Use of aggregation functions in decision making

A key component of many decision making processes is the aggregation step, whereby a set of numbers is summarised with a single representative value. This research showed that aggregation functions can provide a mathematical formalism to deal with issues like vagueness and uncertainty, which arise naturally in various decision contexts

LIPIcs, Volume 261, ICALP 2023, Complete Volume

LIPIcs, Volume 261, ICALP 2023, Complete Volum

International Conference on Continuous Optimization (ICCOPT) 2019 Conference Book

The Sixth International Conference on Continuous Optimization took place on the campus of the Technical University of Berlin, August 3-8, 2019. The ICCOPT is a flagship conference of the Mathematical Optimization Society (MOS), organized every three years. ICCOPT 2019 was hosted by the Weierstrass Institute for Applied Analysis and Stochastics (WIAS) Berlin. It included a Summer School and a Conference with a series of plenary and semi-plenary talks, organized and contributed sessions, and poster sessions. This book comprises the full conference program. It contains, in particular, the scientific program in survey style as well as with all details, and information on the social program, the venue, special meetings, and more

Resource-aware plan recognition in instrumented environments

This thesis addresses the problem of plan recognition in instrumented environments, which is to infer an agent';s plans by observing its behavior. In instrumented environments such observations are made by physical sensors. This introduces specific challenges, of which the following two are considered in this thesis: - Physical sensors often observe state information instead of actions. As classical plan recognition approaches usually can only deal with action observations, this requires a cumbersome and error-prone inference of executed actions from observed states. - Due to limited physical resources of the environment it is often not possible to run all sensors at the same time, thus sensor selection techniques have to be applied. Current plan recognition approaches are not able to support the environment in selecting relevant subsets of sensors. This thesis proposes a two-stage approach to solve the problems described above. Firstly, a DBN-based plan recognition approach is presented which allows for the explicit representation and consideration of state knowledge. Secondly, a POMDP-based utility model for observation sources is presented which can be used with generic utility-based sensor selection algorithms. Further contributions include the presentation of a software toolkit that realizes plan recognition and sensor selection in instrumented environments, and an empirical evaluation of the validity and performance of the proposed models.Diese Arbeit behandelt das Problem der Planerkennung in instrumentierten Umgebungen. Ziel ist dabei das Erschließen der Pläne des Nutzers anhand der Beobachtung seiner Handlungen. In instrumentierten Umgebungen erfolgt diese Beobachtung über physische Sensoren. Dies wirft spezifische Probleme auf, von denen zwei in dieser Arbeit näher betrachtet werden: - Physische Sensoren beobachten in der Regel Zustände anstelle direkter Nutzeraktionen. Klassische Planerkennungsverfahren basieren jedoch auf der Beobachtung von Aktionen, was bisher eine aufwendige und fehlerträchtige Ableitung von Aktionen aus Zustandsbeobachtungen notwendig macht. - Aufgrund beschränkter Resourcen der Umgebung ist es oft nicht möglich alle Sensoren gleichzeitig zu aktivieren. Aktuelle Planerkennungsverfahren bieten keine Möglichkeit, die Umgebung bei der Auswahl einer relevanten Teilmenge von Sensoren zu unterstützen. Diese Arbeit beschreibt einen zweistufigen Ansatz zur Lösung der genannten Probleme. Zunächst wird ein DBN-basiertes Planerkennungsverfahren vorgestellt, das Zustandswissen explizit repräsentiert und in Schlussfolgerungen berücksichtigt. Dieses Verfahren bildet die Basis für ein POMDP-basiertes Nutzenmodell für Beobachtungsquellen, das für den Zweck der Sensorauswahl genutzt werden kann. Des Weiteren wird ein Toolkit zur Realisierung von Planerkennungs- und Sensorauswahlfunktionen vorgestellt sowie die Gültigkeit und Performanz der vorgestellten Modelle in einer empirischen Studie evaluiert

Approaches to mechanism design with boundedly rational agents

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references.This dissertation ties together three papers on mechanism design with boundedly rational agents. These papers explore theoretically whether, and to what extent, limitations on agents' ability to strategically misrepresent their preferences can help a mechanism designer achieve outcomes that she could not achieve with perfectly rational agents. The first chapter investigates whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to logically imply full incentive-compatibility, in a variety of mechanism design settings. This can be motivated by a boundedly rational model in which agents cannot contemplate all possible misrepresentations, but can consider those that are close to their true preferences. This chapter offers a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces, showing that in many commonly studied cases, local incentive-compatibility (suitably defined) implies full incentive-compatibility. The second chapter advances the methodology of looking quantitatively at incentives for strategic behavior, motivated by the premise that agents will be truthful if the incentive to be strategic is small enough. This chapter defines a mechanism's susceptibility to manipulation as the maximum amount of expected utility any agent can ever gain from strategic misrepresntation. This measure of susceptibility is then applied to anonymous voting rules. One set of results estimates the susceptibility of specific voting rules; an important finding is that several voting systems previously identified as resistant to manipulation are actually more susceptible than simple plurality rule, by the measure proposed here. A second set of results gives asymptotic lower bounds on susceptibility for any possible voting rule, under various combinations of efficiency, regularity, and informational conditions. These results illustrate how one can quantitatively explore the tradeoffs between susceptibility and other properties of the voting rule. The third chapter carries the methodology of the second chapter to a market environment: unit-demand, private-value double auction markets. This chapter quantitatively studies the tradeoff between inefficiency and susceptibility to manipulation, among all possible mechanisms for such markets. The main result approximately locates the possibility frontier, pinning it down within a factor that is logarithmic in the size of the market.by Gabriel D. Carroll.Ph.D