Bipolarity and multipolarity in aggregation structures

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Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns among Major Powers, 1816-1965

This paper examines the relationship of war to power concentration and alliance configuration among the major powers. It does so by developing a theoretical argument from the literature on bipolarity and multipolarity. The paper suggests that bipolarity has two components — power distribution and alliance clustering. The two, it is argued, have 'opposite' effects on warfare in the major power system: power bipolarity minimizes the magnitude of those wars that do break out, while alliance bipolarity increases the likelihood that a war will occur. Correlational evidence, drawn from the Correlates of War data set, is supportive of both hypotheses for the twentieth century. The power polarity hypothesis is also confirmed for the nineteenth century, but the alliance polarity hypothesis seems disconfirmed for that century, perhaps because of the effects of hostility on the balance of power alliance structures of that era. The con ceptual framework and findings of the present paper allow one the reexamine the classic debate on the relative probabilities of war in bipolar and multipolar systems. The insights of Deutsch and Singer on the one hand and Waltz on the other appear to be more consistent with each other than heretofore recognized. Key elements of both the Waltz and the Deutsch and Singer arguments are supported by the findings. On the other hand, more recent, empirical studies by Bueno de Mesquita and others are critiqued on the basis of the present paper's theoretical perspective and empirical findings.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68829/2/10.1177_002234338402100105.pd

Indian Involvement in Afghanistan: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block to Regional Hegemony?

This paper seeks an explanation for the resilience of the Syrian authoritarian regime under Hafez and Bashar Al-Asad. It will be argued that this resilience is to a relevant extent caused by the fact that the regime’s “material” as well as “ideational” forms of power share a common element, if not an underlying principle. This generates their compatibility and congruency and thus produces a convergence of forces which manifests in the regime’s ability to exceed the mere sum of its individual forms of power. It will be demonstrated that this common principle can be conceptualized as a “tacit pact” between unequal parties, with the weaker party under constant threat of exclusion and/or coercion in the event of noncompliance. It will be argued that inherent in the pact is a high level of ambiguity; this, paradoxically, renders it more effective but at the same time also more instable as a tool of domination.Afghanistan, India, South Asia, regional security, regional hegemony

Rethinking benchmark dates in international relations

International Relations has an ‘orthodox set’ of benchmark dates by which much of its research and teaching is organized: 1500, 1648, 1919, 1945 and 1989. This article argues that International Relations scholars need to question the ways in which these orthodox dates serve as internal and external points of reference, think more critically about how benchmark dates are established, and generate a revised set of benchmark dates that better reflects macro-historical international dynamics. The first part of the article questions the appropriateness of the orthodox set of benchmark dates as ways of framing the discipline’s self-understanding. The second and third sections look at what counts as a benchmark date, and why. We systematize benchmark dates drawn from mainstream International Relations theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism/English School and sociological approaches) and then aggregate their criteria. The fourth section of the article uses this exercise to construct a revised set of benchmark dates which can widen the discipline’s theoretical and historical scope. We outline a way of ranking benchmark dates and suggest a means of assessing recent candidates for benchmark status. Overall, the article delivers two main benefits: first, an improved heuristic by which to think critically about foundational dates in the discipline; and, second, a revised set of benchmark dates which can help shift International Relations’ centre of gravity away from dynamics of war and peace, and towards a broader range of macro-historical dynamics

Great Powers, Great Perils: A Neorealist Analysis of the Impact of Multipolarity on the Risks of Confrontation, 1890-1911 and 2001-2009

This thesis departs from a neorealist theoretical perspective but adds a rational actor perspective based on game theory. It shares Waltz' assumption of deep anarchy and the need for states to ensure their security but also maintains that actor prospects may be able to cope with the structural incentives in a flexible manner. Two cases of international politics are studied; 1890-1911 and 2001-2009. It is then argued that the historical case can provide a basis for limited probabilistic generalization about the use of hard power in a modern multipolar setting using a methodological approach based on the concept of transferability. The underlying assumption is that the world may be headed for a multipolar world order and that some patterns related to the use of hard power from 1890-1911 were being repeated in 2001-2009. The use of hard power manifests itself in two major ways; warfare and power projection. Multipolarity increases the number of actors that can use these instruments without implicit or explicit approval from another state. The differing actor prospects mean that some great powers are more likely to resort to hard power than others