OnionBots: Subverting Privacy Infrastructure for Cyber Attacks

Over the last decade botnets survived by adopting a sequence of increasingly sophisticated strategies to evade detection and take overs, and to monetize their infrastructure. At the same time, the success of privacy infrastructures such as Tor opened the door to illegal activities, including botnets, ransomware, and a marketplace for drugs and contraband. We contend that the next waves of botnets will extensively subvert privacy infrastructure and cryptographic mechanisms. In this work we propose to preemptively investigate the design and mitigation of such botnets. We first, introduce OnionBots, what we believe will be the next generation of resilient, stealthy botnets. OnionBots use privacy infrastructures for cyber attacks by completely decoupling their operation from the infected host IP address and by carrying traffic that does not leak information about its source, destination, and nature. Such bots live symbiotically within the privacy infrastructures to evade detection, measurement, scale estimation, observation, and in general all IP-based current mitigation techniques. Furthermore, we show that with an adequate self-healing network maintenance scheme, that is simple to implement, OnionBots achieve a low diameter and a low degree and are robust to partitioning under node deletions. We developed a mitigation technique, called SOAP, that neutralizes the nodes of the basic OnionBots. We also outline and discuss a set of techniques that can enable subsequent waves of Super OnionBots. In light of the potential of such botnets, we believe that the research community should proactively develop detection and mitigation methods to thwart OnionBots, potentially making adjustments to privacy infrastructure.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

Botnet Detection using Social Graph Analysis

Signature-based botnet detection methods identify botnets by recognizing Command and Control (C\&C) traffic and can be ineffective for botnets that use new and sophisticate mechanisms for such communications. To address these limitations, we propose a novel botnet detection method that analyzes the social relationships among nodes. The method consists of two stages: (i) anomaly detection in an "interaction" graph among nodes using large deviations results on the degree distribution, and (ii) community detection in a social "correlation" graph whose edges connect nodes with highly correlated communications. The latter stage uses a refined modularity measure and formulates the problem as a non-convex optimization problem for which appropriate relaxation strategies are developed. We apply our method to real-world botnet traffic and compare its performance with other community detection methods. The results show that our approach works effectively and the refined modularity measure improves the detection accuracy.Comment: 7 pages. Allerton Conferenc

Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences

In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks, highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control (C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages. Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor

Classification hardness for supervised learners on 20 years of intrusion detection data

This article consolidates analysis of established (NSL-KDD) and new intrusion detection datasets (ISCXIDS2012, CICIDS2017, CICIDS2018) through the use of supervised machine learning (ML) algorithms. The uniformity in analysis procedure opens up the option to compare the obtained results. It also provides a stronger foundation for the conclusions about the efficacy of supervised learners on the main classification task in network security. This research is motivated in part to address the lack of adoption of these modern datasets. Starting with a broad scope that includes classification by algorithms from different families on both established and new datasets has been done to expand the existing foundation and reveal the most opportune avenues for further inquiry. After obtaining baseline results, the classification task was increased in difficulty, by reducing the available data to learn from, both horizontally and vertically. The data reduction has been included as a stress-test to verify if the very high baseline results hold up under increasingly harsh constraints. Ultimately, this work contains the most comprehensive set of results on the topic of intrusion detection through supervised machine learning. Researchers working on algorithmic improvements can compare their results to this collection, knowing that all results reported here were gathered through a uniform framework. This work's main contributions are the outstanding classification results on the current state of the art datasets for intrusion detection and the conclusion that these methods show remarkable resilience in classification performance even when aggressively reducing the amount of data to learn from