Social dilemmas, time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problem

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one 'objective'resource game may induce several 'subjective' games in the class of social dilemmas. Which unique 'subjective'game is actually played depends crucially on how the agents discount their future payo¤s. We examine equilibrium behavior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool resource system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. A sufficient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the degree of patience between agents is sufficiently dissimilar, the more patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium. We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the enormous complexity surrounding the general cases

IE WP 02/04 Technology and the environment: an evolutionary approach to sustainable technological change

Can the individual actions of agents spontaneously move the system out of a state where it is locked into an environmentally inferior technology, or is coordination from outside the system necessary in the form of public intervention? More importantly, even if the system were able to make the transition unaided, could market coordination mechanisms play an important role? The results of our model show that it would be advisable to undertake policies expressly aimed at the process of sustainable technological change –applying an ex ante (precautionary) approach– in a way that is complementary to the conventional equilibrium oriented environmental policies. The nature of these policies and how they might be implemented are questions we will address from this novel approach to the concept of sustainable development. In short, the main objectives of this paper are to understand more fully the dynamics of the process of technological change, its role in sustainable development, and to assess the implications of this dynamic approach to techno-environmental policy. To achieve these goals we have developed an agent based model (ABM), using distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) concepts drawn from the general methodology of social simulation.Technology diffusion; standardization; lock-in; sustainability; precautionary approach; evolutionary models; agent-based models

Towards Integration of Cognitive Models in Dialogue Management: Designing the Virtual Negotiation Coach Application

This paper presents an approach to flexible and adaptive dialogue management driven by cognitive modelling of human dialogue behaviour. Artificial intelligent agents, based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture, together with human actors are participating in a (meta)cognitive skills training within a negotiation scenario. The agent  employs instance-based learning to decide about its own actions and to reflect on the behaviour of the opponent. We show that task-related actions can be handled by a cognitive agent who is a plausible dialogue partner.  Separating task-related and dialogue control actions enables the application of sophisticated models along with a flexible architecture  in which  various alternative modelling methods can be combined. We evaluated the proposed approach with users assessing  the relative contribution of various factors to the overall usability of a dialogue system. Subjective perception of effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction were correlated with various objective performance metrics, e.g. number of (in)appropriate system responses, recovery strategies, and interaction pace. It was observed that the dialogue system usability is determined most by the quality of agreements reached in terms of estimated Pareto optimality, by the user's negotiation strategies selected, and by the quality of system recognition, interpretation and responses. We compared human-human and human-agent performance with respect to the number and quality of agreements reached, estimated cooperativeness level, and frequency of accepted negative outcomes. Evaluation experiments showed promising, consistently positive results throughout the range of the relevant scales

Unanimously acceptable agreements for negotiation teams in unpredictable domains

A negotiation team is a set of agents with common and possibly also conflicting preferences that forms one of the parties of a negotiation. A negotiation team is involved in two decision making processes simultaneously, a negotiation with the opponents, and an intra-team process to decide on the moves to make in the negotiation. This article focuses on negotiation team decision making for circumstances that require unanimity of team decisions. Existing agent-based approaches only guarantee unanimity in teams negotiating in domains exclusively composed of predictable and compatible issues. This article presents a model for negotiation teams that guarantees unanimous team decisions in domains consisting of predictable and compatible, and alsounpredictable issues. Moreover, the article explores the influence of using opponent, and team member models in the proposing strategies that team members use. Experimental results show that the team benefits if team members employ Bayesian learning to model their teammates’ preferences. 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.This research is partially supported by TIN2012-36586-C03-01 of the Spanish government and PROMETEOII/2013/019 of Generalitat Valenciana. Other part of this research is supported by the Dutch Technology Foundation STW, applied science division of NWO and the Technology Program of the Ministry of Economic Affairs; the Pocket Negotiator Project with Grant No. VICI-Project 08075.Sánchez Anguix, V.; Aydogan, R.; Julian Inglada, VJ.; Jonker, C. (2014). Unanimously acceptable agreements for negotiation teams in unpredictable domains. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications. 13(4):243-265. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2014.05.002S24326513