Bilateral negotiation of a meeting point in a maze

International audienceNegotiation between agents aims at reaching an agreement in which the conflicting interests of agents are accommodated. In this paper, we present a concrete negotiation scenario where two agents are situated in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where they will meet. Based on their individual preferences (a minimal distance from their location computed from their partial knowledge of the environment), we propose a negotiation protocol which allows agents to submit more than two proposals at the same time and a conciliatory strategy. Formally, we prove that the agreement reached by such a negotiation process is Pareto- optimal and a compromise, i.e. a solution which minimizes the maximum effort for one agent. Moreover, the path between the two agents emerges from the repeated negotiations in our experiments

Bilateral negotiation of a meeting point in a maze: Demonstration

International audienceNegotiation between agents aims at reaching an agreement in which the conflicting interests of agents are accommodated. In this demonstration, we present a concrete negotiation scenario where two agents are situated in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where they will meet. Their individual preferences match with a minimal distance computed from their partial knowledge of the environment. We illustrate a bargaining protocol which allows agents to submit several proposals at the same round and a negotiation strategy which consists in starting from the best deal for the agent and then concedes. The path between the agents emerges from the repeated negotiations

FUTURE TRADE RESEARCH AREAS THAT MATTER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRY POLICYMAKERS

GATT, WTO, NTB

Contract Law and the self-enforcing range of contracts in agriculture.: Private institutions and multilateral reputation mechanisms

The enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange in economic activities. The predominance in agriculture of informal contracts leads in many countries to the implementation of specific legal rules for contract law. This article emphasises the complementarities between public and private ordering when contracts are informal. We analyse the role of private contract-enforcement institution (CEI) as a support for multilateral reputation mechanisms. Our case study is focusing on interprofessional organisations, which are usually analysed as cartels having a negative impact on welfare. We demonstrate that under specific conditions, they can improve contract enforcement and thus efficiency

From Spaghetti Bowl to Jigsaw Puzzle? Addressing the Disarray in the World Trade System

The rise of mega-regionals such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) suggests that the world trade system is fragmenting to the point it appears more like a jigsaw puzzle than a spaghetti bowl. There are both regional and global jigsaw puzzles to be solved—in that order—to clean up the world trade system. But is this even likely? The difficulties of free trade agreement (FTA) consolidation at the regional level are well known, while piecing together the blocs around the world to form a coherent whole is even more challenging. In this context, a way forward is to return to the most widely used modality of trade liberalization—unilateral actions—but this time involving the multilateralization of preferences rather than unreciprocated reductions in tariff rates. As more and more FTAs are negotiated, preference erosion sets in, reducing the resistance of FTA partners to multilateralization. Multilateralization of preferences may then present a practical way forward in addressing the disarray in the world trade system

THE ASSAULT ON AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

International Relations/Trade,

THE DOHA ROUND: COMIN\u27 ALlVE?

May I first pay compliments to the leadership of the Asian Development Bank for hosting this seminar. Asia has a huge stake in the success of the WTO generally, and the Doha Round specifically, but not everyone realizes that. So seminars of this _ nature are terribly important in providing focus to the Doha Round, encouragement to the negotiators, and in building public support for this endeavor. Let\u27s hope we can accomplish those objectives here in Osaka

Developing Countries' Stake in the Doha Round

In this paper we discuss the various aspects of the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the WTO that offer potential benefits for developing countries. We then use the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the major trading countries/regions of the reductions in tariffs, subsidies in agriculture, and barriers in services that may be negotiated in the Doha Round, as well as a variety of regional free trade agreements (FTAs). We estimate that an assumed reduction of post-Uruguay Round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 percent in the Doha Round would increase world welfare by $686.4 billion, with significant gains for all industrialized and developing countries/regions. Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare, but by much less than the Doha multilateral trade round. There would also be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some nonmember countries for the FTAs analyzed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalization are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.WTO, Trade Liberalization

Trade and payments arrangements in post-CMEA Eastern and Central Europe

A web of trade and payments arrangements binds countries of Eastern and Central Europe under the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) agreements. However, it is incompatible with these countries recent commitments to move toward liberalized trade and currency convertibility. The importance of trade with other CMEA members, and the apparent desire of the USSR and others to denominate all future mutual trade at international prices poses a number of problems of transition for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. This paper identifies three broad problems in this connection: (1) the breakdown of the CMEA arrangements has led to a serious breakdown of trade relations and reduced trade volume among former CMEA members; (2) denominating international trade at international prices implies changes in the terms of trade for each country in the system; and (3) all countries may not reach full currency convertibility in the near term, but the continuation of the old CMEA arrangements is also impossible. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possible interim institutional arrangements for trade of payments among previous CMEA members and how such arrangements can contribute to addressing the emerging payments imbalances.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade Policy,Transport and Trade Logistics