Informe bibliográfico sobre la lógica (epistémica) de la conciencia

Awareness Logic is an extension of epistemic logic that solves the problem of logical omniscience by incorporating an awareness operator that separates the explicit knowledge from the implicit one. This report collects the most prominent works regarding the beginnings of this logic, as well as its developments in the past three decades. Specifically, it reviews the approaches from Dynamic Epistemic Logic, from the ones that combine other logics with Awareness Logic and those from Game Theory.La lógica de la conciencia es una extensión de la lógica epistémica que solventa el problema de la omnisciencia lógica incorporando un operador de conciencia para separar el conocimiento explícito del implícito. Este informe recopila los principales textos tanto de los orígenes de esta lógica, así como de sus desarrollos en las últimas tres décadas. En concreto analiza los enfoques desde la lógica epistémica dinámica, desde su combinación con otras lógicas y los enfoques de teoría de juegos

New Directions in Model Checking Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) can model complex information scenarios in a way that appeals to logicians. However, its existing implementations are based on explicit model checking which can only deal with small models, so we do not know how DEL performs for larger and real-world problems. For temporal logics, in contrast, symbolic model checking has been developed and successfully applied, for example in protocol and hardware verification. Symbolic model checkers for temporal logics are very efficient and can deal with very large models. In this thesis we build a bridge: new faithful representations of DEL models as so-called knowledge and belief structures that allow for symbolic model checking. For complex epistemic and factual change we introduce transformers, a symbolic replacement for action models. Besides a detailed explanation of the theory, we present SMCDEL: a Haskell implementation of symbolic model checking for DEL using Binary Decision Diagrams. Our new methods can solve well-known benchmark problems in epistemic scenarios much faster than existing methods for DEL. We also compare its performance to to existing model checkers for temporal logics and show that DEL can compete with established frameworks. We zoom in on two specific variants of DEL for concrete applications. First, we introduce Public Inspection Logic, a new framework for the knowledge of variables and its dynamics. Second, we study the dynamic gossip problem and how it can be analyzed with epistemic logic. We show that existing gossip protocols can be improved, but that no perfect strengthening of "Learn New Secrets" exists

Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 7)

This volume collects together revised papers originally presented at the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 2006). LOFT is a key venue for presenting research at the intersection of logic, economics and computer science, and the present collection gives a lively and wide-ranging view of an exciting and rapidly growing area

Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory

Logical models for bounded reasoners

This dissertation aims at the logical modelling of aspects of human reasoning, informed by facts on the bounds of human cognition. We break down this challenge into three parts. In Part I, we discuss the place of logical systems for knowledge and belief in the Rationality Debate and we argue for systems that formalize an alternative picture of rationality -- one wherein empirical facts have a key role (Chapter 2). In Part II, we design logical models that encode explicitly the deductive reasoning of a single bounded agent and the variety of processes underlying it. This is achieved through the introduction of a dynamic, resource-sensitive, impossible-worlds semantics (Chapter 3). We then show that this type of semantics can be combined with plausibility models (Chapter 4) and that it can be instrumental in modelling the logical aspects of System 1 (“fast”) and System 2 (“slow”) cognitive processes (Chapter 5). In Part III, we move from single- to multi-agent frameworks. This unfolds in three directions: (a) the formation of beliefs about others (e.g. due to observation, memory, and communication), (b) the manipulation of beliefs (e.g. via acts of reasoning about oneself and others), and (c) the effect of the above on group reasoning. These questions are addressed, respectively, in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. We finally discuss directions for future work and we reflect on the contribution of the thesis as a whole (Chapter 9)