Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory---the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems---leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.Comment: 58 pages, to appear in "Computability: G\"odel, Turing, Church, and beyond," MIT Press, 2012. Some minor clarifications and corrections; new references adde

NP-complete Problems and Physical Reality

Can NP-complete problems be solved efficiently in the physical universe? I survey proposals including soap bubbles, protein folding, quantum computing, quantum advice, quantum adiabatic algorithms, quantum-mechanical nonlinearities, hidden variables, relativistic time dilation, analog computing, Malament-Hogarth spacetimes, quantum gravity, closed timelike curves, and "anthropic computing." The section on soap bubbles even includes some "experimental" results. While I do not believe that any of the proposals will let us solve NP-complete problems efficiently, I argue that by studying them, we can learn something not only about computation but also about physics.Comment: 23 pages, minor correction

Non-classical computing: feasible versus infeasible

Physics sets certain limits on what is and is not computable. These limits are very far from having been reached by current technologies. Whilst proposals for hypercomputation are almost certainly infeasible, there are a number of non classical approaches that do hold considerable promise. There are a range of possible architectures that could be implemented on silicon that are distinctly different from the von Neumann model. Beyond this, quantum simulators, which are the quantum equivalent of analogue computers, may be constructable in the near future

Effective Physical Processes and Active Information in Quantum Computing

The recent debate on hypercomputation has arisen new questions both on the computational abilities of quantum systems and the Church-Turing Thesis role in Physics. We propose here the idea of "effective physical process" as the essentially physical notion of computation. By using the Bohm and Hiley active information concept we analyze the differences between the standard form (quantum gates) and the non-standard one (adiabatic and morphogenetic) of Quantum Computing, and we point out how its Super-Turing potentialities derive from an incomputable information source in accordance with Bell's constraints. On condition that we give up the formal concept of "universality", the possibility to realize quantum oracles is reachable. In this way computation is led back to the logic of physical world.Comment: 10 pages; Added references for sections 2 and

Do we live in a [quantum] simulation? Constraints, observations, and experiments on the simulation hypothesis

The question "What is real?" can be traced back to the shadows in Plato's cave. Two thousand years later, Rene Descartes lacked knowledge about arguing against an evil deceiver feeding us the illusion of sensation. Descartes' epistemological concept later led to various theories of sensory experiences. The concept of "illusionism", proposing that even the very conscious experience we have is an illusion, is not only a red-pill scenario found in the 1999 science fiction movie "The Matrix" but is also a philosophical concept promoted by modern tinkers, most prominently by Daniel Dennett. Reflection upon a possible simulation and our perceived reality was beautifully visualized in "The Matrix", bringing the old ideas of Descartes to coffee houses around the world. Irish philosopher Bishop Berkeley was the father of what was later coined as "subjective idealism", basically stating that "what you perceive is real". With the advent of quantum technologies based on the control of individual fundamental particles, the question of whether our universe is a simulation isn't just intriguing. Our ever-advancing understanding of fundamental physical processes will likely lead us to build quantum computers utilizing quantum effects for simulating nature quantum-mechanically in all complexity, as famously envisioned by Richard Feynman. In this article, we outline constraints on the limits of computability and predictability in/of the universe, which we then use to design experiments allowing for first conclusions as to whether we participate in a simulation chain. Eventually, in a simulation in which the computer simulating a universe is governed by the same physical laws as the simulation, the exhaustion of computational resources will halt all simulations down the simulation chain unless an external programmer intervenes, which we may be able to observe.Comment: 27 pages, 5 figure