interest
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference EEDAL'11 Energy Efficiency in Domestic Appliances and Lighting
This book contains the papers presented at the sixth international conference on Energy Efficiency in
Domestic Appliances and Lighting. EEDAL'11 was organised in Copenhagen, Denmark in May 2011. This major
international conference, which was previously been staged in Florence 1997, Naples 2000, Turin 2003,
London 2006, Berlin 200h9a s been very successful in attracting an international community of stakeholders
dealing with residential appliances, equipment, metering liagnhdti ng (including manufacturers, retailers,
consumers, governments, international organisations aangde ncies, academia and experts) to discuss the progress
achieved in technologies, behavioural aspects and poliacineds , the strategies that need to be implemented to
further progress this important work.
Potential readers who may benefit from this book include researchers, engineers, policymakers,
and all those who can influence the design, selection, application, and operation of electrical appliances and lighting.JRC.F.7-Renewable Energ