Social Aspects of New Technologies - the CCTV and Biometric (Framing Privacy and Data Protection) in the Case of Poland

The purpose of this paper is to review the institution responsible for the protection of personal data within the European Union and national example - Polish as a country representing the new Member States. The analysis of institutional system - providing legal security of communication and information institutions, companies and citizens against the dangers arising from the ongoing development of innovative new technologies in the European Union and Poland. This article is an attempt to analyze the possibility of using security systems and Biometry CTTV in Poland in terms of legislation. The results of the analysis indicate that, in terms of institutions Poland did not do badly in relation to the risks arising from the implementation of technology. The situation is not as good when it comes to the awareness of citizens and small businesses. This requires that facilitate greater access to free security software companies from data leakage or uncontrolled cyber-terrorist attacks. With regard to the use of security systems, CCTV and biometrics, Poland in legal terms is still early in the process of adapting to EU Directive. The continuous development of technology should force the legislature to establish clear standards and regulations for the application of CCTV technology and biometrics, as it is of great importance in ensuring the fundamental rights and freedoms of every citizen of the Polish Republic.Wyniki analizy wskazują, że pod względem instytucji Polska nie wypada źle w odniesieniu do zagrożeń wynikających z wdrożenia technologii. Sytuacja nie jest tak dobra, jeśli chodzi o świadomość obywateli i mniejszych firm. Wymaga to ułatwiania szerszego dostępu do darmowych programów zabezpieczających firmy przed wyciekiem danych lub niekontrolowanych cyber-ataków terrorystycznych. W odniesieniu do stosowania systemów zabezpieczeń CCTV oraz biometrii, Polska pod względem prawnym jest wciąż na początku procesu dostosowania do dyrektywy UE. Ciągły rozwój technologii powinien zmusić ustawodawcę do stworzenia jednoznacznych standardów i przepisów obowiązujących w zakresie stosowania technologii CCTV oraz biometrii, gdyż ma to ogromne znaczenie w zapewnieniu podstawowych praw i wolności każdego obywatela Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Quantum surveillance and 'shared secrets'. A biometric step too far? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe, July 2010

It is no longer sensible to regard biometrics as having neutral socio-economic, legal and political impacts. Newer generation biometrics are fluid and include behavioural and emotional data that can be combined with other data. Therefore, a range of issues needs to be reviewed in light of the increasing privatisation of ‘security’ that escapes effective, democratic parliamentary and regulatory control and oversight at national, international and EU levels, argues Juliet Lodge, Professor and co-Director of the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence at the University of Leeds, U

Biometric surveillance in schools : cause for concern or case for curriculum?

This article critically examines the draft consultation paper issued by the Scottish Government to local authorities on the use of biometric technologies in schools in September 2008 (see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/09/08135019/0). Coming at a time when a number of schools are considering using biometric systems to register and confirm the identity of pupils in a number of settings (cashless catering systems, automated registration of pupils' arrival in school and school library automation), this guidance is undoubtedly welcome. The present focus seems to be on using fingerprints, but as the guidance acknowledges, the debate in future may encompass iris prints, voice prints and facial recognition systems, which are already in use in non-educational settings. The article notes broader developments in school surveillance in Scotland and in the rest of the UK and argues that serious attention must be given to the educational considerations which arise. Schools must prepare pupils for life in the newly emergent 'surveillance society', not by uncritically habituating them to the surveillance systems installed in their schools, but by critically engaging them in thought about the way surveillance technologies work in the wider world, the various rationales given to them, and the implications - in terms of privacy, safety and inclusion - of being a 'surveilled subject'

‘Crisis’, control and circulation: Biometric surveillance in the policing of the ‘crimmigrant other’

Automated facial recognition, the use of dactyloscopic data and advanced forensic DNA analyses are becoming dominant technological surveillance means for ‘crimmigration’ control. ‘Crimmigration’ describes the increasing criminalisation of migration, based on a perceived ‘crisis’ of mass migration and its assumed negative impact on national stability and welfare, materialising in overlapping crime and migration control regimes. We analyse the policing of migration through biometric technologies as the reproduction of social practices of security against crime. By combining concepts of social practices and ethical regimes, we suggest that biometric ethical regimes are constituted by social practices working towards legitimising the use of biomaterials and biodata. This analytical synthesis supports us in exploring how biometric technologies deployed in the policing of crime circulate into the policing of migration and vice versa. First, technologies as materials (DNA, fingerprints, facial images, analysis kits, databases, etc.) are inscribed with assumptions about validating identity and suspicion, and are increasingly made accessible as data across policy domains. Second, forensic competence moves in abstracted forms of expertise independent of context and ethics of application, creating challenges for reliable and legitimate technology deployment. Third, biometric technologies, often portrayed as reliable, useful, accurate policing tools, travel from crime into migration control with meanings that construct generalised criminal suspicion of migrants. To evidence the complexity and difficulty of achieving accountability and responsibility for the ethical governance of biometric technologies in policing, we trace how the goals, risks, benefits and values of biometric technologies are framed, and how the legitimacy of their deployment in policing of migration is constructed and negotiated.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Establishing Identity for International Protection: Challenges and Practices

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The Impact of Information Security Technologies Upon Society

This paper's aims are concerned with the effects of information security technologies upon society in general and civil society organisations in particular. Information security mechanisms have the potential to act as enablers or disablers for the work of civil society groups. Recent increased emphasis on national security issues by state actors, particularly 'anti-terrorism' initiatives, have resulted in legislative instruments that impinge upon the civil liberties of many citizens and have the potential to restrict the free flow of information vital for civil society actors. The nascent area of cyberactivism, or hactivism, is at risk of being labelled cyberterrorism, with the accompanying change of perception from a legitimate form of electronic civil disobedience to an abhorrent crime. Biometric technology can be an invasive intrusion into citizens' privacy. Internet censorship and surveillance is widespread and increasing. These implementations of information security technology are becoming more widely deployed with profound implications for the type of societies that will result

When mobility is not a choice Problematising asylum seekers’ secondary movements and their criminalisation in the EU. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 2019-11, December 2019

The notion of ‘secondary movements’ is commonly used to describe the mobility of third country nationals for the purpose of seeking international protection in an EU member state other than the one of first irregular entry according to the EU Dublin Regulation. Secondary movements are often identified as a major insecurity factor undermining the sustainability of the Schengen regime and the functioning of the EU Dublin system. Consequently, EU policies have focused on their ‘criminalisation’, as testified by the range of sanctions included in the 2016 CEAS reform package, and on a ‘policing’ approach, which has materialised in the expanded access to data stored in the EURODAC database by police authorities, and its future interconnection with other EU databases under the 2019 EU Interoperability Regulations. This Paper shows that the EU notion of secondary movements is flawed and must be reconsidered in any upcoming reform of the CEAS. The concept overlooks the fact that asylum seekers’ mobility may be non-voluntary and thus cannot be understood as a matter of ‘free choice’ or in terms of ‘preferences’ about the member state of destination. Such an understanding is based on the wrong assumption that asylum seekers’ decisions to move to a different EU country are illegitimate, as all EU member states are assumed to be ‘safe’ for people in need of international protectio

Watching You: Systematic Federal Surveillance of Ordinary Americans

To combat terrorism, Attorney General John Ashcroft has asked Congress to "enhance" the government's ability to conduct domestic surveillance of citizens. The Justice Department's legislative proposals would give federal law enforcement agents new access to personal information contained in business and school records. Before acting on those legislative proposals, lawmakers should pause to consider the extent to which the lives of ordinary Americans already are monitored by the federal government. Over the years, the federal government has instituted a variety of data collection programs that compel the production, retention, and dissemination of personal information about every American citizen. Linked through an individual's Social Security number, these labor, medical, education and financial databases now empower the federal government to obtain a detailed portrait of any person: the checks he writes, the types of causes he supports, and what he says "privately" to his doctor. Despite widespread public concern about preserving privacy, these data collection systems have been enacted in the name of "reducing fraud" and "promoting efficiency" in various government programs. Having exposed most areas of American life to ongoing government scrutiny and recording, Congress is now poised to expand and universalize federal tracking of citizen life. The inevitable consequence of such constant surveillance, however, is metastasizing government control over society. If that happens, our government will have perverted its most fundamental mission and destroyed the privacy and liberty that it was supposed to protect