Improvement of a convertible undeniable partially blind signature scheme

Undeniable signatures are the digital signatures that should be verified with the help of the signer. A signer may disavow a genuine document, if the signature is only verifiable with the aid of the signer under the condition that the signer is not honest. Undeniable signatures solve this problem by adding a new feature called the disavowal protocol in addition to the normal components of signature and verification. Disavowal protocol is able to prevent a dishonest signer from disavowing a valid signature. In some situations, an undeniable signature should be converted into a normal digital signature in order that the signature can be universally verified. Blind signatures are the digital signatures that help a user to get a signature on a message without revealing the content of the message to a signer. For the blind signatures, if the signer is able to make an agreement with the user, then the underlying signer may include some common information that is known to the user, then such signatures are partially blind signatures. Convertible undeniable partially blind signatures are of the features of undeniable signatures, blind signatures, convertible undeniable signatures, and partially blind signatures. Recently, a convertible undeniable partially blind signature scheme was presented. In this paper, we first analyse a security flaw of the convertible undeniable partially blind signature scheme. To address the security flaw, we present an improvement on the disavowal protocol. The improved scheme can prevent the signer from either proving that a given valid signature as invalid, or cheating the verifier

A pairing-based blind signature scheme with message recovery

Blind signatures enable users to obtain valid signatures for a message without revealing its content to the signer. This paper presents a new blind signature scheme, i.e. identity-based blind signature scheme with message recovery. Due to the message recovery property, the new scheme requires less bandwidth than the identity based blind signatures with similar constructions. The scheme is based on modified Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic curves, and thus requires smaller key sizes for the same level of security compared to previous approaches not utilizing bilinear pairings. Security and efficiency analysis for the scheme is provided in this paper

A Novel Blind Signature Scheme Based On Discrete Logarithm Problem With Un-traceability

Blind Signatures are a special type of digital signatures which possess two special properties of blindness and untraceability, which are important for today’s real world applications that require authentication , integrity , security , anonymity and privacy. David Chaum[2] was the first to propose the concept of blind signatures. The scheme's security was based on the difficulty of solving the factoring problem [3, 4]. Two properties that are important for a blind signature scheme in order to be used in various modern applications are blindness and untraceability[2, 5, 6] . Blindness means that the signer is not able to know the contents of the message while signing it, which is achieved by disguising (or blinding) the message through various methods. Untraceability refers to preventing the signer from linking the blinded message it signs to a later unblinded version that it may be called upon to verify. Blind signatures based on discrete logarithm problem are still an area with much scope for research. We aim to propose a novel blind signature scheme with untraceability , based on the discrete logarithm problem

Lattice-based Blind Signatures

Motivated by the need to have secure blind signatures even in the presence of quantum computers, we present two efficient blind signature schemes based on hard worst-case lattice problems. Both schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model and unconditionally blind. The first scheme is based on preimage samplable functions that were introduced at STOC 2008 by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan. The scheme is stateful and runs in 3 moves. The second scheme builds upon the PKC 2008 identification scheme of Lyubashevsky. It is stateless, has 4 moves, and its security is based on the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices

Lattice Blind Signatures with Forward Security

Blind signatures play an important role in both electronic cash and electronic voting systems. Blind signatures should be secure against various attacks (such as signature forgeries). The work puts a special attention to secret key exposure attacks, which totally break digital signatures. Signatures that resist secret key exposure attacks are called forward secure in the sense that disclosure of a current secret key does not compromise past secret keys. This means that forward-secure signatures must include a mechanism for secret-key evolution over time periods. This paper gives a construction of the first blind signature that is forward secure. The construction is based on the SIS assumption in the lattice setting. The core techniques applied are the binary tree data structure for the time periods and the trapdoor delegation for the key-evolution mechanism.Comment: ACISP 202

Formalizing group blind signatures and practical constructions without random oracles

Group blind signatures combine anonymity properties of both group signatures and blind signatures and offer privacy for both the message to be signed and the signer. The primitive has been introduced with only informal definitions for its required security properties. In this paper, we offer two main contributions: first, we provide foundations for the primitive and present formal security definitions. In the process, we identify and address some subtle issues which were not considered by previous constructions and (informal) security definitions. Our second main contribution is a generic construction that yields practical schemes with a round-optimal signing protocol and constant-size signatures. Our constructions permit dynamic and concurrent enrollment of new members and satisfy strong security requirements. To the best of our knowledge, our schemes are the first provably secure constructions in the standard model. In addition, we introduce some new building blocks which may be of independent interest. © 2013 Springer-Verlag

Concurrently Secure Blind Schnorr Signatures

Many applications of blind signatures (notably in blockchains) require the resulting signatures to be compatible with the existing system. This makes schemes that produce Schnorr signatures (now being standardized and supported by major cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin) desirable. Unfortunately, the existing blind-signing protocol has been shown insecure when users can open signing sessions concurrently (Eurocrypt\u2721). On the other hand, only allowing sequential sessions opens the door to denial-of-service attacks. We present the first practical, concurrently secure blind-signing protocol for Schnorr signatures, using the standard primitives NIZK and PKE and assuming that Schnorr signatures themselves are unforgeable. We cast our scheme as a generalization of blind and partially blind signatures: we introduce the notion of predicate blind signatures, in which the signer can define a predicate that the blindly signed message must satisfy. We provide proof-of-concept implementations and benchmarks for various choices of primitives and scenarios, including blindly signing Bitcoin transactions conditioned on certain properties