ZOO: Zeroth Order Optimization based Black-box Attacks to Deep Neural Networks without Training Substitute Models

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are one of the most prominent technologies of our time, as they achieve state-of-the-art performance in many machine learning tasks, including but not limited to image classification, text mining, and speech processing. However, recent research on DNNs has indicated ever-increasing concern on the robustness to adversarial examples, especially for security-critical tasks such as traffic sign identification for autonomous driving. Studies have unveiled the vulnerability of a well-trained DNN by demonstrating the ability of generating barely noticeable (to both human and machines) adversarial images that lead to misclassification. Furthermore, researchers have shown that these adversarial images are highly transferable by simply training and attacking a substitute model built upon the target model, known as a black-box attack to DNNs. Similar to the setting of training substitute models, in this paper we propose an effective black-box attack that also only has access to the input (images) and the output (confidence scores) of a targeted DNN. However, different from leveraging attack transferability from substitute models, we propose zeroth order optimization (ZOO) based attacks to directly estimate the gradients of the targeted DNN for generating adversarial examples. We use zeroth order stochastic coordinate descent along with dimension reduction, hierarchical attack and importance sampling techniques to efficiently attack black-box models. By exploiting zeroth order optimization, improved attacks to the targeted DNN can be accomplished, sparing the need for training substitute models and avoiding the loss in attack transferability. Experimental results on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet show that the proposed ZOO attack is as effective as the state-of-the-art white-box attack and significantly outperforms existing black-box attacks via substitute models.Comment: Accepted by 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISEC) with the 24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS

Categorical Inputs, Sensitivity Analysis, Optimization and Importance Tempering with tgp Version 2, an R Package for Treed Gaussian Process Models

This document describes the new features in version 2.x of the tgp package for R, implementing treed Gaussian process (GP) models. The topics covered include methods for dealing with categorical inputs and excluding inputs from the tree or GP part of the model; fully Bayesian sensitivity analysis for inputs/covariates; sequential optimization of black-box functions; and a new Monte Carlo method for inference in multi-modal posterior distributions that combines simulated tempering and importance sampling. These additions extend the functionality of tgp across all models in the hierarchy: from Bayesian linear models, to classification and regression trees (CART), to treed Gaussian processes with jumps to the limiting linear model. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the baseline functionality of the package, outlined in the first vignette (Gramacy 2007).

Bounding rare event probabilities in computer experiments

We are interested in bounding probabilities of rare events in the context of computer experiments. These rare events depend on the output of a physical model with random input variables. Since the model is only known through an expensive black box function, standard efficient Monte Carlo methods designed for rare events cannot be used. We then propose a strategy to deal with this difficulty based on importance sampling methods. This proposal relies on Kriging metamodeling and is able to achieve sharp upper confidence bounds on the rare event probabilities. The variability due to the Kriging metamodeling step is properly taken into account. The proposed methodology is applied to a toy example and compared to more standard Bayesian bounds. Finally, a challenging real case study is analyzed. It consists of finding an upper bound of the probability that the trajectory of an airborne load will collide with the aircraft that has released it.Comment: 21 pages, 6 figure