Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation

We have previously tried to explain perceptual inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pursues Helmholtz’s agenda to understand the brain in terms of energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as the minimization of a free-energy bound on the likelihood of sensory inputs, given an internal model of how they were caused. In this article, we consider what would happen if the data themselves were sampled to minimize this bound. It transpires that the ensuing active sampling or inference is mandated by ergodic arguments based on the very existence of adaptive agents. Furthermore, it accounts for many aspects of motor behavior; from retinal stabilization to goal-seeking. In particular, it suggests that motor control can be understood as fulfilling prior expectations about proprioceptive sensations. This formulation can explain why adaptive behavior emerges in biological agents and suggests a simple alternative to optimal control theory. We illustrate these points using simulations of oculomotor control and then apply to same principles to cued and goal-directed movements. In short, the free-energy formulation may provide an alternative perspective on the motor control that places it in an intimate relationship with perception

Landmarks and frontiers in biological fluid dynamics

Biological systems are influenced by fluid mechanics at nearly all spatiotemporal scales. This broad relevance of fluid mechanics to biology has been increasingly appreciated by engineers and biologists alike, leading to continued expansion of research in the field of biological fluid dynamics. While this growth is exciting, it can present a barrier to researchers seeking a concise introduction to key challenges and opportunities for progress in the field. Rather than attempt a comprehensive review of the literature, this article highlights a limited selection of classic and recent work. In addition to motivating the study of biological fluid dynamics in general, the goal is to identify both longstanding and emerging conceptual questions that can guide future research. Answers to these fluid mechanics questions can lead to breakthroughs in our ability to predict, diagnose, and correct biological dysfunction, while also inspiring a host of new engineering technologies

Cocaine Addiction as a Homeostatic Reinforcement Learning Disorder

Drug addiction implicates both reward learning and homeostatic regulation mechanisms of the brain. This has stimulated 2 partially successful theoretical perspectives on addiction. Many important aspects of addiction, however, remain to be explained within a single, unified framework that integrates the 2 mechanisms. Building upon a recently developed homeostatic reinforcement learning theory, the authors focus on a key transition stage of addiction that is well modeled in animals, escalation of drug use, and propose a computational theory of cocaine addiction where cocaine reinforces behavior due to its rapid homeostatic corrective effect, whereas its chronic use induces slow and long-lasting changes in homeostatic setpoint. Simulations show that our new theory accounts for key behavioral and neurobiological features of addiction, most notably, escalation of cocaine use, drug-primed craving and relapse, individual differences underlying dose-response curves, and dopamine D2-receptor downregulation in addicts. The theory also generates unique predictions about cocaine self-administration behavior in rats that are confirmed by new experimental results. Viewing addiction as a homeostatic reinforcement learning disorder coherently explains many behavioral and neurobiological aspects of the transition to cocaine addiction, and suggests a new perspective toward understanding addiction

Being Emergence vs. Pattern Emergence: Complexity, Control, and Goal-Directedness in Biological Systems

Emergence is much discussed by both philosophers and scientists. But, as noted by Mitchell (2012), there is a significant gulf; philosophers and scientists talk past each other. We contend that this is because philosophers and scientists typically mean different things by emergence, leading us to distinguish being emergence and pattern emergence. While related to distinctions offered by others between, for example, strong/weak emergence or epistemic/ontological emergence (Clayton, 2004, pp. 9–11), we argue that the being vs. pattern distinction better captures what the two groups are addressing. In identifying pattern emergence as the central concern of scientists, however, we do not mean that pattern emergence is of no interest to philosophers. Rather, we argue that philosophers should attend to, and even contribute to, discussions of pattern emergence. But it is important that this discussion be distinguished, not conflated, with discussions of being emergence. In the following section we explicate the notion of being emergence and show how it has been the focus of many philosophical discussions, historical and contemporary. In section 3 we turn to pattern emergence, briefly presenting a few of the ways it figures in the discussions of scientists (and philosophers of science who contribute to these discussions in science). Finally, in sections 4 and 5, we consider the relevance of pattern emergence to several central topics in philosophy of biology: the emergence of complexity, of control, and of goal-directedness in biological systems

Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies

Curriculum for parents of children in foster care who are working to achieve reunification

This review considers the reasons for the disconnect between what has been identified as best practice and what is routinely practiced regarding services to biological parents of children in foster care. As well it synthesizes the current data regarding what practices are most effective in working with biological parents of children in foster care in achieving the goal of family reunification to create a curriculum for parents of children in foster care who are working to achieve reunification. It also synthesizes current data regarding best practices and presents a curriculum for parents of children in foster care who are working to achieve reunification. This curriculum emphasizes creating a relationship of respect and an environment of team effort when working with parents who are seeking reunification. Allowing the parents to have a space where their difficulties are acknowledged and their strengths embraced is of utmost importance in this approach