702 research outputs found
FlexAuc: Serving Dynamic Demands in a Spectrum Trading Market with Flexible Auction
In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum
holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless
service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to
stimulate more participants and maximize the revenue from the auction. As
buyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction to better
serve their end users.
In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading market consisting
of the SH, the WSPs and the end users. We jointly study the strategies of the
three parties. The SH determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies to
optimize its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms of
both demands and valuations considering the strategies of the end users. We
design FlexAuc, a novel auction mechanism for this market to enable dynamic
supplies and demands in the auction. We prove theoretically that FlexAuc not
only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties such
as truthfulness and computational tractability.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figures, Preliminary version accepted in INFOCOM 201
Strategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets
Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating nature of such auctions, and focus on greedily maximizing social welfare. Such auctions can cause subsets of users to experience starvation in the long run, reducing their incentive to continue participating in the auction. It is desirable to increase the diversity of users allocated spectrum in each auction round, so that a trade-off between social welfare and fairness is maintained. We study truthful mechanisms towards this objective, for both local and global fairness criteria. For local fairness, we introduce randomization into the auction design, such that each user is guaranteed a minimum probability of being assigned spectrum. Computing an optimal, interference-free spectrum allocation is NP-Hard; we present an approximate solution, and tailor a payment scheme to guarantee truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all secondary users. For global fairness, we adopt the classic maxmin fairness criterion. We tailor another auction by applying linear programming techniques for striking the balance between social welfare and max-min fairness, and for finding feasible channel allocations. In particular, a pair of primal and dual linear programs are utilized to guide the probabilistic selection of feasible allocations towards a desired tradeoff in expectation. © 2011 IEEE.published_or_final_versionThe IEEE INFOCOM 2011, Shanghai, China, 10-15 April 2011. In Conference Proceedings, 2011, p. 3020-302
POEM: Pricing Longer for Edge Computing in the Device Cloud
Multiple access mobile edge computing has been proposed as a promising
technology to bring computation services close to end users, by making good use
of edge cloud servers. In mobile device clouds (MDC), idle end devices may act
as edge servers to offer computation services for busy end devices. Most
existing auction based incentive mechanisms in MDC focus on only one round
auction without considering the time correlation. Moreover, although existing
single round auctions can also be used for multiple times, users should trade
with higher bids to get more resources in the cascading rounds of auctions,
then their budgets will run out too early to participate in the next auction,
leading to auction failures and the whole benefit may suffer. In this paper, we
formulate the computation offloading problem as a social welfare optimization
problem with given budgets of mobile devices, and consider pricing longer of
mobile devices. This problem is a multiple-choice multi-dimensional 0-1
knapsack problem, which is a NP-hard problem. We propose an auction framework
named MAFL for long-term benefits that runs a single round resource auction in
each round. Extensive simulation results show that the proposed auction
mechanism outperforms the single round by about 55.6% on the revenue on average
and MAFL outperforms existing double auction by about 68.6% in terms of the
revenue.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure, Accepted by the 18th International Conference on
Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing (ICA3PP
Snipers, Shills, and Sharks eBay and Human Behavior
Every day on eBay, millions of people buy and sell a vast array of goods, from rare collectibles and antiques to used cars and celebrity memorabilia. The internet auction site is remarkably easy to use, which accounts in part for its huge popularity. But how does eBay really work, and how does it compare to other kinds of auctions? These are questions that led Ken Steiglitz--computer scientist, collector of ancient coins, and a regular eBay user--to examine the site through the revealing lens of auction theory. The result is this book, in which Steiglitz shows us how human behaviors in open markets like eBay can be substantially more complex than those predicted by standard economic theory. In these pages we meet the sniper who outbids you in an auction's closing seconds, the early bidder who treats eBay as if it were an old-fashioned outcry auction, the shill who bids in league with the seller to artificially inflate the price--and other characters as well. Steiglitz guides readers through the fascinating history of auctions, how they functioned in the past and how they work today in online venues like eBay. Drawing on cutting-edge economics as well as his own stories from eBay, he reveals practical auction strategies and introduces readers to the fundamentals of auction theory and the mathematics behind eBay. Complete with exercises and a detailed appendix, this book is a must for sophisticated users of online auctions, and essential reading for students seeking an accessible introduction to the study of auction theory.eBay, auctions, auction theory, human behavior, open markets, strategies, English auctions, Vickrey auctions
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